New details of the Trump administration's agreement to provide Saudi Arabia with a civilian nuclear program are spurring criticism that the landmark deal doesn't do enough to head off the risk of nuclear proliferation.
The text of the accord was shared with lawmakers last week along with a raft of related documents. It outlines a road map for how uranium might be enriched in the kingdom's territory after further consultations, including at a level of nearly 20%.
Such an enrichment level could be needed to power a small modular civilian reactor, but it would add to the risk nuclear material could be diverted for military purposes unless there were stringent controls.
"There is a civilian case for it," said Scott Roecker, a former Energy Department official who is vice president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonprofit security organization.
"But the flip side is that at that level of enrichment you are most of your way toward producing weapons grade material in terms of the work that needs to be done," Roecker added. "So you would want to be sure you know exactly where that material is and be sure you control it."
President Trump has said on social media that the accord wouldn't allow enrichment in Saudi Arabia, but signed a memo to top aides in July that endorsed the accord and its potential pathway to enrichment.
The U.S. spent years trying to prevent Iran from producing 20% enriched material. Under the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement reached by the U.S., five other world powers and Tehran, Iran's enrichment of uranium was to be capped at 3.67% for 15 years at which point that restriction would lapse.
Trump withdrew from that agreement during his first term as president, setting in motion a dynamic in which Iran enriched uranium to as much as 60% during years of stop-and-start negotiations that were finally superseded by U.S. and Israeli military strikes. A 90% enrichment level is considered to be bomb grade.
U.S. companies and their foreign supplies would have a favored place under the agreement with Saudi Arabia and would run a potential enrichment facility, squeezing out the Russians and the Chinese, U.S. officials say.
"The deal provides some important benefits for the United States, including the revitalization of the U.S. nuclear industry and the strengthening of U.S.-Saudi strategic ties," said Robert Einhorn, a former senior State Department official who worked on nonproliferation issues.
"The question for Congress is whether those benefits, as well as the restrictions built into the agreements, are sufficient to offset the inherent proliferation risks of sensitive nuclear cooperation with a country that has expressed an interest in nuclear weapons," Einhorn said.
Trump has been sensitive to criticism from Israel supporters and arms control proponents that the U.S. should not sell nuclear technology to a country whose de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, said in 2018 that the kingdom would develop a nuclear weapon if Iran ever got one.
Soon after U.S. and Saudi officials signed the nuclear deal, Trump wrote in a July 23 social-media post that there "will be no enrichment of material!" under the agreement.
But while the accord doesn't provide a green light at the outset for the enrichment of uranium on Saudi soil, it outlines a series of steps that could allow work to begin on an enrichment facility within several years.
Nor does the deal include the political condition Trump later added that Saudi Arabia must normalize relations with Israel and embrace the Abraham Accords. The White House says that Trump is determined to stick to that stipulation, but there is nothing in the accord that would preclude the president from changing his mind.
According to the deal, U.S. and Saudi officials will carry out a "Joint Enrichment and Conversion Study" within two years to study "the economic viability" of enriching uranium and arrangements to guard against proliferation risks.
During that study period, reactors could be sold, but enrichment would be prohibited.
If U.S. and Saudi officials agree on the need for enrichment. American companies and their foreign suppliers would construct a facility that would enrich uranium to a level of 5%. Further study by the two sides could lead to uranium enrichment that would approach 20%
Lawmakers who have poured over the text say there is no opportunity for Congress to challenge a decision to enrich if it is endorsed by the study.
"There is supposed to be a consultation that could last two years. Well, they could agree in two days," said Rep. Brad Sherman, a California Democrat who is a sharp critic of the deal. "We know that Congress won't be involved."
Blocking the agreement will be an uphill battle for Congressional critics. The Senate and House would need to adopt a joint resolution of disapproval by a two-thirds veto proof majority to stop it. Barring such a step, the accord would legally take effect after 90 legislative days.
Trump administration officials say that the central role of American companies will ensure that nuclear materials cannot be diverted for military purposes.
Negotiators have also worked out an inspection agreement that would cover a list of sites involved in sensitive U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation. Rafael Grossi, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said last week that the verification arrangements appeared to be adequate.
"What is important for me is that I will have the capacity to do what I need to do in the country to verify that there is no diversion of nuclear material or no undeclared activity," he said in an appearance at the Stimson Center think tank.
But Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association, said the arrangement stopped well short of the IAEA's "Additional Protocol," which allows the agency to visit any facility considered suspicious even if there is no nuclear material present. Iran was obliged to implement the protocol under the 2015 deal.
"This agreement establishes a standard that is far lower than that required by more than 100 countries around the world," said Kimball. "And in this case we are dealing with a country that has threatened to pursue nuclear weapons."
For all of the detail, some key elements of the deal haven't been publicly disclosed. The Trump administration has said that the Saudis would be prohibited from enriching uranium on their own or with a foreign partner for ten years if the U.S. opts not to support enrichment.
But such a commitment isn't outlined in the unclassified information provided to Congress. And administration officials haven't said if it is addressed in side letters or other documents that are to be shared on a classified basis.
A group of former nonproliferation officials from Republican as well as Democrat administrations have urged that any classified side agreements be made public so that the deal can be more carefully scrutinized.
The Energy Department and White House didn't immediately respond to a question for comment on whether they are considering this request.
Comments