Palantir has only 203 total customers as of Q3 2021, while just 20 of those customers account for 58% of total revenue.
Revenue growth in Palantir’s core client cohort slowed to 20% annualized through the first three quarters of 2021 compared to 2020.
During 2021, Palantir fundamentally transformed its go-to-market strategy. The company is now using its cash to aggressively invest in other companies (Investees) who agree to purchase Palantir’s software.
Management continues to guide for 30% sales growth through mid-decade. However, Palantir’s 3-phase business model hints at sales trending lower excluding its Investee sales.
Palantir offers extraordinary long-term growth potential which should place it on the watchlist of all growth investors. The investment case rests on the fulcrum between opportunity and red flags.
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I am assigning Palantir (NYSE:PLTR) a neutral risk/reward rating as the long-term growth opportunity is counterbalanced by near-term red flags. The long-term opportunity lies in becoming a foundational enterprise operating system capable of integrating structured and unstructured data for real-time intelligence. However, a number of notable red flags warrant caution. The primary red flags include slowing sales, an unusual go-to-market shift, rapidly decelerating profitability, and an elevated valuation which offers limited margin for error.
Risk/Reward Rating: Neutral
Palantir has an unusual business model compared to its peers in the enterprise software sector in regard to how it acquires and grows its customer base. The company categorizes its customers according to three phases of development or cohorts: (1) Acquire, (2) Expand, and (3) Scale. While they are generic terms that are applicable to all businesses, they are unique in the case of Palantir due to how the company approaches its customers.
Customer Detail
Palantir defines a customer in the Acquire cohort as one that has generated less than $100,000 of revenue as of year-end while being unprofitable to Palantir. The Expand cohort is characterized by a customer that generated more than $100,000 of sales yet remained unprofitable. Finally, the Scale cohort is defined as a customer that has generated more than $100,000 of revenue while being a profitable relationship for Palantir during the year.
The following tables were compiled from Palantir’s Q3 2021 10-Q filed with the SEC. The first table displays Palantir’s 2020 sales from each of the client cohorts which were categorized at the end of 2020 (2020 Revenue). In the 2021 Annualized column, you will find the sales of each of these 2020 customer cohorts through Q3 2021 annualized. In the second set of tables, I have compiled key details regarding Palantir’s largest customers over the past twelve months, as well as critical details pertaining to customers that are new to Palantir in 2021 which are not yet assigned to a cohort. Cohort categorization occurs at the end of each year.
Source: Created by Brian Kapp, stoxdox
Source: Created by Brian Kapp, stoxdox
For ease of comparison, I have color-coded the information that is related. One of the dominant realities for Palantir is its concentrated customer base, which is highlighted in blue. Palantir has only 203 customers, with the top 20 accounting for 58% of sales.
By definition, Palantir’s largest customers are in the Scale cohort. Through the first three quarters of 2021, the Scale cohort (categorized as such at the end of 2020) is growing at an annualized rate of 20%. Given that this group accounts for 86% of Palantir’s revenue, it will be challenging to move the sales growth needle materially above 20% without explosive growth from the other two cohorts or a material acceleration from the Scale cohort. It should be noted that management is guiding to 30% annual sales growth through mid-decade.
The 2020 year-end Acquire and Expand cohorts are highlighted in yellow in the upper table. New customers in 2021 will not be assigned to a cohort until the year-end Palantir report. I have highlighted the pertinent 2021 new customer data in yellow for easy comparison to the 2020 Acquire and Expand customer cohorts. I view the 2021 new customer sales performance excluding sales to Investees to be a sustainable core growth rate. The Investee customer acquisition strategy is extraordinarily unusual and carries an exceedingly high capital risk which introduces reputational and, therefore, brand risk.
Please note that Investee here refers to customers that Palantir has purchased the stock of in return for the Investee using Palantir’s software. Meaning, the revenue from Investees is a reciprocation of Palantir investing in the shares of these customers. In this respect, these are not arm’s-length transactions. I believe the new client numbers excluding sales to Investees is an important data point for ascertaining a purely market-based new customer growth rate.
Similar to the Scale cohort growth rate annualizing at 20% in 2021, the new customer sales growth rate is annualizing at 22% through Q3 2021 compared to the $20.6 million of sales from the Acquire and Expand cohorts of 2020. While this is not a perfect comparison for sales growth from new customers, it is a fair estimation. As a result, Palantir appears to be trending toward an underlying sales growth rate closer to 20% than the company’s 30% sales growth guidance through mid-decade.
Investees
It is important to step back and review Palantir’s investments in Investees as this is an extraordinarily unusual go-to-market strategy for customer acquisition. The above numbers, which suggest revenue growth is trending toward 20%, place Palantir’s use of its balance sheet cash to fund new customers in a new light. The following tables were compiled from Palantir’s Q3 2021 10-Q. The first table lists companies that Palantir has funded as of the end of Q3 2021. The second table displays Palantir’s investment commitments to new companies that are not yet funded.
Source: Created by Brian Kapp, stoxdox
I have conducted a cursory review of each of the above companies. The common theme is that they are all early-stage companies in the most popular growth sectors. These sectors include EVs, robotics, flying electric vehicles, satellite services and drug discovery. None of the Investees appears to offer enough appreciation potential in its own right to move the needle materially for Palantir’s valuation. Palantir’s ownership stake ranges from 0.4% to 1.6%.
It remains unclear how much of each company’s funding can be spent on Palantir’s software. Furthermore, it is not clear if the $19 million of revenue through Q3 2021 from these companies is sustainable.
I have highlighted in blue Palantir’s total investment of $150 million in the seven companies. The yellow highlighted cell represents the current valuation of the investments. Palantir is now down approximately $64 million on these seven companies alone. This highlights an extreme risk for this method of customer acquisition as the capital losses to date dwarf the revenue generated. There are other private company investments not listed above, however, Palantir does not break out the details. They are included in other assets on Palantir’s balance sheet which amounted to $116 million as of Q3 2021.
The following table displays Palantir’s commitments to invest in new companies as of Q3 2021. I have highlighted in yellow the two companies that Palantir funded subsequent to the end of Q3 2021.
Source: Created by Brian Kapp, stoxdox
I have highlighted in blue the total funding commitment for new investments as of Q3 2021. This is $252 million on top of the $150 million completed prior to the end of Q3. While I have not looked into these particular companies, they appear similar to the first seven investments reviewed above. Meaning, they appear to carry extreme capital risk with upside potential that is likely to be minimal when compared to the valuation upside inherent in Palantir’s software business. It should be noted that recent valuations were extreme and continue to contract rapidly. As a result, the timing risk for capital loss is also heightened by making the investments at the top of the VC/IPO cycle.
Financial Performance
Turning to Palantir’s recent performance, I have chosen to view sales growth excluding the Investees as this is the most likely sustainable growth trajectory. The following table was compiled from Palantir’s Q3 2021 10-Q filed with the SEC. I made an adjustment by removing Investee revenue to arrive at a net revenue figure.
Source: Created by Brian Kapp, stoxdox
I have highlighted in yellow the 29% revenue growth in Q3 2021 after removing the Investee revenue. Investees added 6.5% to growth in Q3. Year-to-date, the Investee revenue accounted for 1.7% revenue growth. The 29% growth rate is already decelerating beneath the company’s 30% growth guidance through mid-decade. Keep in mind that the Investee revenue stream will grow with additional funding of Palantir’s investment commitments. Regardless, growth is decelerating rapidly at 29% in Q3 compared to 41% year-to-date excluding these non-arm’s-length sales.
Geographic & Segment Sales
The sales slowdown is being led by France, which contracted 22% through the first
Summary
All told, Palantir should be placed on the watchlist for high-risk growth investors. The long-term opportunity lies in becoming a foundational enterprise operating system capable of integrating structured and unstructured data for real-time intelligence. However, with notable red flags in the mix, caution is in order. The primary red flags include slowing sales, an unusual go-to-market shift, rapidly decelerating profitability, and an elevated valuation which offers limited margin for error. The resulting symmetry between risk and reward results in a neutral rating.
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