After 14 years of unsuccessful IPO preparations and amid weakening operational performance, some individual shareholders of Beijing Rural Commercial Bank are selling their stakes.
The bank's path to listing appears to have reached an unprecedented crossroads. Recently, multiple individual shareholdings in Beijing Rural Commercial Bank were publicly auctioned on the Alibaba Asset Auction platform at starting prices ranging from 3.6 yuan to 4 yuan per share. This price represents a discount of nearly 50% compared to the bank's net asset value per share of approximately 8.37 yuan at the end of the third quarter of 2025.
Simultaneously, the bank's third-quarter report for 2025 disclosed a nearly 10% year-on-year decline in operating revenue, an increase in the non-performing loan ratio, and a significant drop in the provision coverage ratio. More concerningly, since the beginning of 2025, the bank has received three separate fines each exceeding one million yuan, involving regulatory red lines such as anti-money laundering and data security.
Notably, based on the recent starting auction price of about 3.8 yuan per share, the dividend yield of Beijing Rural Commercial Bank is 3.68%. If calculated using the net asset value per share of 8.37 yuan, the dividend yield falls to 1.67%. Even at 3.68%, the bank's dividend yield is lower than that of Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank and Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank.
The deeply discounted share auctions may indicate a collapse in confidence among minority shareholders. Auction platform data shows several individual shareholdings recently listed, with some currently being auctioned at starting prices generally between 3.6 and 4 yuan per share. For example, a recent lot of 100,000 shares had a starting price set around 380,000 yuan, equating to just 3.8 yuan per share. This suggests shareholders prefer to liquidate their holdings at a 50% discount to net asset value rather than retain them. In some cases, sellers have even set starting prices as low as 188 yuan for 100,000 shares in an attempt to attract attention.
This situation contrasts sharply with the bank's confident push for an IPO five years ago. For unlisted banks, particularly smaller ones, shareholder expectations primarily revolve around dividends and potential IPO premiums. With the lengthy IPO process showing no clear end and operational performance under pressure, some individual shareholders with lower acquisition costs are choosing to exit their positions.
It is worth noting, however, that between 2022 and 2024, Beijing Rural Commercial Bank distributed cash dividends three times based on a total share capital of 12.148 billion shares, amounting to a total distribution of 5.103 billion yuan. Currently, the auctions for individual shareholdings are attracting viewers but have essentially zero registered bidders.
Furthermore, this selling pressure from minority shareholders could exacerbate the instability of the bank's already fragmented ownership structure, a key sensitivity in regulatory IPO reviews. As of the end of September 2025, the bank had 297 corporate shareholders holding 77.35% of shares and 27,500 individual shareholders holding 22.65%. Among the top ten shareholders, five state-owned shareholders collectively hold 46.28%, with no other shareholder holding more than 5%. This highly dispersed structure complicates the listing process and leaves minority shareholders with little influence, prompting them to exit at low prices if an IPO seems unlikely.
If the share auctions reflect market sentiment, the financial reports reveal underlying operational issues. In the first three quarters of 2025, the bank's operating revenue was 11.926 billion yuan, a decrease of 9.65% year-on-year. This decline is more pronounced compared to the full-year 2024 revenue of 18.063 billion yuan, which grew 18.09%, and the 2023 revenue of 15.296 billion yuan, which saw a slight increase of 0.23%.
Over a longer period from 2018 to 2022, operating revenues were 19.53 billion yuan, 18.839 billion yuan, 16.565 billion yuan, 16.586 billion yuan, and 15.261 billion yuan, respectively, showing an overall downward trend over five years. The revenue growth in 2024 was primarily driven by a surge in non-interest net income, which increased 75.04% mainly due to a significant rise in investment net收益 to 4.015 billion yuan, rather than improvements in core interest-based operations.
During the same periods from 2018 to 2024 and the first three quarters of 2025, the bank's net profits were 7.252 billion yuan, 8.229 billion yuan, 7.415 billion yuan, 7.578 billion yuan, 7.906 billion yuan, 7.917 billion yuan, 7.973 billion yuan, and 5.966 billion yuan, with year-on-year growth rates of 15.01%, 13.48%, -9.90%, 2.20%, 4.32%, 0.14%, 0.71%, and 1.53%, respectively. Apart from double-digit growth in 2018 and 2019, profit growth has been minimal in recent years.
Amid profit pressure, the bank's asset quality has also raised alarms. By the end of September 2025, the non-performing loan ratio was 1.19%, up 0.23 percentage points from the end of the previous year. The provision coverage ratio stood at 250.24%, a significant decrease of 72.47 percentage points from the end of the previous year. This decline could be due to accelerated non-performing loan formation depleting provisions or reduced provisioning to bolster profits, both indicating challenges in asset quality management.
Additionally, since the start of 2025, the bank has received three fines each exceeding one million yuan. For example, in January 2025, it was fined over 9.02 million yuan for ten violations including providing false statistical data and misappropriating fiscal funds. In September 2025, it was fined 1.85 million yuan for issues including inadequate internet system security management and inaccurate data reporting. In late February 2026, it received a 1 million yuan fine for violating data security management regulations. These penalties, involving legal and security red lines, expose weaknesses in the bank's internal controls during its digital transformation and raise questions about a potential focus on performance over compliance.
The bank's IPO journey has been a marathon of endurance testing. The process dates back to 2011 when an IPO leadership group was established. Progress continued with辅导 agreements signed in 2018 and key preparatory work completed by 2019. Shareholders approved resolutions to extend IPO preparation authorizations in 2020 and 2021. The 2022 annual report again mentioned listing as a focus for 2023. However, no substantial progress has been made. In contrast, other major rural commercial banks like Chongqing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai have already listed, leaving Beijing Rural Commercial Bank as the only one among the four major ones still struggling to go public. The bank did not provide a clear response regarding a new IPO timetable under new management.
In recent years, regulators have raised the bar for financial institution listings, emphasizing high-quality development. This makes it harder for banks with existing issues, such as fragmented ownership and regulatory penalties, to qualify. Currently, only five banks are queuing for A-share IPOs. Over the past decade, Beijing Rural Commercial Bank has seen four changes in its top leader. The most recent change occurred in early 2026 when Guan Wenjie, who had been in the role for just over a year, was transferred, and Bai Xiaodong, a veteran of the bank since its restructuring in 2005, was appointed as the new Party Secretary and proposed Chairman.
The new leader now faces the complex task of rebuilding external shareholder confidence while addressing internal compliance risks.
Comments