On the 22nd local time, the U.S. Department of Energy announced a historic nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. The two sides signed a nuclear cooperation pact along with a supporting bilateral safeguards agreement. The U.S. has been engaged in military actions against Iran for months, with objectives including dismantling Iran's nuclear program. This raises the question: why does the U.S. employ maximum pressure and obstruction against Iran on nuclear issues while giving Saudi Arabia the green light and opening the door to nuclear cooperation?
Why the U.S. Is Opening the Nuclear Door to Saudi Arabia
The U.S. has made an exception by permitting Saudi Arabia to conduct domestic uranium enrichment activities. Qin Tian, Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, noted that the U.S. has long adhered to a so-called "gold standard" in its foreign nuclear cooperation, which prohibits partner countries from conducting uranium enrichment or reprocessing activities on their own soil. The current exception for Saudi Arabia clearly demonstrates a double standard.
The U.S. holds entirely different perceptions of Saudi and Iranian nuclear activities. Qin Tian explained the first reason: the U.S. views the nature of the nuclear issues with Saudi Arabia and Iran completely differently. It perceives Iran's nuclear ambitions as potentially involving a tendency toward nuclear weapons possession, posing a security threat that must be contained. In contrast, Saudi Arabia's nuclear development is seen as an attempt at peaceful nuclear energy utilization for power generation, which is entirely peaceful, poses no threat to the U.S., and may even be beneficial. Thus, the U.S. approaches these two issues with fundamentally different perspectives.
The ally relationship mitigates U.S. concerns over Saudi uranium enrichment. Qin Tian pointed to a second reason: the U.S. has vastly different relationships with the two nations. The U.S. and Iran have a long-standing adversarial relationship, with the nuclear issue being just one manifestation of their broader conflict. Due to its concerns and hostility, the U.S. would not allow Iran to master advanced nuclear technologies. For an ally like Saudi Arabia, however, the U.S. considers its mastery of uranium industrial and enrichment activities as safe and non-threatening. Assisting Saudi Arabia in developing peaceful nuclear energy technology is even viewed as a duty of an ally.
U.S.-Saudi relations have cooled due to the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict. Qin Tian cited a third factor: the current exception for Saudi Arabia also reflects strategic and geopolitical considerations of the U.S. administration. Following the outbreak of U.S.-Israel-Iran conflicts in late February, U.S.-Saudi relations have somewhat distanced. Saudi Arabia perceives that the U.S.'s military action against Iran has drawn Saudi Arabia into the conflict, resulting in attacks on its territory. This has led to a cooling attitude from Saudi Arabia and a re-evaluation of its alliance with the U.S.
The U.S. is using nuclear cooperation to re-engage Saudi Arabia. Qin Tian stated that in this context, the U.S. administration is leveraging civilian nuclear cooperation to mend ties with Saudi Arabia, aiming to keep a nation of significant importance in international affairs and global energy supply within its alliance system.
Prospects for the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Agreement's Implementation
What subsequent procedures are required for the U.S.-Saudi nuclear energy cooperation agreement? How likely is its smooth implementation? And what impact would its implementation have on the Middle East security landscape?
Current obstacles to the agreement's implementation are limited. Qin Tian expressed overall optimism regarding the implementation of the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement. The primary obstacle lies within U.S. domestic law, as the agreement requires Congressional approval to take effect. However, with the Republican Party controlling both chambers, Congress is unlikely to pose significant resistance to the agreement's passage, though the process may take some time.
The U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal raises concerns in the international community. Qin Tian noted that the main variable affecting implementation is the international response. The U.S. exception for Saudi Arabia, allowing domestic uranium enrichment, has raised concerns among many experts who view it as setting a dangerous precedent for nuclear proliferation that could undermine the long-standing international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Within the international community, one nation holds particularly clear opposition: Israel. Israel pursues a hegemonic policy in the Middle East and seeks to maintain absolute nuclear superiority as the region's sole nuclear-armed state. It would not permit any other country to master the nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear weapons, as evidenced by its years of sabotage, pressure, and military actions against Iran. Israel is certain to be deeply concerned about Saudi Arabia gaining control over its own nuclear fuel cycle and will likely use its lobbying power and political influence in the U.S. to create difficulties for the agreement's implementation.
U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation may provoke a strong reaction from Iran. Qin Tian stated that if the agreement proceeds, it would likely have a negative impact on the Middle East security architecture. One risk is that it could trigger countermeasures from Iran, which might not rule out taking new steps on its nuclear program, potentially even considering intensifying its nuclear research and development efforts.
Regional nations may vie for domestic uranium enrichment rights. Qin Tian added that regional countries are also likely to react to the U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal. In recent years, major Middle Eastern powers like Turkey, the UAE, and Egypt have also been vigorously promoting nuclear energy development, but they strictly adhere to the so-called standard of not conducting domestic uranium enrichment. Now that Saudi Arabia is set to conduct such activities domestically, these countries may seek to follow suit, leading to further erosion of the international nuclear non-proliferation system.
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