Goldman Sachs Cuts Gold Price Targets: Bull Market Logic Not Over, but the Fed Has Changed the Rules

Deep News11-06

Goldman Sachs analysts Lina Thomas and Daan Struyven, in their November 5 report titled "Precious Metals Analyst Report: Long-Term Bullish on Gold, but Not Now," lowered their end-2026 gold price forecast from $4,650 per ounce to $4,150, and their end-2027 target from $5,400 to $4,800.

For a bank that has long supported a structural bull market in gold, this is a meaningful adjustment. But Goldman Sachs still expects central banks to continue buying gold heavily, concerns over foreign exchange reserve security to persist, and eventual declines in U.S. interest rates to provide support for gold prices.

Stephen Innes, a macro market strategist and foreign exchange and commodities expert in the international financial community, interpreted the report as saying that what has truly changed is the driving force structure behind gold's rally: central banks are still increasing their gold holdings, but the Federal Reserve's tight monetary policy is weakening private investors' willingness to buy, especially speculative funds that rely on leverage and options trading. The change taking place in the gold market is that central banks may still be buying, but leveraged funds are no longer willing to follow them at any cost.

Fed hawkish expectations suppress speculative capital, gold's rally logic shifts

This round of Goldman Sachs forecast cuts mainly stems from a reassessment of the Fed's future monetary policy path. Goldman Sachs economists still expect the Fed to raise rates in December 2026. Thomas and Struyven believe that further monetary tightening will curb investors' willingness to buy gold as a hedge against currency depreciation risk.

For investors accustomed to judging gold prices through the traditional relationship between the dollar and U.S. Treasury yields, this change is worth noting. Gold generates no interest income, so rising real yields increase the opportunity cost of holding gold. But beyond interest rate factors, whether investors are willing to take on risk matters equally. If the market still believes the Fed will continue tightening, even several consecutive days of declining Treasury yields may not be enough to prompt investors to rebuild aggressive leveraged long positions.

Goldman Sachs also raised a more adverse policy scenario: the Fed could hike again in March 2027, delay rate cuts, or maintain the terminal policy rate at a higher level. Under the scenario of an additional rate hike in March 2027 and a higher terminal rate, Goldman Sachs estimates that gold prices would reach about $4,660 by the end of 2027, rather than $4,800 under the base case.

The real policy turning point is expected to come later. Goldman Sachs expects the Fed to begin cutting rates in the second half of 2027 and continue through early 2028, with three cumulative cuts. This easing cycle is expected to remove the interest rate constraint on gold, drive a renewed increase in Western gold ETF demand, and work in tandem with continued central bank gold purchases.

Innes believes that until then, investors cannot assume gold has formed a lasting bottom simply because Treasury yields have declined. For some time now, gold has repeatedly shown that traditional market correlations do not function smoothly as investors expect.

Central banks buy 85 tonnes of gold per month, long-term demand remains the bull market pillar

Although short-term speculative demand has weakened, gold's long-term structural support has not disappeared. Goldman Sachs estimates that global central bank gold purchases currently run at about 85 tonnes per month on a seasonally adjusted three-month average basis, compared with a historical average of only 17 tonnes per month before 2022.

In formulating its gold price forecasts, Goldman Sachs assumes central banks will buy 60 tonnes of gold per month in 2026 and 2027, still more than three times the pre-2022 average. Thomas and Struyven also noted a subtle shift in discussions among developed economy central banks. Many central banks already hold substantial gold reserves, and increasingly the question is where these reserves should be stored, rather than whether gold should be held at all. This reflects further weakening trust among sovereign institutions.

However, Innes cautions that continued central bank gold buying does not mean they are committed to defending a specific gold price level. Central banks' investment cycles are typically far longer than those of macro hedge funds and CTA trend strategies. When speculative investors decide to liquidate, central banks do not necessarily increase purchases in tandem.

Goldman Sachs' breakdown of expected gold gains for 2027 also reflects the distinction between these two types of capital. According to the bank's forecast, gold prices are expected to rise 15% in 2027 from the starting price level used in the report, with most of that gain contributed by central bank buying, while ETF inflows and professionally managed funds are expected to provide only limited support.

This means gold's rally logic is changing. Previously, structural demand and speculative enthusiasm combined to drive gold prices rapidly higher; now, the market is shifting toward a slower accumulation process more dependent on long-term official demand. For investors with multi-year investment horizons, this change may not necessarily undermine gold's appeal. But for leveraged traders currently suffering losses, strong long-term demand does not solve the problem of short-term forced liquidation of positions.

Innes particularly noted that Goldman Sachs' comparison of the current market with 2022 is a valuable observation in the report. At that time, after Russia's foreign exchange reserve assets were frozen, central bank gold buying provided strong underlying demand for gold. But rising U.S. real rates severely suppressed private investment demand, curtailing the ability of official sector gold purchases to translate into sustained price increases.

The current market shares similar characteristics: central banks are still firmly buying gold, but the Fed's more hawkish policy stance is suppressing private investors' willingness to buy gold at higher prices. Innes believes the trading lesson still applies: even with strong physical gold demand and long-term structural buying, there is no guarantee the market will avoid a significant correction when marginal investors begin selling. After the sharp rally in early 2026, gold could well enter a prolonged period of weakness without the long-term bull market logic having ended.

AI stock selloff and leveraged liquidation make gold a tool for raising cash

In the recent gold correction, one noteworthy phenomenon is gold's performance when other assets experience significant volatility. Goldman Sachs found that, on an intraday basis, rising oil prices tend to pressure gold through systematic selling. Over the medium term, higher energy costs could also sustain higher interest rates, putting fundamental pressure on gold prices.

At the same time, when stock markets fall sharply, margin calls and broader deleveraging also drag down gold prices first. Investors seeking to raise cash often sell liquid assets like gold that have accumulated substantial paper profits. This is closely related to the recent AI asset selloff. If a fund suffers losses on semiconductor stocks, it may sell profitable gold holdings to meet margin requirements or reduce overall portfolio risk exposure.

Innes points out that when investors urgently need dollars, the market does not care that gold is supposed to be a safe-haven asset. The relationship between oil prices and gold also makes market trading more complex. Recently, the geopolitical risk premium embedded in crude oil prices has clearly faded. Under traditional market logic, lower energy prices, weaker inflation expectations, and lower bond yields should create a favorable environment for gold.

But this relationship can only fully function when financial conditions are stable enough for investors to respond positively to macro improvements. During a broad selloff, the urgent need to reduce risk exposure can overwhelm the benefits of an improved macro environment. Goldman Sachs expects this market environment to continue challenging CTA trend strategies and macro hedge funds over the next 3 to 6 months. Especially with strict drawdown limits and lingering uncertainty in inflation, employment, and energy markets, the room for maneuver for such funds will be further constrained.

Innes believes that in the current gold market, technical factors and investor positioning structure are already as important as long-term fundamentals.

Call option demand fades, gold's rally booster is disappearing

Goldman Sachs' analysis of gold call option demand provides another perspective on why gold's upward momentum has weakened so quickly. The bank expects that with the Fed maintaining its hawkish stance, the unusually strong call option demand seen earlier this year will gradually return to historical norms. This means gold's previous rally booster is disappearing.

In the future, if concerns about U.S. fiscal sustainability reheat, investors may once again seek tools to hedge against the risk of monetary system disorder. Increased defense spending, rising public debt, and energy import burdens could further exacerbate these long-term risks. If these concerns happen to reheat during a Fed rate-cutting period, gold could even see gains stronger than Goldman Sachs' $4,800 base case.

But at least for now, Goldman Sachs is unwilling to assume investors will aggressively buy gold call options again. In Innes' view, this target price cut should not be interpreted as Goldman Sachs abandoning gold, but rather as the bank clearly distinguishing long-term investment logic from the short-term trading environment.

Going forward, he will focus on three changes: whether gold can once again respond positively to declining Treasury yields and a weakening dollar; whether selling pressure from stock market liquidations diminishes; and whether speculative option demand stabilizes and stops further amplifying gold price volatility.

Gold's long-term rally does not require central banks to significantly increase purchases beyond current levels. What truly needs to happen is for marginal private investors to stop selling and return to the market, buying gold alongside central banks. Innes believes that until price action truly shows this shift, investors need not rush to build aggressive long gold positions.

Disclaimer: Investing carries risk. This is not financial advice. The above content should not be regarded as an offer, recommendation, or solicitation on acquiring or disposing of any financial products, any associated discussions, comments, or posts by author or other users should not be considered as such either. It is solely for general information purpose only, which does not consider your own investment objectives, financial situations or needs. TTM assumes no responsibility or warranty for the accuracy and completeness of the information, investors should do their own research and may seek professional advice before investing.

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