In October 2026, Haidilao founder Zhang Yong and his wife Shu Ping stepped down from senior positions at several core domestic entities, including Sichuan Xinpai Catering Management Group and Sichuan Haidilao Catering Co., Ltd.
This wave of departures came as the company faced operational pressure and new offshore trust tax regulations took effect, prompting market speculation about whether Zhang Yong was preparing to exit.
Personnel: Front stage and back stage
According to business registration records, Sichuan Xinpai Catering Management Group recently completed changes in which Zhang Yong stepped down as chairman and Shu Ping stepped down as director.
During the same period, the couple also withdrew from senior management roles at Sichuan Haidilao Catering Co., Ltd., Shanghai Leda Haisheng Enterprise Management Consulting Co., Ltd., and Jianyang Jingyuan Investment Co., Ltd.
Sichuan Xinpai has registered capital of approximately SGD 621 million and is wholly owned by Haidilao's overseas holding entity.
Its business covers catering services, supply chain management, and internet sales, making it a key platform for domestic integrated operations and diversified expansion.
The concentrated handover across four entities within the same time window clearly represents a systematic restructuring of operational responsibilities.
The successor, Tang Lanying, joined Haidilao in October 1998 and started from menial work in the self-service area after graduating from high school.
The following year, when Haidilao was preparing its first Xi'an store, she volunteered and progressed from cashier and clerical roles to management.
After April 2022, Tang Lanying became the legal representative, general manager, and director of Sichuan Haixi Catering Management Co., Ltd., which serves as the core investment and brand incubation platform for the "Red Pomegranate Plan."
Behind sub-brands such as Yanqing BBQ Shop, Flame Official BarBecue, Haini Beef Mala Tang, and Jugao Gao Self-Service Hotpot, Tang Lanying is one of the core operators of this internal entrepreneurship system.
This handover did not happen suddenly.
The legal representative of Sichuan Haidilao has changed three times in the past five years.
It went from Li Haiyan to Xie Ying in October 2021, from Xie Ying to Yuan Huaqiang in February 2025, and now from Yuan Huaqiang to Tang Lanying.
Li Haiyan was an early co-founder, while Xie Ying, Yuan Huaqiang, and Tang Lanying all grew from front-line store positions as internal professional managers.
In other words, the legal representative authority of domestic operating entities has long been systematically transferring from the founding team to a professional manager梯队.
The wave of departures in October only made this long-term trend more visible.
The layout at the listed company level follows the same logic.
When Zhang Yong retook the role of group CEO in January 2026, Gou Yiqun resigned as CEO, Song Qing and Gao Jie resigned as executive directors, and Li Nana, Zhu Yinhua, Jiao Defeng, and Zhu Xuanyi were appointed as executive directors.
These four managers had grown through front-line roles in regional operations, product supply chains, and group strategic support.
The founder returned to the strategic center, a younger generation took over operational execution, and domestic operating entities handed legal positions to core operators within the Red Pomegranate system.
These three layers form a clear path of "strategy centralized upward, operations delegated downward."
Another factor that should not be overlooked is that Zhang Yong is a Singapore citizen.
Foreign nationals serving long-term as legal representatives of domestic operating entities add procedural complexity in business registration and compliance filings.
Handing domestic legal positions to Chinese professional managers is itself a routine governance compliance arrangement.
It should be noted that this motivation is reasonable speculation, and all information should be subject to official disclosures from Haidilao.
Trusts: Coincidence or inevitability?
Almost within the same time window, three lines converged: personnel departures, capital reductions, and new trust tax rules.
On July 24, 2026, the Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation Administration issued the "Announcement on Matters Concerning Individual Income Tax on Offshore Trusts" (2026 No. 21), systematically establishing individual income tax rules for offshore trusts across establishment, existence, and termination liquidation.
The general tax rate is 20%, with a 90-day transition period ending October 22, during which supplementary filings could avoid late fees.
The core of the rule is that no matter how many layers of BVI or Cayman shell companies a trust nests, it is treated as transparent for tax purposes and pierced through to the underlying resident individual.
Income during the trust's existence is included in annual individual income whether or not it is actually distributed.
The shareholding structure of Zhang Yong and Shu Ping is a typical target of this rule.
According to Haidilao's financial reports, the couple established a two-layer offshore trust before the 2018 listing.
Zhang Yong's Apple Trust and Shu Ping's Rose Trust indirectly hold Haidilao equity through BVI companies, with UBS Trustees serving as trustee.
However, market estimates suggest that Haidilao's cumulative dividends since listing have been substantial.
With the couple holding about 50%, the trust accounts would have received significant amounts, implying a considerable potential tax burden at the 20% rate.
Combined with taxes on share reduction proceeds, market estimates are not low.
Against this background, on September 8, 2026, Shu Ping's SP NP Ltd. sold 259 million shares at HK$10.62 per share in a block trade, cashing out approximately HK$2.75 billion at a discount of about 6.7% to the previous day's closing price.
Then on October 12, Haidilao announced a loan to Zhang Yong with a principal cap equivalent to RMB 100 million, with a term of only 30 days, an interest rate of 1-month HIBOR plus 60 basis points, unsecured, and limited to personal financial arrangements.
It must be emphasized that claims that the share reduction was used to pay taxes or that the loan is related to the share sale proceeds are market speculation and have not been confirmed by official announcements.
All information should be subject to official disclosures from Haidilao or relevant government departments.
But even without drawing causal conclusions, these actions at least reveal one fact: when offshore trust tax transparency truly takes effect, there will be a previously underpriced linkage between the founding family's personal cash flow management and the listed company's governance transparency.
Performance: Core brand under pressure, secondary lines breaking through
Returning to Haidilao's operating fundamentals, a breakdown of its 2026 interim report shows clear divergence across business lines.
In the first half of 2026, revenue was RMB 22.337 billion, up 7.9% year on year.
Core operating profit was RMB 2.513 billion, up 4.4%.
Profit for the period was RMB 1.764 billion, up 0.5%.
Net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 1.767 billion, up 0.47%.
Profit growth was significantly lower than revenue growth.
The core operating margin fell from about 11.6% a year earlier to 11.25%.
Raw materials and consumables as a share of revenue rose 1.8 percentage points to 41.6%, partly due to a higher proportion of low-margin businesses and partly due to proactive concessions to consumers.
The core brand and incremental businesses moved in clearly opposite directions.
Haidilao restaurant operating revenue was RMB 17.837 billion, down 4.0% year on year.
The number of self-operated restaurants fell from 1,322 at the end of June 2025 to 1,290, a net decrease of 32.
Table turnover rate was 3.9 times per day, up only 0.1 times year on year.
Average spending per customer was RMB 97.0, down 0.9%.
Same-store sales fell 1.3% year on year.
The core brand has shifted from a growth engine to a stable base.
Delivery revenue was RMB 2.051 billion, up 121.2%, with its share rising from 4.5% to 9.2%, driven mainly by single-person "rice with dishes" products and the self-built delivery station model.
Other restaurant operating revenue was RMB 1.271 billion, up 113.1%, with its share rising to 5.7%, from multiple brands under the "Red Pomegranate Plan" and scenarios such as camping hotpot and late-night hotpot.
As of the end of June 2026, the group operated 21 other catering brands with 183 restaurants in total.
Food stall hotpot and sushi formats have entered the stage of scaled replication.
This data also answers the earlier question of why Tang Lanying took over.
As the core brand enters a phase of stock optimization, new brand incubation and refined operations become the core capabilities for the next stage.
Having the core operator of the Red Pomegranate system lead the domestic operating entity is a pragmatic arrangement to tilt organizational resources toward new growth curves.
The future: Three unavoidable questions
As of 10:38 on October 23, 2026, Haidilao shares were at HK$9.17, up slightly 0.55%.
This price is not only far from the HK$13.39 at which founder Zhang Yong increased his stake in May, but also below the HK$10.62 block trade price of the family trust in September, and is approaching the 52-week low of HK$8.925.
Since its 2018 listing, Haidilao has gone through a complete cycle: high table turnover driving growth, countercyclical expansion leading to a first loss, store closures promoting recovery, and weakening momentum creating renewed pressure.
Behind this sharp volatility, how much room for trial and error does the capital market still leave Haidilao?
The most direct test is the core base.
In the first half of 2026, same-store sales of the core brand remained negative.
The slight improvement in table turnover was offset by small declines in average spending and party size.
Management signaled a recovery in table turnover in July and August and faster store openings in 2027, but the long-term proposition for the core brand is no longer about opening more stores.
It is about pulling same-store sales back to positive growth within the existing network.
This is the bottom line Haidilao must defend.
Delivery and other restaurant revenue growth is impressive, but rising delivery platform fees have pushed up the share of "other expenses," and the expansion of low-margin businesses is diluting overall gross margin.
Shifting the "Red Pomegranate Plan" from broad expansion to focused replication is wise, but whether food stall hotpot, sushi, and other formats can translate into profitable scaled revenue in 2027 still needs time to verify.
More subtle and more decisive than the business side is the tension between the founding family's capital actions and the listed company's governance.
Haidilao's RMB 100 million short-term loan to Zhang Yong was fully compliant procedurally, and Zhang Yong recused himself from voting as required.
But what the market really cares about is not the RMB 100 million amount.
It is whether the boundary between personal financial arrangements and company funds is sufficiently clear when the founder simultaneously serves as controlling shareholder, CEO, and borrower.
Shu Ping's share reduction was characterized as a "shareholder's private matter," but combined with the departures and the loan, it objectively amplifies external scrutiny of governance transparency.
Zhang Yong retreating to the strategic backstage and operational responsibilities being delegated downward is an inevitable path for Haidilao as it moves from a "founder company" to a "platform organization."
But whether this transformation can succeed ultimately depends on whether Haidilao can rebuild a sustained and stable growth engine during its organizational transition.
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