Exclusive Interview with Wang Zhongyao, General Manager of China Re P&C: The Climate Has Left Its Steady State—The Insurance Industry Must Relearn El Niño Risk

Deep News11-12

When "super El Niño" shifts from a meteorological term to a core concern for the insurance and reinsurance industries, the entire sector needs to relearn El Niño risk.

On one hand, historical patterns suggest it may suppress Atlantic hurricane activity, offering some catastrophe portfolios a brief respite; on the other hand, it simultaneously elevates multi-hazard risks including strong typhoons in the western North Pacific, droughts in Australia, and floods in South America, rendering actuarial models built on historical experience increasingly obsolete.

Risks no longer distribute linearly by single hazard or single region, but instead transmit across time periods and markets along climate chains; historical loss series are no longer steady-state samples, but "non-stationary data" requiring recalibration.

Faced with this complex landscape, how should the reinsurance industry reassess risk exposure, arrange cross-year capital and retrocession protection, and shore up which capabilities?

To address these questions, the reporter conducted an exclusive interview with Wang Zhongyao, General Manager of China Re P&C, who dissected the risk logic behind super El Niño and the industry's response strategies from a reinsurance perspective.

Risk Forms Have Already Changed

NBD: The most closely watched topic in the second half of this year is the extreme weather phenomena brought by super El Niño. We noted that three super El Niño events have occurred before. Why is this El Niño event drawing such intense attention from the insurance industry?

Wang Zhongyao: The reason this round of super El Niño has attracted such high attention from the insurance and reinsurance industries is that it represents a concentrated stress test of climate risk becoming normalized, chained, and cross-regionally transmitted against the backdrop of global warming.

Specifically, both the event's intensity and its rate of development set historical records and have directly transmitted to insurers' claims side. The sea surface temperature monitoring index's warming rate is significantly higher than the same period during the previous three events. It took only five months from entering El Niño conditions to developing into a super event, and by October it had evolved into the strongest El Niño event since monitoring records began, with the peak sea surface temperature index expected to exceed 3.2°C.

Affected by this, China's climate anomalies this year have been particularly prominent, with rainstorm processes covering wide areas with intense localized rainfall and overlapping, repeated impact zones. Typhoons formed at greater distances and in larger numbers, with wind and rain impacts lasting longer and covering broader areas. Particularly in July and August, Typhoon "Maysak" triggered historically rare, widespread, and sustained heavy rainfall in Guangxi; Typhoon "Bavi" became the strongest typhoon to make landfall in Zhejiang in July since 1949, inducing severe flooding in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and Northeast China, with claims pressure on insurance companies already beginning to emerge.

At the same time, the global warming backdrop far exceeds previous levels, and compound disaster chain risks are systematically rising. The global warming context superimposed on this El Niño event is far stronger than the previous three events. The period from 2023 to 2025 is the warmest three years since observational records began, with global average temperatures approximately 1.48°C above pre-industrial levels. On a higher temperature baseline, the atmosphere's water-holding capacity is greater, and the circulation system's response to sea surface temperature anomalies is more complex. Compound disaster chains form more easily, rapid shifts between drought and flood become more frequent, and the traditional spatial pattern of "floods in the south, droughts in the north" is also changing.

For the insurance industry, risk forms are evolving from "point risks" in a single region or single hazard into "chain risks" transmitted across hazards and time periods, posing severe challenges to risk management capabilities. Additionally, risk exposure continues to climb, and loss consequences are significantly amplified. Over past decades, China's economic stock and asset density have risen substantially, with infrastructure and supply chains deeply interconnected, causing losses to spread along industrial chains. Combined with rising reconstruction costs and increased insurance penetration, extreme weather of equivalent intensity now corresponds to potential insured losses far higher than similar historical events—this is the practical foundation for why this event has drawn such intense industry attention.

Historical Experience Must Be Recalibrated

NBD: Compared with the previous three events, what is the biggest difference in climate change brought by this round of El Niño? How much reference value do the insurance loss experiences from the three historical events still hold today?

Wang Zhongyao: Beyond the warming baseline superposition just mentioned, the biggest difference between this event and the previous three is that the climate environment itself has entered a non-stationary state. The previous three events, regardless of intensity, all occurred within a relatively stable climate statistical environment. After those events, the climate system largely returned to its original statistical distribution, and historical observation samples still had good representativeness for the future. This round, however, occurs during a continuously rising baseline, where the probability and intensity distributions of extreme events are themselves changing. The assumptions of stationarity and consistency in hydrological and meteorological series are being broken.

The insurance loss experiences from the three historical events remain valuable, but must be used at differentiated levels and after recalibration. Mechanistic-level experience can continue to be applied, but directly fitting historical loss data for pricing is no longer reliable. Climate is no longer a steady-state distribution, and historical loss series are "non-stationary samples." Insurers need to make trend adjustments based on asset density growth and reconstruction cost increases on one hand, and on the other hand should use catastrophe models to introduce climate scenarios and conduct forward-looking reassessment of insurance risk exposure.

NBD: From the underwriting and claims process perspective, El Niño's impacts often have lag effects. Disaster shocks do not only occur in the current year but extend into the following year. From an insurance perspective, how should El Niño's lagged risks be assessed?

Wang Zhongyao: El Niño's lag effects on underwriting and claims include two dimensions. First, the lag in disaster risk: the ocean's heat capacity far exceeds that of the atmosphere, and the atmosphere's response to sea surface temperature anomalies itself has a lag of several months. Therefore, El Niño's peak climate impact often comes later than the sea surface temperature peak and manifests concentratedly in the decay year. Second, the lag in loss development: catastrophe claims have long cycles from reporting, survey and loss assessment to final settlement, and losses often get recorded across accounting years.

Based on this judgment, insurers should establish a cross-year, multi-scenario dynamic assessment framework and treat the period from the current year's flood season to the next year's flood season as a continuous risk window for managing capital, limits, and retrocession arrangements. At the capital level, incorporate climate year scenarios into solvency stress tests, maintain prudence in reserve evaluation, fully consider the uncertainty of outstanding claims reserves brought by lagged claim development, and ensure capability to respond under extreme scenarios. At the limit level, conduct multi-hazard superimposed accumulation scenario assessments, match contract event definitions with disaster occurrence characteristics to make limit usage under chain disasters clear and measurable; set limit warning lines for highly sensitive regions and support control mechanisms including underwriting restrictions and reduced retentions. At the retrocession level, arrange retrocession protection based on stress test scenarios, ensure retrocession adequacy under extreme scenarios, and explore new risk transfer methods such as catastrophe bonds and "sidecars."

Key Focus on Building Data Foundation Capabilities

NBD: If this round of El Niño persists into early 2027, what cyclical changes do you predict for the global and domestic reinsurance markets?

Wang Zhongyao: The three historical super El Niño events did not individually trigger a complete soft-hard cycle transition in the global reinsurance market. Losses from El Niño are more localized and hazard-specific pressures. El Niño events are often catalysts for reinsurance market cycles, but market direction ultimately depends on the combined force of reinsurance capital supply, cession demand changes, and risk pricing—El Niño itself is only an amplifying variable, not a decisive one.

Regarding reinsurance market cyclical changes, I prefer to give three observation variables. First, whether reinsurance capital supply is sufficient. Currently, global reinsurance capital is generally abundant, which means this round of strong El Niño is more likely to produce structural, regional adjustments rather than a full-market soft-hard cycle transition. Second, whether cession demand undergoes structural changes. The risk expectations of super El Niño and the trend toward extreme weather normalization will push direct insurers to re-examine their own risk management levels and retention levels for high-risk business, particularly strengthening cumulative risk limits and deductible management, and advancing transformation of high-risk business, which will bring new business growth opportunities and structural optimization space to reinsurance. Third, whether risk redistribution is fully considered. The impact of strong El Niño on global catastrophes is essentially a redistribution of risk, not simply an increase or decrease in total losses. In underwriting practice, the reinsurance industry needs to establish more prudent underwriting strategies, not merely following aggregate-level loss experience while ignoring structural differentiation of risk across regions and hazards.

NBD: Super El Niño is not a one-time event; extreme climate will become the norm in the future. For China's reinsurance industry, what is the most core long-term capability gap, and what capabilities should the industry focus on building in the next 3 to 5 years?

Wang Zhongyao: Currently, the most core capability gap in China's domestic reinsurance industry is not insufficient short-term underwriting capacity, but insufficient risk measurement capability under non-stationary climate assumptions. The industry should focus on building data foundation capabilities, climate risk pricing capabilities, and stable risk supply and transfer capabilities.

First, build a catastrophe model system oriented toward climate change. On the basis of typhoon, earthquake, and flood models, accelerate research and development of models for severe convection, geological, and high/low temperature disasters, introduce climate change scenarios, strengthen modeling of chain disasters and secondary disasters, and promote normalization of scenario analysis and stress testing. It is necessary to promote the establishment of unified data collection formats and standards, jointly build and share an industry catastrophe fundamental database, strengthen data coordination among meteorological, water resources, emergency management, and housing departments, and establish rapid post-disaster loss assessment and data feedback mechanisms. Strengthen the integrated application of ground station monitoring data with satellite remote sensing, radar measurement (InSAR), drones, and other real-time observation methods.

Second, build climate-adaptive risk pricing and portfolio management capabilities. Move beyond single-hazard independent pricing frameworks, fully consider risk resonance and loss aggregation effects brought by disaster chains, and quantify cumulative risks of multi-hazard superposition. Change actuarial logic that relies on historical stationary series, establish a climate risk loading pricing framework, incorporate loss results from multi-scenario climate stress tests into pricing references, and improve pricing rationality under extreme scenarios. Improve full-portfolio dynamic exposure monitoring and cross-year stress testing mechanisms, embed climate risk assessment into the entire process of underwriting admission, limit approval, and capital planning, forming a closed loop of "risk identification—quantitative pricing—exposure control—review and iteration."

Third, enhance cross-cycle capital and product supply capabilities. Reinsurance is the "ballast stone" for addressing climate and catastrophe risks. From industry practice, reinsurance bears approximately one-third of catastrophe losses in the non-marine insurance market, generally showing the characteristic that "the larger the catastrophe loss scale, the more prominent reinsurance's risk-sharing role." A long-term mechanism for catastrophe risk diversification should be established, continuously solidifying multi-layered risk transfer arrangements coordinated among direct insurance, reinsurance, capital markets, and fiscal authorities. Continuously broaden risk diversification channels, prudently use tools such as catastrophe bonds and "sidecars" to transfer excess catastrophe risk to capital markets, explore single-hazard and multi-hazard index-triggered catastrophe bond transfer forms, and advance domestic catastrophe risk securitization practices in an orderly manner, better attracting domestic long-term capital to participate in catastrophe risk sharing and activating the potential of domestic capital markets to serve catastrophe risk management.

Disclaimer: Investing carries risk. This is not financial advice. The above content should not be regarded as an offer, recommendation, or solicitation on acquiring or disposing of any financial products, any associated discussions, comments, or posts by author or other users should not be considered as such either. It is solely for general information purpose only, which does not consider your own investment objectives, financial situations or needs. TTM assumes no responsibility or warranty for the accuracy and completeness of the information, investors should do their own research and may seek professional advice before investing.

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