A share transaction dispute that dragged on for two and a half years has finally reached the stage of compulsory enforcement.
On May 21, 2026, Yonghui Superstores Co.,Ltd. issued an announcement regarding its arbitration case against Dalian Yujin, Wang Jianlin, Sun Xishuang, and the Dalian Yifang Group. The arbitration award document took effect on May 7. Yonghui applied to the court for compulsory enforcement, which the court accepted.
A particularly candid statement in the announcement reads: "There is uncertainty regarding the amount of recovery from the enforcement, and it is temporarily impossible to determine the impact on the company's current or future period profits." In plain terms, while the arbitration ruling was won, it remains uncertain how much money will be recovered, when it will be recovered, or the final amount that can be obtained.
Here is how it began.
In December 2023, Yonghui sold its shares in Wanda Commercial Management. The sale involved 389 million shares, representing approximately 1.43% of Wanda Commercial Management's total share capital, for a price of 4.53 billion yuan. The buyer was Dalian Yujin Trade Co., Ltd.
At that time, Yonghui was already in a difficult position. Traditional supermarkets were being squeezed by e-commerce, community group buying, and front-end warehouses. Its stock price had fallen by 70-80%, and its cash flow was tightening. Liquidating assets was a last resort.
However, the buyer did not provide the full payment upfront. The 4.53 billion yuan was to be paid in eight installments. Starting from the second installment, Dalian Yujin failed to make payments. Despite repeated demands from Yonghui, the funds were never received.
In July 2024, the two parties signed a supplementary agreement. The very act of signing this agreement indicated that the original payment plan had failed. The supplementary agreement added Wang Jianlin, Sun Xishuang, and the Dalian Yifang Group as providers of full joint and several liability guarantees.
Essentially, when the money could not be repaid, a major figure was brought in to provide backing, a tactic often associated with debt evasion. Wang Jianlin and Sun Xishuang carry significant weight in business circles; their joint guarantee effectively stakes their personal reputations.
In September 2024, the fourth installment payment was again defaulted on. Yonghui decided to wait no longer. In October 2024, Yonghui formally submitted an arbitration application to the Shanghai International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission.
In April 2026, the final arbitration award was issued. On May 7, 2026, the award took effect. On May 22, 2026, the court accepted the case for compulsory enforcement.
The entire process spanned two and a half years, with each step escalating the situation.
How was the 3.6 billion yuan calculated? The original announcement states: "Remaining share transfer price: 3,639,089,070.93 yuan." Note the precise amount, calculated down to the cent.
This figure represents the principal. Additionally, there is a penalty of 218 million yuan. Other miscellaneous expenses, including legal fees and arbitration costs, amount to approximately 2.23 million yuan.
Principal (3.639 billion yuan) + penalty (0.218 billion yuan) + miscellaneous fees (2.23 million yuan) totals approximately 3.859 billion yuan.
It is worth noting that the announcement uses the term "remaining share transfer price." This wording is precise, indicating the exact amount still unpaid. It also underscores that the previous installment payments were insufficient from the start.
Now, the key question remains: How much of this 3.8 billion yuan can actually be recovered through enforcement?
How critical is this money for Yonghui? First, consider Yonghui's financial situation.
For the full year 2025, it reported a net loss of 2.552 billion yuan. Over the past five years, cumulative losses have exceeded 12 billion yuan. This is no longer just a matter of profitability; it is a question of survival. Its core business has been operating at a substantive loss for five consecutive years, each year relying on asset sales, share reductions, and financing to keep operations afloat.
What is its asset-liability ratio? At the end of 2025, it stood at 94.61%. This figure is considered high-risk in any industry. The current ratio is only 0.55, meaning current assets cannot cover current liabilities. Monetary funds have long been insufficient to cover interest-bearing debt.
Stores have been continuously shrinking, transitioning to a "small store" model. While this may be described as a transformation, it is essentially a retreat for survival—prioritizing existence over scale.
In this context, what does 3.639 billion yuan mean? Most directly, it would provide a breather for cash flow. It could be used to repay part of the debt, alleviating liquidity pressure. If it can be recognized in profit and loss in one go, it could also help lift the net asset value.
However, the announcement's statement that "it is temporarily impossible to determine the impact on the company's current or future period profits" is not a mere formality; it is the reality. Compulsory enforcement has just been accepted, and the process from acceptance to fund recovery involves asset seizure, evaluation, and auction procedures. This could take several months at best, or drag on for a year or two in more complex cases.
Moreover, whether the other party has assets available for enforcement depends on their financial situation.
What is Wang Jianlin's situation? The three guarantors—Wang Jianlin, Sun Xishuang, and the Dalian Yifang Group—are jointly liable.
Dalian Yujin has a registered capital of only 500,000 yuan. A company with 500,000 yuan in registered capital engaging in a multi-billion-yuan transaction clearly lacks repayment capacity. The real guarantee relies on the backing of the Yifang Group and the personal credit of the two prominent figures.
Dalian Yujin is 100% controlled by the Yifang Group. Sun Xishuang is the actual controller of the Yifang Group and has collaborated with Wang Jianlin for many years. This is a classic case of a transaction where the main entity lacks strength and relies on relationships and personal backing.
The question now is whether Wang Jianlin and Sun Xishuang still have the funds.
On Wang Jianlin's side, Wanda has been selling assets in recent years to repay debts. It is no secret that its core equity has been frozen. Wanda Commercial Management's interest-bearing debt exceeds 140 billion yuan, and its liquidity is tight—an open secret.
Sun Xishuang's Yifang Group faces similar challenges, with significant debt pressure and occasional enforcement notices.
A joint liability of 3.6 billion yuan would put considerable pressure on both individuals.
Once compulsory enforcement enters the substantive stage, the court can seize bank accounts, equity, real estate, accounts receivable, and other assets. Whether these assets can be sold and at what discount depends on the asset conditions and market willingness to take over.
The announcement includes a statement: "This arbitration matter will not affect the company's normal production and business activities." This is Yonghui's official stance. It makes no mention of Wang Jianlin's situation.
What does this reflect on a broader scale? Looking at this within the larger context, the practice of mutual and joint guarantees is largely reaching its end.
Over the past two decades, a common practice among private entrepreneurs has been mutual and joint guarantees—providing guarantees for each other and binding personal credit to facilitate financing. During economic upswings, this posed no issues, as everyone could manage.
However, when the economy slows, this "insurance fuse" becomes a "fuse for trouble."
The transaction between Yonghui and Dalian Yujin follows this script. The seller sought to cash out, the buyer wanted to take over, and the personal credit of major figures was used as collateral, making it seem like a win-win. However, with the economic downturn, purchasing power collapsed first, and the mutual guarantee mechanism ended up dragging all participants into the crisis.
Similar scenarios have become increasingly common in recent years. Large-scale equity transactions with installment payments ending in arbitration, and the enforcement of personal joint liability for actual controllers, are no longer isolated cases in China's private enterprise sector.
The supermarket sector is also a mess. Yonghui is not the only one struggling. The entire traditional supermarket segment has been collapsing over the past five years—stores closing, performance declining, and transformations faltering. Yonghui simply draws more attention due to its size.
With industry红利 gone, all underlying issues have surfaced. Aggressive expansion, related-party transactions, and excessive guarantees—all are coming back to haunt them.
What to watch next? Three key aspects need monitoring.
First, the progress of enforcement. From court acceptance to fund recovery, there is a series of procedures, including asset seizure, evaluation, and auction. Each step takes time. In complex cases, cross-regional enforcement could drag on for a year or two.
Second, the amount of enforceable assets the other party possesses. What assets can be sold under the names of Wang Jianlin, Sun Xishuang, and the Yifang Group, their value, and the final realization rate. This directly determines how much Yonghui can recover.
Third, the actual financial impact on Yonghui. Regardless of the amount recovered, once received, it must be handled according to accounting standards. It is not a simple case of "receipt equals profit."
Keep in mind the statement at the end of the announcement: "The company will conduct corresponding accounting treatments based on the progress of the matter and the requirements of accounting standards."
A final note. A 4.53 billion yuan equity transaction has gone through the full process of a supplementary agreement, arbitration, and compulsory enforcement. From the end of 2023 to May 2026—two and a half years.
Yonghui is counting on this money to survive. Wang Jianlin and Sun Xishuang, already under financial strain, now face additional pressure from a 3.6 billion yuan joint liability.
The final outcome of the 3.6 billion yuan remains uncertain. However, this case itself will serve as a sample for large-scale equity transaction disputes among Chinese private enterprises.
The extent of enforcement, how assets are disposed of, and when the funds will be recovered—these will unfold step by step.
This 3.6 billion yuan has pushed Yonghui to the brink of survival and has also thoroughly implicated Wang Jianlin and Sun Xishuang.
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