Hallo has taken control of Yian Insurance Brokerage for the second time.
A piece of insurance brokerage license that was returned by the same buyer four years ago has recently been taken back once more.
Recently, Shanghai Junfeng, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hello Inc., completed the full acquisition of Yian Insurance Brokerage, with the original shareholders exiting and the industrial and commercial changes officially taking effect. This is not actually Hello's first acquisition. As early as May 2022, Hello gained full control of Yian Insurance Brokerage through its subsidiary Shanghai Junfeng. However, just five months later, in November of the same year, Shanghai Junfeng suddenly withdrew.
Now, with this second acquisition, the transferee is still Hello. The same license, the same buyer, a second handshake, exactly four years apart.
In reality, Yian Insurance Brokerage itself is not a particularly attractive target. Established in 2004 with a registered capital of 50 million yuan, it was originally an institution under the FAW Group. After the FAW shareholders exited in batches in 2017 and 2019, it became fully market-oriented, but its operational performance continued to decline. Data from the "China Insurance Yearbook 2025" shows that in 2024, Yian Insurance Brokerage's operating revenue was only 30,000 yuan, with a net loss of 2.22 million yuan. It had only 5 employees, making it nearly a shell company.
Why did Hello return in 2026 to buy the same insurance brokerage license after withdrawing in 2022? What changes occurred in the insurance intermediary industry's landscape during this entry and exit?
Contrasting Approaches in Two Moves: From Testing the Waters to Strategic Holding
Hello's two acquisitions of Yian Insurance Brokerage involve the same action but stem from fundamentally different contexts, occurring in almost entirely separate regulatory and industry cycles.
During its first acquisition in 2022, China's internet insurance sector was in a critical period of specialized rectification, with post-facto regulatory reporting required for equity changes in platform financial holdings. At that time, Hello's positioning for its insurance brokerage business was not yet clear. Its "Anxin Ride" cycling protection product had not been launched on a large scale, and its insurance operations relied primarily on third-party partnerships. These were embedded within cycling orders in its app as "value-added service add-ons," with the platform acting as a traffic entry point. Hello's external characterization at the time was that this "did not constitute its own insurance sales activities."
Subsequently, Hello held shares in Yian Insurance Brokerage for less than half a year before exiting. The market widely speculated this was related to regulatory feedback on the qualifications for the equity change. It is worth noting that around 2022, several internet platforms acquiring financial licenses experienced similar situations of "brief entry followed by exit," with core sticking points often being shareholder suitability, business isolation mechanisms, and other compliance requirements.
Now, with this second acquisition in 2026, the market environment is completely different. On one hand, the regulatory framework of the National Financial Regulatory Administration has stabilized. After four years of developing its financial business, Hello's compliance structure and shareholder qualifications have become relatively mature. The smooth completion of this change is equivalent to an implicit validation by regulators of Hello's capability to hold a financial license.
On the other hand, although Hello briefly exited Yian Insurance Brokerage previously, the two parties have maintained a foundation for business cooperation, such as with the "Anxin Ride" product, meaning the business transition is not starting from zero. Currently, Hello's "Anxin Ride" already covers 2.32 million users, and its app features an insurance section covering categories like accident insurance and medical insurance.
Therefore, this acquisition is equivalent to Hello replacing its previous third-party cooperation entity with its own licensed institution. The transition cost is far lower than reapplying for a license or acquiring an unfamiliar target. Moreover, Yian Insurance Brokerage has no historical debt or violation records, making it a typical "clean license" in the intermediary market.
Regarding this second entry, Hello has also provided a clear statement: "Based on diversified business layout, to further solidify the compliance framework for the insurance brokerage business license."
A more pressing driver may come from impending regulatory rules. The "Measures for the Administration of Online Marketing of Financial Products" officially takes effect on September 30, 2026. It explicitly states that institutions without an insurance intermediary license may not intervene in core insurance sales processes, including product recommendation, premium calculation, and policy application operations; they can only display products and set up redirects.
This means that Hello's previous model of "third-party add-on insurance"—where users select protection while cycling, and the platform coordinates with an insurer in the background—is no longer viable. This model has always existed in a gray regulatory area. After the new rules take effect, unlicensed platforms will directly face certain risks. Especially given the reality that "Anxin Ride" has repeatedly triggered customer complaints due to "pre-selected checkboxes," Hello's acquisition of an insurance brokerage license appears even more urgent, shifting from a "strategic layout" to a "compliance necessity."
Industry insiders also acknowledge that in the past, relying on third-party partnerships for travel insurance harbored risks of unclear business boundaries and processes outside of autonomous control. Obtaining its own license can largely mitigate these regulatory risks.
The Real Intent Behind the Second Entry: Compliance and Closing the Loop
Examining the contrast between the two entries, the motivation for Hello's return this time goes far beyond the vague notion of "improving the ecosystem." It can be broken down into three more concrete considerations.
The first layer is compliance and risk mitigation. The September 30 deadline is fast approaching. Within Hello's mobility scenarios, insurance is an unavoidable ancillary service: accident insurance for bicycles and e-bikes, supplementary compulsory traffic insurance for ride-sharing and taxi services, theft insurance and third-party liability insurance for electric vehicles—all previously relied on partnerships with third-party brokerage firms.
Under such arrangements, product customization authority, risk control data, and claims processes were not in Hello's hands. In the event of complaints, it was difficult to completely separate primary responsibility. With this license acquisition, Hello can now bring all these aspects under its own system.
The second layer is the actuarial conversion of scenario data. Hello's core scenario is high-frequency two-wheeled travel: the daily order volume for bicycles, e-bikes, and electric vehicles far exceeds that of four-wheeled travel. While the per-transaction value is low, the touchpoint density is extremely high, corresponding to very granular risk data and naturally carrying fragmented risk exposures.
According to disclosures by National People's Congress representative Chen Da during the 2026 Two Sessions, a shared bicycle operating company self-reported approximately 700 "sudden stop" injury accidents in 2025, with injuries like fractures and ligament tears occurring frequently. Taking Shanghai as an example, the Shanghai Consumer Council handled 7,197 complaints related to shared bicycles in 2025, a year-on-year increase of 74.5%.
It is evident that the insurance needs corresponding to these risk scenarios are high-frequency and fragmented. However, relying on third-party partnerships previously meant Hello had no control over protection product customization, risk control data analysis, or claims processes. For instance, data on accident rates for specific routes, fall probabilities for certain age groups, or risk coefficients for riding in the rain could only be provided by Hello to partner insurers for reference.
But with its own brokerage license, Hello can collaborate with insurance companies to develop dynamically priced products based on per-use, daily, or mileage-based fees. It can transform travel data like riding frequency, route, and time period into actuarial factors. This can both lower loss ratios and offer users cheaper products. More importantly, pricing for such fragmented risks is precisely what traditional insurers struggle with, representing the core differentiated space for Hello post-licensing.
The third layer is the intermediate zone for traffic monetization. Hello boasts over 800 million registered users, making financial monetization an unavoidable proposition.
Among paths for deepening financial services, compared to the regulatory pressure, credit risk, and high bad debt rates faced by credit businesses, and the low ceiling for advertising monetization, insurance brokerage is a light-asset, low-risk intermediary service. Commission income is sustainable, compliance pressure is relatively controllable, and user acceptance is higher.
Therefore, this brokerage license enables Hello to embed insurance services into core businesses like cycling and ride-sharing. It can progress from a few cents of accident insurance per ride to gradually permeate users' sports accident insurance, home property insurance, and commuter accident insurance. This is a classic path for converting high-frequency, low-value traffic into long-term customer revenue, offering a much larger profit margin than simply selling cycling insurance. It is also a key step in Hello's transformation into a comprehensive local life service platform.
Three Licenses, Three Views on Assets
Hello is not the first shared mobility player to obtain an insurance intermediary license, and certainly won't be the last. Comparing Didi, Meituan, and Hello, even though all three are entering the insurance intermediary space, their approaches differ from the start in terms of asset weight, scenario DNA, and conversion logic. The "synergy of gathering in the same track" is not the primary factor; rather, it's more about each addressing their own shortcomings.
Didi's approach is the heaviest among the three. In 2016, it obtained an insurance agency license by acquiring a controlling stake in Zhong'an Fengshang (Beijing). In 2020, it further took a 32% stake in Modern Property & Casualty Insurance, forming a dual-drive model of "intermediary distribution + shareholding in an insurer," touching both the sales and underwriting ends.
The logic of this model lies in Didi's main operational scenario being four-wheeled ride-hailing. The service duration is longer, safety perception is stronger, and the average per-order value is higher, making it a natural funnel for insurance conversion. In 2025, a majority of the incremental premiums in Modern Property & Casualty Insurance's 1.137 billion yuan in premiums came from order synergies and traffic diversion from Didi, essentially internalizing the risks of the mobility business into its own insurance company.
Meituan's path is the lightest. It obtained the Jinchenghunuo Insurance Brokerage license in 2018, focusing purely on brokerage functions without holding stakes in any insurance companies, only handling the sales end and back-end matching. In March of this year, the appointment qualification for Pan Xing as the Executive Director and General Manager of Jinchenghunuo was officially approved, marking a significant move by Meituan in its insurance business segment.
In fact, after acquiring this valuable insurance brokerage license, Meituan has been able to seamlessly embed protection into hundreds of specific consumption scenarios, ranging from food delivery and hotel bookings to travel and entertainment.
Meituan's scenario DNA is local life + flexible employment. Its core products are accident insurance for delivery riders, food safety insurance for merchants, and the user-side "On-Time Guarantee." Public data shows that the "On-Time Guarantee" alone has provided compensation for over 60 million delayed orders, with cumulative claim payments reaching 280 million yuan. Meanwhile, the "Meituan Business Protection" for merchants covers over 300,000 small and micro businesses.
Currently, Meituan continues to increase its focus on inclusive protection for flexible employment, with its insurance brokerage business expanding significantly. The essence is providing risk-matching for both the supply and demand sides of the local life ecosystem, without touching underwriting, only earning channel and service fees.
Hello's path lies between the two. It involves a pure brokerage license to complete its own licensed entity, without venturing into equity investments in insurance companies.
Hello's scenario DNA is a mix of high-frequency two-wheeled travel and ride-sharing/taxi services. The per-transaction value is lower than Didi's, but the touchpoint density is higher than Meituan's, with a massive user base. Its advantage lies in the operational space of "accumulating small premiums into large ones."
Didi's insurance conversion goes from "taking a car" to "car insurance/accident insurance." Meituan's conversion goes from "ordering food" to "rider insurance/merchant insurance." Hello's conversion can jump from "riding a bike" to "sports accident/home property/commuter" all-scenario personal protection, with a potentially longer user lifecycle.
However, Hello's operational difficulty is also higher. After all, the premium for a single ride is only a few cents. Converting tens of millions of cycling users into long-term insurance users paying hundreds of yuan annually requires far more complex operational capabilities than the other two.
The similarities among the three shared mobility giants in entering the insurance intermediary track are also clear: they all use licenses as a compliance entry ticket, they all embed insurance into their own scenarios for deeper traffic monetization, and none treat insurance as an independent business line but rather as a complement and supplement to their main operations.
But it is the differences that determine their respective growth boundaries. Didi has the heaviest assets, with larger profit potential. After integrating underwriting and distribution within its own system, it can complete the closed loop from sales to claims. However, heavy assets mean higher capital occupation and solvency regulatory pressure.
Meituan has the lightest assets, focusing on intermediary matching with high flexibility. But its commission space is constrained by the "Premium and Commission Integration" policy which caps handling fees.
Hello sits between the two. The risk density and per-transaction value of its two-wheeled scenarios may not match Didi's, but the frequency of touchpoints far exceeds the other two. The granularity of data generated from a user riding twice a day is incomparable to four-wheeled travel.
The Gathering of Three Giants Coincides with the Sector's "Coldest" Period
Interpreting the gathering of the three giants as a sign of the insurance intermediary sector heating up might be exactly the opposite. Over the past two years, regulatory intensity in the insurance intermediary industry has visibly tightened, with the market undergoing a deep reshuffle driven by multiple regulatory measures.
First, the "Premium and Commission Integration" policy has been fully implemented. Starting with auto and life insurance in 2023, it expanded to non-auto insurance in October 2025, setting unified upper limits for intermediary commission rates and prohibiting off-book rebates. The financial models of small and medium-sized intermediaries that previously survived on "high rebates + channel fees" directly collapsed. Industry estimates suggest non-auto intermediary revenues fell by an average of over 30%.
Second, the "Clearing Inefficient Entities and Improving Quality" action has been continuously advancing. From 2024 to 2025, nationwide efforts cumulatively revoked or canceled 3 insurance intermediary groups, 57 professional intermediary legal entities, 3,730 branches, and 226 concurrent agents. In the first half of 2026, another 132 intermediary licenses were revoked. A large number of shell,违规, and non-operational licensed entities were cleared from the market. The number of professional insurance intermediary legal entities has declined for six consecutive years.
Furthermore, with the new online marketing rules taking effect on September 30, unlicensed platforms can only display and redirect, effectively blocking the path that internet platforms have used in recent years for "unlicensed insurance traffic diversion."
Under these circumstances, the pricing of insurance intermediary licenses has now become extremely polarized.
On one hand, the market price for licenses is collapsing. For example, the 100% equity of "Kaxing Tianxia Insurance Brokerage" held by logistics platform Kaxing Tianxia had an initial listing price of 50 million yuan. After ten auctions, it ultimately sold for only 71,000 yuan. PICC Life listed the 100% equity of its joint venture insurance sales intermediary, Sino-American International, for a base price of just 1 yuan. The acquirer would need to assume over 20 million yuan in debt, yet there were no takers. The 100% equity of China Telecom's subsidiary Zhongtong Yangguang Insurance Brokerage had an initial listing price of 137 million yuan. After four price reductions to 96.06 million yuan, it still failed to sell.
On the other hand, "clean licenses" with no debt, no lawsuits, and no violation records remain stable in the price range of 15-25 million yuan, showing almost no decline.
This polarization highlights that the market is not rejecting insurance intermediary licenses per se. Instead, it rejects "shell speculation licenses" and only recognizes "clean licenses capable of connecting to real business and generating commissions." Industry insiders point out that the irrational premium for insurance intermediary licenses is returning to reasonable levels. Valuation now centers on real cash flow and sustainable operational capability. The market is no longer paying for an "entry ticket" but pricing based on profitability. The era of "license arbitrage" has ended.
It is precisely against this backdrop that Hello's "second return" takes on a different interpretive dimension. The period of clearing out shell insurance intermediaries is precisely the optimal window for scenario-based players to enter—as speculative capital exits, platforms with real business and the ability to generate their own cash flow take over. The gathering of the three giants is not proof of the sector heating up, but rather a footnote to the insurance intermediary industry's shift from "license-driven external expansion" to "real operational capability-driven internal growth."
For the insurance intermediary industry, the real variable brought by the three giants is not simply adding three licensed entities. It lies in forcing the entire industry chain to change its mindset. Traditional intermediaries relying on mass manpower tactics and channel fee models are accelerating their exit under the dual pressures of "Premium and Commission Integration" and "Clearing Inefficient Entities." Embedded scenario intermediaries, leveraging real risk scenarios, proprietary data capabilities, and user reach efficiency, are beginning to rise strongly.
Of course, obtaining a license is just a starting point. For Hello, challenges lie ahead: rebuilding teams involving the introduction and磨合 of professional talent in actuarial, underwriting, and claims; deep integration of mid-platform systems with the app; co-development of scenario-based insurance products; and building a claims service system. Each of these tasks is complex, presenting a test of management's operational wisdom and strategic resolve.
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