China Fortune Land Development and Ping An at Loggerheads Over Debt Restructuring

Deep News11-21

On the evening of November 19, Wang Wei, a director of China Fortune Land Development (CFLD), issued a statement expressing ignorance and lack of prior notice regarding the company’s recent "pre-restructuring" move. Wang accused CFLD of—

**"Severely violating board meeting rules and fundamental corporate governance procedures."**

The complaint was also filed with regulators. Wang, representing Ping An Insurance Group’s interests as its appointee to CFLD’s board, signaled an escalating conflict between **Ping An and CFLD**.

### The Backstory Ping An is CFLD’s largest creditor. In July 2018, Ping An invested ¥13.77 billion for a 19.7% stake, becoming the second-largest shareholder. At the time, CFLD was a dominant player in Beijing’s satellite cities, with founder Wang Wenxue as Hebei’s richest person. Ping An later extended additional loans and guarantees, funneling tens of billions into CFLD.

Then came the default. CFLD’s collapse turned Ping An from a major shareholder into its top financial creditor.

### The Latest Clash The dispute stems from CFLD’s recent "pre-restructuring" triggered by a ¥4.17 million debt claim from contractor Longcheng Construction. The Hebei court accepted the application after CFLD stated it had **"no objection"**—despite bypassing board and shareholder approvals.

Wang Wei’s protest highlights procedural irregularities. While the legality remains unclear, the move—initiated by a minor creditor, greenlit by the court, and approved unilaterally by CFLD—has raised eyebrows.

### Why Ping An Is Furious Ping An’s outrage traces back to October 2024, when CFLD proposed a controversial **"debt-asset swap"** plan. Creditors were asked to lend *double* their existing claims at sub-3.85% rates to receive repayments—effectively **"using their own money to pay themselves."** Despite Ping An’s opposition (holding 25% shares but just one board seat), the plan passed with 55.3% approval.

By April 2025, CFLD sold two subsidiaries to a Langfang state-owned firm for **¥2** (yes, two yuan), offsetting ¥22.575 billion in debt. While this cleaned CFLD’s books, other creditors were left fuming: **"Prime assets are gone—what’s left for us?"**

### Financial Freefall CFLD’s assets have plummeted from ¥440 billion in 2021 to ¥274.5 billion in Q3 2025, with cash reserves shrinking from ¥11.4 billion to ¥2.4 billion. Despite restructuring ¥192.7 billion in debt, ¥24.6 billion remains unpaid, including just 5% of promised 2023 cash repayments.

### Speculative Surge Amid the turmoil, CFLD’s stock soared 61% over five days (November 13–19), fueled by "pre-restructuring" hype and name-driven speculation. Notably, Langsen Auto Park—a firm tied to CFLD’s founder—bought 38.2 million CFLD shares in Q2 2025.

Market watchers call Ping An’s CFLD investment **"a rare misstep"** for the insurance giant. Meanwhile, Langsen’s timing seems impeccable.

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