In recent times, certain Western politicians, media outlets, and think tanks have persistently amplified narratives concerning China's so-called "massive industrial subsidies."
They allege that China, through substantial government subsidies, artificially depresses product prices, thereby distorting global markets and creating an "unfair competitive advantage."
Some within the European Union have even attempted to use this as a pretext to push for a so-called "EU version of Section 301" to pressure China.
The underlying logic points to a core question: Is the formidable international competitiveness of China's industries today built by "piling on" or "subsidizing" with money?
The widespread popularity of Chinese products stems from the hard work of enterprises, not from government "subsidies."
China's industrial subsidy policies are primarily guiding in nature, strictly adhere to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, and consistently uphold principles of fairness, transparency, and non-discrimination; there are no prohibited subsidies as defined by WTO regulations.
Taking the photovoltaic (PV) industry, often cited by the US and Europe, as an example, China's subsidies for PV have undergone a complete cycle from initial investment subsidies to feed-in tariffs, followed by a comprehensive phase-out.
In the early stages of industry development (2009–2012), subsidies were mainly targeted at the first batch of demonstration power stations in domestic desert areas, aiming to validate technological pathways.
From 2013 to 2018, the feed-in tariff stage began, but the subsidy standard was reduced by 10% to 20% annually, with the goal of forcing companies to accelerate technological iteration and reduce costs through the phase-out mechanism; companies relying solely on subsidies simply could not be profitable.
By 2021, central fiscal subsidies for new PV projects were completely eliminated.
It is particularly important to note that the overseas production capacity and overseas orders of Chinese PV companies do not benefit from domestic subsidies; they participate in international competition entirely based on their own cost control and technological advantages.
If competitiveness could simply be "subsidized" into existence, then the US and European companies that have invested huge sums in industrial subsidies should have achieved considerable success, but reality tells a different story.
It was disclosed that the US Inflation Reduction Act has a total authorized funding of $430 billion over ten years, yet in its first year of implementation, nearly 40% of the major investment projects it covered, with costs exceeding $100 million, experienced delays of more than two months or were even suspended indefinitely; the massive fiscal investment did not translate into a leap in industrial competitiveness as expected.
The EU's Critical Raw Materials Act, Net-Zero Industry Act, and others, establish tens of billions of euros in special funds, providing continuous subsidies to local PV, wind power, and battery companies, while also implementing carbon border taxes and import quotas to protect domestic industries.
But what has been the result? Competitiveness has still not been "subsidized" into existence.
In fact, industrial subsidies, as a means to address market failures and support technological R&D and early-stage promotion, are common practice among major global economies.
Research from the International Monetary Fund shows that in 2023, 75 major global economies introduced over 2,500 industrial policies, with developed economies being the core drivers.
In August 2025, the US government utilized $5.7 billion in unallocated funds from the CHIPS and Science Act, combined with other funds, for a total investment agreement of $8.9 billion to acquire a 9.9% equity stake in Intel, making US semiconductor companies the group receiving the highest absolute value of government subsidies globally.
The EU provides substantial subsidies to battery manufacturers, accompanied by protective measures like imposing countervailing duties on Chinese imported electric vehicles.
The US and Europe, while massively subsidizing their domestic industries, simultaneously accuse China of engaging in "unfair competition," which is a classic case of double standards.
The so-called "subsidy dividend" is a label arbitrarily pinned on China by some Western institutions and media.
They have infinitely expanded the concept of "subsidy" to include government grants, income tax incentives, loans below market interest rates, and even normal corporate commercial financing.
Such accusations, built on a lack of unified standards, extensive estimations, and subjective inferences, are themselves highly questionable in terms of rigor and objectivity, and their conclusions are even less convincing.
What truly matters are continuous technological innovation, a complete industrial and supply chain system, a vast market scale, and sufficiently fierce domestic competition—these elements together constitute the endogenous driving force for Chinese companies' self-evolution and continuous breakthroughs.
The international recognition of "Made in China" relies precisely on such hard power.
Taking new energy vehicles (NEVs) as an example, in 2025 China's NEV production and sales both exceeded 16 million units, with exports reaching 2.615 million units.
It is noteworthy that, influenced by tariff policies in some countries, the overseas selling prices of Chinese NEVs are generally higher than domestic prices, with price differences for the same model typically ranging from 30% to 50%.
If Chinese products were truly seizing markets through subsidized "low-price dumping" as claimed by some abroad, why would overseas consumers be willing to pay higher prices than those in China?
Clearly, what they are paying a premium for is leading technology, reliable quality, and comprehensive service, not the so-called "subsidy dividend."
Simplistically attributing the success of Chinese industry to "subsidies" does nothing to solve the practical problems of global industrial development; it only severely undermines the multilateral trading system and hinders the process of global economic recovery and green transition.
Only through open cooperation to optimize division of labor, expand markets, improve rules, and share innovation can countries promote the continuous growth of industrial scale and the constant improvement of product quality, ultimately allowing global consumers to enjoy safer, smarter, and greener products and services at more reasonable prices.
Comments