The recent rumor about China Vanke's top executives returning their salaries has once again put the embattled property developer under the spotlight. Although Vanke quickly denied claims regarding "refunding four years of salaries" and "Yu Liang selling his house," the speculation serves as a mirror reflecting the real challenges facing the former industry leader—billions in losses, major management reshuffles, and mounting debt pressure. This also signals a heavy full stop to the golden era of real estate for this benchmark company.
Regardless of the rumor's validity, Vanke's current operational state is lamentable. Public data shows that in 2024, Vanke recorded its first net loss since listing 31 years ago, with a staggering net loss attributable to shareholders of 49.478 billion yuan. By 2025, the loss had further expanded to 82 billion yuan, setting a new record for annual losses among A-share real estate companies. Over two years, cumulative losses exceeded 131.4 billion yuan, a figure larger than the company's current total market capitalization. While the number 1314 is a homophone for "forever" in Chinese slang, no one welcomes such financial losses.
Salary data more directly illustrates Vanke's contraction and distress. According to Vanke's 2024 annual report, compensation for core executives was significantly reduced: former board chairman Yu Liang received an annual salary of 336,000 yuan, former president Zhu Jiushou earned 329,000 yuan, and employee representative director Wang Yun topped the list at 1.056 million yuan. Executives like CFO Han Huihua received around 1 million yuan, while independent directors were uniformly paid 600,000 yuan. After the management reshuffle in 2025, the salary cap policy continued, with core managers earning approximately 10,000 yuan per month, resulting in annual pre-tax compensation between 300,000 and 1 million yuan—far below the high salaries during Vanke's peak years. Former chairman Wang Shi once mentioned in an interview that, as Vanke's lifelong honorary chairman, he received an annual pension and related benefits totaling about 10 million yuan, sufficient for daily expenses.
Even with sharply reduced executive pay, market and investor skepticism persists. When the gross profit margin of the core real estate business falls to 2.0%, cash flow nears depletion, short-term debt exceeds 150 billion yuan, and monetary funds are just over 60 billion yuan, the "salary return" appears more symbolic than substantive, unable to mask the fundamental pressures the company faces.
More critical than salary cuts is the severe instability within Vanke's management. In January 2025, Yu Liang resigned as board chairman, with core executives like Zhu Jiushou and Zhu Xu stepping down simultaneously. Shenzhen Metro Group Chairman Xin Jie took over. By January 2026, Yu Liang retired upon reaching the age limit, completely exiting Vanke. As of March 2026, over 25 core executives had left the company, with nine under investigation or involved in legal cases. Former president Zhu Jiushou was subjected to criminal compulsory measures in October 2025 for alleged involvement in off-balance-sheet financial platform operations. The conclusion of the Yu Liang era marks the end of a complete developmental cycle for Vanke.
The "Vanke salary return" may only be a rumor, but it highlights billion-yuan losses, management turmoil, and deep-seated industry transformations, signaling the end of an era.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that there are no truly sunset industries, only outdated business models. No industry disappears entirely; instead, it reemerges with new formats, structures, and logic. Even for a former leader like Vanke, the conclusion of its old development model amid changing tides does not mean the end of the industry. The close of an era essentially marks the exit of old models and the collapse of old orders, while also heralding the birth of a new industry landscape and the beginning of fresh developmental paths.
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