Chagee's revenue per store under pressure as founder nets nearly RMB 900 million in dividends — why the urgent large payout?

Stock News11-13

US$1.95 per share, roughly RMB 14 — the price of a movie ticket. That is the cash Chagee Holdings Limited (NASDAQ: CHA) plans to pay out for each of its shares. On the evening of November 12 Beijing time, the Nasdaq-listed Chinese tea beverage company announced a special cash dividend of US$1.95 per share, expected to arrive on December 4. Based on total share capital of approximately 191 million shares, the payout totals about US$370 million. At the closing price of US$12.33 the day before the announcement, that amounts to handing shareholders 15.8% of the company's market value in one lump sum.

More noteworthy is the second half of the announcement: starting from fiscal year 2027, for three consecutive fiscal years, annual dividends will be no less than 50% of the prior year's net profit. Why is a company that has been listed for only a year and a half, with its share price falling from US$28 to just over US$12, in such a hurry to send cash out the door?

A company whose stock has been halved is doing the opposite of the obvious move

Consider the company's current situation first. For the full year 2025, Chagee's revenue was RMB 12.91 billion, growing only 4%; net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 1.135 billion, down more than half. In the second quarter of 2026, revenue was RMB 3.415 billion, up just 2.5% year-on-year; same-store GMV — the metric that best represents store-level business — fell 16.1% year-on-year. For a company with double-digit same-store declines and a halved share price, the conventional playbook is to cut costs, contract, and hoard profits to repair the balance sheet. Chagee is doing the opposite: giving away nearly one-sixth of its market value in cash.

An US$8 IPO price, a first-day surge to US$41.8, and now just over US$12 — more than half of the market value has evaporated. The truth behind the astonishingly high dividend yield is not that the dividend is especially large, but that the denominator has already collapsed.

This is not generosity — it is changing the narrative

In the year it listed, Chagee told the story of an "Eastern Starbucks," with a valuation calculated on "how many stores we will open next year." Now, with a global store count of 7,639 and quarterly net additions of only around one hundred, the growth story no longer works, and the market has pushed its valuation down to around 7 times earnings — not the pricing of a growth stock, but that of a mature consumer company, or even a utility.

This shift is not unique to Chagee. The tea beverage companies that crowded onto exchanges in the past two years have almost all met the same treatment in the secondary market: no one is paying for the ten-thousand-store blueprints in their prospectuses anymore. Investors ask only one question — when, and in what form, will the money on your books come to me? Among the six listed tea beverage companies in the first half of the year, some had negative revenue growth and some posted net losses. The "store count" story, once the most useful of all, failed collectively for the first time. Chagee is simply the first to answer that question head-on with a dividend policy.

Under the new pricing approach, the company must prove one thing: the cash on its books is real, and it is willing to share it with shareholders. Chagee held roughly RMB 6.8 billion in cash as of the end of June. This US$370 million payout (about RMB 2.6 billion) amounts to distributing about 40% of that cash. In fact, it was foreshadowed. On the second-quarter earnings call, management said a US$150 million buyback had been completed to the tune of about US$30 million, and that the company was "considering regular dividends and other shareholder return plans." Less than three months passed from "considering" to "approved."

Why it can afford to pay while others cannot

Facing the same growth slowdown, why can some brands only close stores while Chagee can hand out money? The difference lies in the business model. Chagee operates mainly through franchising: store rent, labor, and spoilage are borne by franchisees, while headquarters revenue comes primarily from selling ingredients, packaging, and equipment to franchisees — essentially a business of "collecting rent from the people who open stores." The more stores open, the more headquarters earns regardless of conditions; when stores stop opening, headquarters still holds the cash accumulated over the years.

The cruelty of the asset-light model lies in externalizing risk: when times are good, headquarters earns most steadily; when times are bad, franchisees bear the pressure first. So "being able to afford it" is itself a statement: headquarters judges that its cash-cow role can be sustained long-term, which is why it dares to commit that cash. Conversely, asset-heavy direct-operated brands, even with money on their books, must first cover the costs of hundreds of stores and cannot pay out even if they want to.

The dividend commitment has another easily overlooked effect: locking half of annual profit into dividends means the money headquarters can freely dispose of is institutionally cut in half — blind capital expenditure, casually incubated side businesses, and high-priced cross-industry acquisitions will all be held back by the lack of funds. For franchisees, this is not necessarily bad news.

Do the math yourself: who takes the lion's share

Founder Zhang Junjie holds 34.2% of the shares through a family trust, and this time he will receive about US$127 million, or roughly RMB 900 million. What does RMB 900 million mean? For the full year 2025, Chagee's net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 1.135 billion — roughly spread across the current 7,639 stores, each store contributed about RMB 15,000 in net profit to headquarters per year. The amount Zhang Junjie alone takes out this time is roughly equal to the profit that about six thousand stores generate for headquarters in a year. A single founder dividend equals about 80% of the company's annual net profit.

Now trace the entire flow of money: the money a consumer pays for a cup of milk tea becomes revenue and profit for headquarters through franchisee purchases; the profit becomes a US$370 million dividend; about one-third of that goes back into the founder's own pocket. This is not a transfer of benefits — paying dividends in proportion to shareholding is beyond reproach under the rules — but it clearly answers the question of "who this company is now run for": for shareholders taking cash, not for franchisees opening new stores.

Stores are hot, the books are cold

The store level is actually not cold. A JPMorgan research note dated November 12 mentioned that during Chagee's buy-one-get-one-free promotion in October, participating stores recorded daily sales of RMB 40,000 to 50,000, or about 2,000 to 2,500 cups; on the last day of the promotion, some staff posted on social media about an endless flood of orders — "can't finish them, simply can't finish them." At noon on November 13, the final round of the password-based buy-one-get-one-free offer was still to come.

Stores going viral, the company handing out money, the share price at a bottom — three things happening at once precisely shows that the problem is not the product, but the question of whether "opening stores can still make money." Heat on the product side cannot save the thinning of the single-store model, so the company chooses to pocket the cash it has earned rather than laying out more stores first.

Reading these three things together reveals a fourth layer: paying out at the bottom is itself a reassurance to the market. Telling investors with real money that "the company does not need this cash for emergencies" is more effective than any statement about "sound operations" — and it proved effective, with the stock closing higher against the trend on the night of the announcement.

A falsifiable judgment

Judgment: Chagee is transitioning from a "growth stock" to a "cash cow," with store openings subordinate to dividends. If this holds → we will see: the fiscal 2027 annual report honoring a dividend of no less than 50%; global net store additions continuing to decelerate; the company no longer setting large-scale store-opening targets. If it does not hold → same-store GMV returns to double-digit growth in the first half of 2027 and the company restarts aggressive store expansion, then this dividend was merely a one-off gesture during a trough, and the judgment is void.

One caveat on wording: 50% is a "floor," not a "committed amount," and the board retains room to "determine as appropriate in light of capital expenditure" — so when verifying this judgment, what matters is not how much was paid in any single year, but whether the floor holds for three consecutive years. The next observation points: the 2026 annual report around April 2027, and monthly third-party store counts.

For people who drink milk tea, this is good news in the short term: at the bottom of its share price, the company needs traffic and word of mouth, so promotions like buy-one-get-one-free will continue. For those thinking about becoming franchisees, think one layer deeper: with headquarters prioritizing profit for shareholders rather than reinvestment, the support and concessions new stores can get will most likely be less than in previous years.

Some say that when a business has run its course, sharing out the money is the most honest thing to do for shareholders; others say tea beverages are far from their ceiling, and paying out now is conceding defeat early. Which side are you on — should Chagee distribute half its profit, or use it to open more stores?

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