On December 25, 2025, a core component company within the ZEEKR system under Geely Holding Group, Wever Electric Vehicle Technology (Ningbo) Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Wever Electric"), formally sued Sunwoda Power Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Sunwoda Power"), a subsidiary of power battery supplier Sunwoda, claiming losses of 2.314 billion yuan, plus related interest, appraisal fees, and attorney costs.
ZEEKR had just completed its privatization and delisting from the U.S. stock market on December 22, 2025. Merely three days later, on December 25, Wever Electric swiftly initiated this lawsuit.
It is noteworthy that ZEEKR's entire journey from its U.S. listing to its quiet delisting spanned only 19 months, leaving Geely with a substantial paper loss of at least 3.5 billion yuan. Following the finalization of the delisting, ZEEKR immediately launched a high-value claim against one of its former key power battery suppliers.
The timing raises significant questions: is this "sue immediately after delisting" a legitimate supplier quality claim by ZEEKR, or a strategic maneuver by major shareholder Geely to avoid U.S. regulatory scrutiny and reduce privatization costs? The numerous questions behind this major commercial dispute warrant close attention.
Question 1: Why Was No Lawsuit Filed During the 3-Year Period from When Battery Issues Emerged to the Official Claim? Information shows that the plaintiff, Wever Electric, was established on June 23, 2017, with a registered capital of 122 million yuan. It was transferred under ZEEKR in 2021 and is currently owned by ZEEKR Auto (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. (51%) and Geely Auto Group Co., Ltd. (49%).
Currently, Wever Electric's main business is the R&D and manufacturing of new energy three-electric systems, providing core components like batteries, motors, and electronic controls. It is deeply integrated into ZEEKR's supply chain and is a key subsidiary within the ZEEKR auto system. Therefore, this lawsuit essentially represents ZEEKR holding a core supplier accountable.
In its complaint, Wever Electric stated that the claim is based on quality issues with power battery cells delivered by Sunwoda Power between June 2021 and December 2023, which allegedly caused massive losses. In addition to the 2.314 billion yuan principal, Wever is demanding that Sunwoda Power pay interest calculated from the filing date based on the LPR, and cover all litigation costs including appraisal and attorney fees.
The relationship between Wever Electric and Sunwoda began in April 2021, when Sunwoda Power received a letter of intent from Wever for the development of power battery cells for its PMA platform, which supports core Geely brands like ZEEKR, smart, Volvo, and Geometry. In October 2021, the ZEEKR 001 began deliveries, with initial models equipped with Sunwoda cells.
Based on industry information and owner feedback, the cells in question were primarily used in the ZEEKR 001 WE86 model. In 2022, annual sales of the ZEEKR 001 exceeded 70,000 units, with the dual-motor, four-wheel-drive WE86 version accounting for over 60% of sales. It was also in this year that related user complaints began surfacing regarding slower charging speeds and exaggerated range claims.
Throughout 2023, an increasing number of ZEEKR 001 WE86 owners reported on social media that charging speeds had significantly slowed, the actual range fell far short of advertised figures, and some vehicles exhibited "power locking" where the system restricted battery charging capacity and power.
By the end of 2023, Wever Electric began reducing its purchases from Sunwoda, shifting towards products from CATL and Geely's own battery companies.
In February 2024, the new ZEEKR 001 model was released, having completely removed Sunwoda cells in favor of batteries from "Times Geely," a joint venture between CATL and Geely.
In October 2024, some ZEEKR 001 owners received notifications from 4S stores indicating that Sunwoda cells posed a fire risk and required battery pack replacements. However, instead of a direct recall, ZEEKR opted for an OTA update that "locked" the battery capacity and reduced charging power to mitigate combustion risks, which subsequently triggered collective complaints from owners.
Also in October, several owners filed complaints on the website chezhi.com, reporting issues like powertrain failure and sudden power drops.
On December 1, 2024, ZEEKR officially issued a "Winter Care Program" notice, acknowledging that some long-range ZEEKR 001 WE86 vehicles experienced slower charging speeds and abnormal battery capacity degradation, and announced free battery pack replacements along with a full inspection campaign.
Given this timeline, if the batteries indeed had serious defects and safety hazards, why weren't these issues resolved during the supply period in 2022 and 2023? Furthermore, why was no lawsuit filed when problems escalated in 2023 and 2024? The extended timeframe of the issues and the highly sensitive timing of the lawsuit inevitably raise doubts.
Question 2: Why Did Geely Rush the Privatization and Delisting of ZEEKR After Only 19 Months on the US Market, Despite a 3.5 Billion Yuan Loss? From its listing in May 2024 to its delisting in December 2025, ZEEKR's tenure on the U.S. stock market lasted a mere 19 months. Regarding this unusually rapid "flash delisting," Geely stated it was part of implementing the strategy outlined in its "Taizhou Declaration" released in September 2024.
However, given the magnitude of Geely's losses, this explanation has not fully alleviated market concerns.
In May 2024, ZEEKR listed on the NYSE with an IPO price of $21 per share. The total nominal fundraising amount was 3.62 billion yuan, of which 61.4% (approximately 1.9 billion yuan) was underwritten by the Geely Group itself, constituting an internal capital rotation rather than genuine external financing. After deducting direct listing costs of 179 million yuan for underwriting fees and legal expenses, ZEEKR's actual net external funds raised from the IPO were approximately 1.496 billion yuan.
During the delisting process, to repurchase the remaining 34.3% of ZEEKR's publicly traded shares, Geely offered a total privatization consideration of $2.4 billion (approximately 17.2 billion yuan). Although a "cash + stock swap" combination was used, with 70.8% of shareholders opting for the stock swap, 29.2% still chose cash, resulting in a direct cash outlay for Geely of about 5 billion yuan.
Based on the above, the direct losses incurred by ZEEKR from listing to delisting are estimated at 3.5 billion yuan. In fact, for Geely, beyond these direct cash losses, there was also an impact from the change in ZEEKR's equity value.
Prior to the IPO, Geely held a 65.7% stake in ZEEKR. At the time of listing, ZEEKR's market capitalization was approximately $6.9 billion, corresponding to an equity value for Geely's stake of about $4.53 billion (32.16 billion yuan). Post-privatization, Geely holds a 100% stake, with a total value of approximately $2.4 billion (17.2 billion yuan), representing a devaluation of about 14.96 billion yuan compared to the listing date, not even considering the hidden costs Geely incurred for the stock swap.
In contrast to these losses, if ZEEKR ultimately wins this lawsuit, it stands to gain significant benefits financially and operationally.
Financially, the 2.314 billion yuan compensation would exceed ZEEKR's net loss of 1.915 billion yuan for the first three quarters of 2025. Receiving this amount would directly improve ZEEKR's net profit, cash flow, and debt ratio.
Furthermore, a successful verdict would establish that quality responsibility lies with the supplier, not ZEEKR itself, helping to repair brand reputation damaged by the battery issues.
Strategically, this lawsuit could trigger industry-wide trust concerns regarding second-tier battery manufacturers. As automakers generally lean towards a "CATL primary supply + second-tier backup supply" model in 2026 sourcing negotiations, ZEEKR, as the first automaker to pursue accountability, could potentially gain more favorable bargaining power and cooperation terms in its supply chain negotiations.
Question 3: Were ZEEKR's Former Shareholders Deliberately Kept in the Dark About Material Information Under Strict US Regulatory Scrutiny? ZEEKR's decision to file the lawsuit immediately after delisting inevitably draws attention to the constraints of U.S. information disclosure rules.
It is understood that U.S. stock markets impose extremely stringent disclosure requirements on listed companies, particularly for material events that could affect financial conditions or stock prices, such as major litigation, supply chain quality issues, and potential massive losses. These require timely, accurate, and complete disclosure; failure to do so can lead to severe consequences like SEC investigations and investor class-action lawsuits.
Considering the battery quality issues central to this lawsuit, ZEEKR had already identified related problems and initiated a free battery replacement service campaign back in 2024, while it was still listed in the U.S. Had ZEEKR filed a massive lawsuit during its listing period, U.S. rules would have mandated prompt disclosure of the lawsuit's details, including the cause, claimed amount, and potential financial impact on the company.
In contrast, after delisting, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Geely, ZEEKR is no longer bound by U.S. disclosure rules. The decision to initiate litigation becomes more flexible, without the concern of its impact on the stock price.
From another perspective, a successful outcome for the 2.3 billion yuan claim would benefit ZEEKR across multiple fronts—performance, funding, reputation, and cooperation with top-tier suppliers—and would undoubtedly boost the company's share price, thereby increasing the cost of Geely's privatization.
This sequential timing allows ZEEKR to avoid the compliance pressure and market value volatility risks associated with disclosing negative information during its listing period, while enabling it to concentrate on pursuing accountability after privatization is complete, objectively suggesting the possibility of strategic timing.
Notably, as early as April 2025, Geely had divested from its joint venture with Sunwoda, "Shandong Geely Sunwoda," reducing its stake from 70% to 0%. This indicates that, months before initiating the lawsuit, Geely had already severed its financial ties with Sunwoda.
From reducing and ultimately ceasing purchases from Sunwoda starting late 2023, to divesting from the joint venture in April 2025, to completing the privatization and delisting in December 2025, followed by the formal lawsuit just three days later, everything appears to have proceeded methodically.
Whether Geely deliberately timed its actions regarding the lawsuit against Sunwoda is a question for which only Geely itself can provide the true answer.
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