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Zonghan8116
2021-06-06
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Zonghan8116
2021-06-06
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Four Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition
Zonghan8116
2021-06-06
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Zonghan8116
2021-06-06
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Four Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition
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Indeed, many laws and logics have been generally proved to be effective.</p><p><b>However, what I want to talk to you about today is actually the dark logic outside the four regulations.</b></p><p>I call it dark logic because the opposite of them is usually true, and the interesting thing about the Internet is:<b>There is no one-size-fits-all universal theorem, and any big logic will have exceptions when carefully observed;</b></p><p>The following is the dark logic outside the four regulations of China's Internet that I summarized-</p><p><b>1. A company with a moat is not necessarily a good company</b></p><p><b>The moat theory of enterprises originated from Buffett's discussion, that is, whether an enterprise has insurmountable advantages for other enterprises.</b></p><p>Later, Pat Dorsey summarized moats into four categories in the book \"Buffett's Moat\": 1. Intangible assets of enterprises, such as brands, patents, etc.; 2. High conversion cost; 3. Cost advantage; 4. Network effect;</p><p>Usually, we think that a company that has one or more of the above four categories of advantages has a moat. The moat is of course very important, but if a company has a moat, is it necessarily a good company worth investing in?</p><p>The answer is not necessarily.</p><p>Weibo is a very typical example.</p><p><b>Today, most people will actually admit that Weibo has a moat</b>-As a communication platform, it is the first fermentation position of any news and current affairs; As an entertainment platform, it is the first support position for fans in idolize; As an influence platform, it also has the widest and most diverse opinion leaders;</p><p><b>The almost monopoly position of these three dimensions has not been shaken since the birth of Weibo. It is indispensable and irreplaceable, which is undoubtedly a moat;</b></p><p>However, do you dare to buy Weibo's stock today?</p><p>I think at least many people dare not. According to the latest financial report, Weibo's monthly active users in Q1 2021 are 530 million, a year-on-year decrease of 4%, and its daily active users are 230 million, a year-on-year decrease of 5%.</p><p>Despite the high base last year due to the epidemic, the weak growth of Weibo users has become a high probability event.</p><p>If it does not have a new second curve, it will actually be difficult for it to gain more user time in the next competition with powerful companies such as ByteDance and Tencent.</p><p>The moat is difficult to protect Weibo.</p><p>An easy to understand logic is-<b>A moat can make it difficult for you to decline quickly, but it doesn't guarantee that you will continue to grow;</b></p><p>For Internet companies, growth is always the top priority theme and the most important life gate.</p><p>Internet companies have not done it once and for all. Those companies that eventually become giants are actually not a new trick, but are constantly expanding their combat radius and continuing to grab new territory. This is true of Tencent, Ali, and Byte.</p><p>Holding the moat of search, Baidu is of course the temporary king. It has no opponents in the search track so far, but its boundary expansion speed is a little slower, and it has been ruthlessly squeezed out of the first group.</p><p><b>Another logic about moats is-you do have a moat in your field, but your field itself is no longer important;</b></p><p>Momo, Meitu, Douban, Tianya, Xunlei... all have extremely high moats in their respective fields. They have been sitting firmly on Diaoyutai and have never been subverted by competitors. However, their respective fields themselves have become It is no longer important, the moat is still there, and the city is gone.</p><p><b>Therefore, the moat is very important, but it is dangerous to be infatuated with the moat. Don't sleep on the moat.</b></p><p>In this sense, in fact, I am still a little worried about Bilibili. The content production and consumption ecology formed by its strong stickiness to the second dimension and young users is of course its moat, which is indestructible. Watermelon Video has been attacked many times. The point.</p><p><b>But can Station B always tell this single story? Can its market-to-market dream rate finally be fulfilled?</b></p><p><b>Second, a big track is not necessarily a good track.</b></p><p>\"Investment track\" is an extremely important genre in the field of Internet investment, and the logic behind it is-<b>If a track is big enough, then it will definitely give birth to excellent companies, and as long as the excellent companies that invest in this track will definitely have long-term benefits;</b></p><p>This logic is basically correct, or it is correct to a large extent. However, there are still some tracks that don't conform to this principle.</p><p>The reason is that these tracks are crowded and lack a moat, and the brutal competition has no endgame in sight, which makes it difficult for their top players to obtain reasonable returns for a long period of time.</p><p><b>China's long video track is a typical example.</b></p><p>There is no doubt that this is a big track, and the total annual revenue of this track is expected to exceed 100 billion, which is not insignificant.</p><p>However, counting from Youku, the pioneer in 2006, the major players in this field have been losing money for 15 consecutive years. For example, iQiyi, with a full-year revenue of 29.7 billion in 2020 and a loss of 6 billion. This is still an achievement after substantial improvement.</p><p>Note that it is difficult to say that these losses are strategic losses. Even today, we still cannot see how long the losses in this field will last and when the dust will finally be settled in the industry.</p><p><b>Yes, money is the only barrier in this industry.</b></p><p>\"Later\" once reported the process of Youku and Tencent Video competing for \"Ruyi's Royal Love in the Palace\"-</p><p>Originally, the two companies friendly agreed that each company would pay 600 million yuan to buy the rights and interests of the drama's simultaneous broadcast on both platforms, but Tencent went back and thought about it, and concluded that the drama might be as popular as Empresses in the Palace, and finally decided to win the exclusive broadcast rights of the drama at a frightening price of 1.3 billion yuan.</p><p>This is a game of burning money. If only the war could be ended by burning money alone, the key life of this industry lies in-<b>Money simply can't buy user loyalty.</b></p><p>Some platforms spend more than 1 billion + to buy the broadcasting rights of the World Cup. Once the World Cup is over, users are attracted by the fresh overall situation of other platforms.</p><p>The big players in this industry are all fighting hard. Despite the large losses, no one is willing to be the first to give up, because they can't ignore the sky-high drowning cost, and they are all waiting for their opponents to withdraw.</p><p>But behind the three major platforms is BAT. Each of them has deep pockets, and they all agree that this is a war of card positions. Each of them is dreaming of \"China Netflix\".</p><p>Even if some players quit, because there are no other high barriers, there will always be new players who are eyeing up. Youku's acquisition of Tudou wanted to unify the rivers and lakes, but it quickly failed, which is a proof.</p><p>That's right, big tracks really aren't necessarily good tracks, and the aviation industry is another example.</p><p>Warren Buffett has two famous sayings about the aviation industry-</p><p>The first sentence is:<i>\"Before the first successful test flight of the plane invented by the Wright brothers in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, if a capitalist shot down it, then investors around the world might recover a lot of losses.\"</i></p><p>The second sentence is:<i>\"If you want to be a millionaire, you can be a multi-millionaire first and then buy airline stocks.\"</i></p><p><b>So, why is the aviation industry, which is a giant in scale, not a good track?</b></p><p>The reason is that the aviation industry has four characteristics: 1. High fixed costs and high debt ratio; 2. Product homogeneity and weak premium ability; 3. Consumers have many choices and extremely low brand loyalty; 4. The industry is highly cyclical and strongly influenced by the macro economy;</p><p>Based on the above characteristics, the aviation industry needs large investment, profit margins fluctuate greatly, and it is difficult to obtain sustained and long-term competitiveness due to fierce competition, so that Warren Buffett, the stock god, has repeatedly stumbled in aviation stocks.</p><p><b>Therefore, to measure whether a track is of high quality, size is actually not the only indicator, growth and health are equally important.</b></p><p><b>3. A company that leads in the early stage of the track may not be able to lead in the long term</b></p><p>Regarding this point, let me start with an example-</p><p>At the beginning of the year, when new energy vehicle stocks were at their craziest, a friend told me that he bought half of his liquidity to buy the stocks of Nio, Ideal and XPeng.</p><p>I asked him about his investment logic, and he said-</p><p><i>\"It is an extremely certain event that China's new energy will eventually rise, and I bet on these three currently leading companies. Of course, I don't know who will win in the end, but my logic is that one of them will definitely win, so as long as The stock price of this winning company triples, and I won't lose money even if the other two die at 0.\"</i></p><p>In a sense, I agree with his view, but I still kindly remind him, is it possible that China's new energy companies will not win in the end among these three companies?</p><p>He said, I didn't think about it. This possibility is relatively small.</p><p><b>I told him that it was indeed relatively unlikely, but it was not impossible, so I told him the story of the short video track-</b></p><p>At this point in 2015 and 2016, the short video track has begun to become lively, and investors have begun to judge that this is a fast-growing and large-scale track, but which teams should they invest in?</p><p>At that time, the market structure was-Miaopai was leading, Meipai was menacing, and Kuaishou was still a small company and had not entered the mainstream sight.</p><p>As a result, the leading second shot became a hot cake in the investment community. During that time, the parent company of second shot received five rounds of financing before and after Technology, of which the final E-round financing scale was as high as 500 million US dollars.</p><p>At the press conference of Series E financing, the excitement of founder Han Kun was beyond words-<i>\"The video matrix of science and technology has become the Chinese version of Youtube.\"</i></p><p>However, everyone knows the following story. A year later, Douyin Kuaishou rose, and Miaopai was helpless and was quickly marginalized.</p><p>Together, they were photographed on the beach, as well as the magnificent beautiful shots of that year.</p><p><b>So far, none of the two leading products of the short video track with countless financing had the last laugh.</b></p><p>Let's sort out the logic behind it a little: because the industry of early leading companies has not yet matured, the track actually has different requirements for the capabilities of startups. This can also explain from one aspect why Miaopai failed and Douyin succeeded..</p><p><b>Of course, there are many reasons behind this, but one of the important perspectives is the difference in focus between the two:</b></p><p>During the period when Second Shot was born and developed, China's 4G was not particularly mature, so the technical requirements for how to play the process in different network environments were very high. Han Kun, the founder of Second Shot, has always been very proud of the basic technical capabilities of Second Shot.</p><p>Before the birth of Second Shot, Han Kun had been leading the team to develop a multimedia framework system called Vitamio, which was a video technology supplier to several Internet companies.</p><p>In fact, one of the important reasons why Sina Weibo invested in second shots is that it can largely make up for the shortcomings of its own video technology.</p><p><b>Therefore, in Han Kun's cognitive framework, technology is an important barrier, and he naturally pays less attention to other variables that determine the real core of this track.</b></p><p>But in 2017, 4G matured, tariffs dropped, and technical barriers proved to be vulnerable. Recommendation algorithms and content production ecology became the real core competitiveness of short videos. In a sense, the outcome of this war may have been doomed from the beginning.</p><p><b>Therefore, it is certainly true to invest in leading companies in the early stage of the track, but it is also necessary to consider whether the core logic of this track will change, and whether the core elements required after the change are truly possessed by the leading companies now.</b></p><p><b>4. The founder does not fully represent the company's competitiveness</b></p><p>As mentioned above, an important genre in the investment field is to invest in the track, while another important genre is to invest in people. Some VCs have targeted a person and will invest no matter what he does, and will even continue to invest after many failures.</p><p><b>From the perspective of probability, the two schools of voting on the track and voting on people have very self-consistent logic, which is right in many cases.</b></p><p>However, people are very complicated, and the probability of deviation in people's judgment is actually very high. More importantly, people are a dynamic process, and entrepreneurship is a marathon. The long process has completely different requirements for founders at different stages-</p><p><b>The ability models required for entrepreneurship, business maintenance, and re-growth are very different. Only a few entrepreneurs can quickly iterate their own cognition and abilities, so as to truly lead the company from 0 to 1 and from 1 to N.</b></p><p>Let me give you an example. One of my former bosses never bought US stocks, but suddenly one day he bought Cheetah Mobile stocks.</p><p>I asked him why he bought cheetah, and he said he was optimistic about Fu Sheng.</p><p>He went on to add: Fu Sheng proved himself to be a top and excellent product manager in 360 before, and leading Cheetah to make a clean-up master overseas proved his strategic ability and execution ability. Fu Sheng is still very young, even though he may make mistakes, but he has great long-term potential.</p><p><b>However, if he bought this order, he lost the shit and doubted his life.</b></p><p>So is there really something wrong with his above logic?</p><p>Actually, not necessarily. Judging a person's ability through his history is a common method to recognize people. This logic is actually a basic operation in the field of venture capital.</p><p>This is why important directors of many big companies are usually sought after by angel capital and early-stage venture capital as soon as they announce their start-up.</p><p>A simple logic behind this is that the important directors of big factories are actually front-line fighters. They can hear the sound of guns and have done it in actual combat. Of course, the probability of success in voting for them will be greater.</p><p>So why do you lose a mess when you vote for Cheetah with the same logic?</p><p><b>The answer is the difference between the probability of casting the net in the primary market and the secondary market.</b></p><p>The logic of primary markets such as venture capital is to bet extensively, because we don't know who will be the next ByteDance, the next Pinduoduo, or the next Kuaishou. We would rather make a wrong investment than miss the big fish.</p><p>Its logical pursuit is the overall winning rate. It invests in 50 companies. In the end, as long as 2 companies can finally be successfully listed, it can Cover the failure of the remaining 48 companies, because the two listed companies may bring 100 times the return..</p><p>In terms of the success rate of a single investment, it is extremely low, that is, 96% of them are failures, but this does not affect his overall profit; (Of course, most venture capitalists can't actually achieve this probability, and these funds themselves are losing money)</p><p><b>If individual investors use the same logic to choose stocks, it is simply a nightmare, because the size of your funds basically determines that it is difficult for you to cast a wide net and diversify risks at all.</b></p><p>Looking at the company from the single dimension of \"people\" is licking blood on the tip of the knife, and the failure rate is extremely high.</p><p>Therefore, if an individual investor wants to buy stocks in a certain company, you can have countless logics, but don't just because of this one reason-\"I chose to buy it because I recognize its founder\".</p><p><b>Note that I'm not saying that founders are unimportant to a company, in fact, the importance of founders to a company cannot be overemphasized.</b></p><p>But what I want to say is that it is actually difficult for us to really judge all about a founder from an external perspective. Even for first-class venture capitalists, they can only judge a founder from a few dimensions, and sometimes this judgment is even extremely emotional.</p><p><b>Allen Zhu has publicly reviewed how he missed ByteDance many times-</b></p><p>At that time, ByteDance's theory B found Jinshajiang. After chatting with Zhang Yiming, Zhu Xiaohu intuitively judged that Zhang Yiming was too gentle and did not have the strong aura of Cheng Wei. In the end, he did not vote for ByteDance. Later, his intestines were full of regret.</p><p><b>People are complicated at all times, so don't be too confident in your own judgment.</b></p><p>OK, the above are the four dark logics of China's Internet summarized by Wei Xi. The Internet is a young industry and a changeable industry. It is evolving at an unprecedented speed, and its speed of evolution is so difficult to summarize a universal law.</p><p>The only thing this generation of young people should do is to join and embrace this industry, and feel and grasp the surging pulse of technology in practice.</p><p><b>Remember, don't lie flat.</b></p>","source":"wxzb","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Four Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nFour Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">卫夕指北</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-06-06 11:09</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><b>In the short 20 years of Internet development in China, it has already experienced many rounds of vicissitudes of life.</b></p><p>From the portal era to Web2.0, from PC Internet to mobile Internet to industrial Internet......</p><p>In this process, industry practitioners and investors have actually been summarizing the logic and laws about this industry. Indeed, many laws and logics have been generally proved to be effective.</p><p><b>However, what I want to talk to you about today is actually the dark logic outside the four regulations.</b></p><p>I call it dark logic because the opposite of them is usually true, and the interesting thing about the Internet is:<b>There is no one-size-fits-all universal theorem, and any big logic will have exceptions when carefully observed;</b></p><p>The following is the dark logic outside the four regulations of China's Internet that I summarized-</p><p><b>1. A company with a moat is not necessarily a good company</b></p><p><b>The moat theory of enterprises originated from Buffett's discussion, that is, whether an enterprise has insurmountable advantages for other enterprises.</b></p><p>Later, Pat Dorsey summarized moats into four categories in the book \"Buffett's Moat\": 1. Intangible assets of enterprises, such as brands, patents, etc.; 2. High conversion cost; 3. Cost advantage; 4. Network effect;</p><p>Usually, we think that a company that has one or more of the above four categories of advantages has a moat. The moat is of course very important, but if a company has a moat, is it necessarily a good company worth investing in?</p><p>The answer is not necessarily.</p><p>Weibo is a very typical example.</p><p><b>Today, most people will actually admit that Weibo has a moat</b>-As a communication platform, it is the first fermentation position of any news and current affairs; As an entertainment platform, it is the first support position for fans in idolize; As an influence platform, it also has the widest and most diverse opinion leaders;</p><p><b>The almost monopoly position of these three dimensions has not been shaken since the birth of Weibo. It is indispensable and irreplaceable, which is undoubtedly a moat;</b></p><p>However, do you dare to buy Weibo's stock today?</p><p>I think at least many people dare not. According to the latest financial report, Weibo's monthly active users in Q1 2021 are 530 million, a year-on-year decrease of 4%, and its daily active users are 230 million, a year-on-year decrease of 5%.</p><p>Despite the high base last year due to the epidemic, the weak growth of Weibo users has become a high probability event.</p><p>If it does not have a new second curve, it will actually be difficult for it to gain more user time in the next competition with powerful companies such as ByteDance and Tencent.</p><p>The moat is difficult to protect Weibo.</p><p>An easy to understand logic is-<b>A moat can make it difficult for you to decline quickly, but it doesn't guarantee that you will continue to grow;</b></p><p>For Internet companies, growth is always the top priority theme and the most important life gate.</p><p>Internet companies have not done it once and for all. Those companies that eventually become giants are actually not a new trick, but are constantly expanding their combat radius and continuing to grab new territory. This is true of Tencent, Ali, and Byte.</p><p>Holding the moat of search, Baidu is of course the temporary king. It has no opponents in the search track so far, but its boundary expansion speed is a little slower, and it has been ruthlessly squeezed out of the first group.</p><p><b>Another logic about moats is-you do have a moat in your field, but your field itself is no longer important;</b></p><p>Momo, Meitu, Douban, Tianya, Xunlei... all have extremely high moats in their respective fields. They have been sitting firmly on Diaoyutai and have never been subverted by competitors. However, their respective fields themselves have become It is no longer important, the moat is still there, and the city is gone.</p><p><b>Therefore, the moat is very important, but it is dangerous to be infatuated with the moat. Don't sleep on the moat.</b></p><p>In this sense, in fact, I am still a little worried about Bilibili. The content production and consumption ecology formed by its strong stickiness to the second dimension and young users is of course its moat, which is indestructible. Watermelon Video has been attacked many times. The point.</p><p><b>But can Station B always tell this single story? Can its market-to-market dream rate finally be fulfilled?</b></p><p><b>Second, a big track is not necessarily a good track.</b></p><p>\"Investment track\" is an extremely important genre in the field of Internet investment, and the logic behind it is-<b>If a track is big enough, then it will definitely give birth to excellent companies, and as long as the excellent companies that invest in this track will definitely have long-term benefits;</b></p><p>This logic is basically correct, or it is correct to a large extent. However, there are still some tracks that don't conform to this principle.</p><p>The reason is that these tracks are crowded and lack a moat, and the brutal competition has no endgame in sight, which makes it difficult for their top players to obtain reasonable returns for a long period of time.</p><p><b>China's long video track is a typical example.</b></p><p>There is no doubt that this is a big track, and the total annual revenue of this track is expected to exceed 100 billion, which is not insignificant.</p><p>However, counting from Youku, the pioneer in 2006, the major players in this field have been losing money for 15 consecutive years. For example, iQiyi, with a full-year revenue of 29.7 billion in 2020 and a loss of 6 billion. This is still an achievement after substantial improvement.</p><p>Note that it is difficult to say that these losses are strategic losses. Even today, we still cannot see how long the losses in this field will last and when the dust will finally be settled in the industry.</p><p><b>Yes, money is the only barrier in this industry.</b></p><p>\"Later\" once reported the process of Youku and Tencent Video competing for \"Ruyi's Royal Love in the Palace\"-</p><p>Originally, the two companies friendly agreed that each company would pay 600 million yuan to buy the rights and interests of the drama's simultaneous broadcast on both platforms, but Tencent went back and thought about it, and concluded that the drama might be as popular as Empresses in the Palace, and finally decided to win the exclusive broadcast rights of the drama at a frightening price of 1.3 billion yuan.</p><p>This is a game of burning money. If only the war could be ended by burning money alone, the key life of this industry lies in-<b>Money simply can't buy user loyalty.</b></p><p>Some platforms spend more than 1 billion + to buy the broadcasting rights of the World Cup. Once the World Cup is over, users are attracted by the fresh overall situation of other platforms.</p><p>The big players in this industry are all fighting hard. Despite the large losses, no one is willing to be the first to give up, because they can't ignore the sky-high drowning cost, and they are all waiting for their opponents to withdraw.</p><p>But behind the three major platforms is BAT. Each of them has deep pockets, and they all agree that this is a war of card positions. Each of them is dreaming of \"China Netflix\".</p><p>Even if some players quit, because there are no other high barriers, there will always be new players who are eyeing up. Youku's acquisition of Tudou wanted to unify the rivers and lakes, but it quickly failed, which is a proof.</p><p>That's right, big tracks really aren't necessarily good tracks, and the aviation industry is another example.</p><p>Warren Buffett has two famous sayings about the aviation industry-</p><p>The first sentence is:<i>\"Before the first successful test flight of the plane invented by the Wright brothers in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, if a capitalist shot down it, then investors around the world might recover a lot of losses.\"</i></p><p>The second sentence is:<i>\"If you want to be a millionaire, you can be a multi-millionaire first and then buy airline stocks.\"</i></p><p><b>So, why is the aviation industry, which is a giant in scale, not a good track?</b></p><p>The reason is that the aviation industry has four characteristics: 1. High fixed costs and high debt ratio; 2. Product homogeneity and weak premium ability; 3. Consumers have many choices and extremely low brand loyalty; 4. The industry is highly cyclical and strongly influenced by the macro economy;</p><p>Based on the above characteristics, the aviation industry needs large investment, profit margins fluctuate greatly, and it is difficult to obtain sustained and long-term competitiveness due to fierce competition, so that Warren Buffett, the stock god, has repeatedly stumbled in aviation stocks.</p><p><b>Therefore, to measure whether a track is of high quality, size is actually not the only indicator, growth and health are equally important.</b></p><p><b>3. A company that leads in the early stage of the track may not be able to lead in the long term</b></p><p>Regarding this point, let me start with an example-</p><p>At the beginning of the year, when new energy vehicle stocks were at their craziest, a friend told me that he bought half of his liquidity to buy the stocks of Nio, Ideal and XPeng.</p><p>I asked him about his investment logic, and he said-</p><p><i>\"It is an extremely certain event that China's new energy will eventually rise, and I bet on these three currently leading companies. Of course, I don't know who will win in the end, but my logic is that one of them will definitely win, so as long as The stock price of this winning company triples, and I won't lose money even if the other two die at 0.\"</i></p><p>In a sense, I agree with his view, but I still kindly remind him, is it possible that China's new energy companies will not win in the end among these three companies?</p><p>He said, I didn't think about it. This possibility is relatively small.</p><p><b>I told him that it was indeed relatively unlikely, but it was not impossible, so I told him the story of the short video track-</b></p><p>At this point in 2015 and 2016, the short video track has begun to become lively, and investors have begun to judge that this is a fast-growing and large-scale track, but which teams should they invest in?</p><p>At that time, the market structure was-Miaopai was leading, Meipai was menacing, and Kuaishou was still a small company and had not entered the mainstream sight.</p><p>As a result, the leading second shot became a hot cake in the investment community. During that time, the parent company of second shot received five rounds of financing before and after Technology, of which the final E-round financing scale was as high as 500 million US dollars.</p><p>At the press conference of Series E financing, the excitement of founder Han Kun was beyond words-<i>\"The video matrix of science and technology has become the Chinese version of Youtube.\"</i></p><p>However, everyone knows the following story. A year later, Douyin Kuaishou rose, and Miaopai was helpless and was quickly marginalized.</p><p>Together, they were photographed on the beach, as well as the magnificent beautiful shots of that year.</p><p><b>So far, none of the two leading products of the short video track with countless financing had the last laugh.</b></p><p>Let's sort out the logic behind it a little: because the industry of early leading companies has not yet matured, the track actually has different requirements for the capabilities of startups. This can also explain from one aspect why Miaopai failed and Douyin succeeded..</p><p><b>Of course, there are many reasons behind this, but one of the important perspectives is the difference in focus between the two:</b></p><p>During the period when Second Shot was born and developed, China's 4G was not particularly mature, so the technical requirements for how to play the process in different network environments were very high. Han Kun, the founder of Second Shot, has always been very proud of the basic technical capabilities of Second Shot.</p><p>Before the birth of Second Shot, Han Kun had been leading the team to develop a multimedia framework system called Vitamio, which was a video technology supplier to several Internet companies.</p><p>In fact, one of the important reasons why Sina Weibo invested in second shots is that it can largely make up for the shortcomings of its own video technology.</p><p><b>Therefore, in Han Kun's cognitive framework, technology is an important barrier, and he naturally pays less attention to other variables that determine the real core of this track.</b></p><p>But in 2017, 4G matured, tariffs dropped, and technical barriers proved to be vulnerable. Recommendation algorithms and content production ecology became the real core competitiveness of short videos. In a sense, the outcome of this war may have been doomed from the beginning.</p><p><b>Therefore, it is certainly true to invest in leading companies in the early stage of the track, but it is also necessary to consider whether the core logic of this track will change, and whether the core elements required after the change are truly possessed by the leading companies now.</b></p><p><b>4. The founder does not fully represent the company's competitiveness</b></p><p>As mentioned above, an important genre in the investment field is to invest in the track, while another important genre is to invest in people. Some VCs have targeted a person and will invest no matter what he does, and will even continue to invest after many failures.</p><p><b>From the perspective of probability, the two schools of voting on the track and voting on people have very self-consistent logic, which is right in many cases.</b></p><p>However, people are very complicated, and the probability of deviation in people's judgment is actually very high. More importantly, people are a dynamic process, and entrepreneurship is a marathon. The long process has completely different requirements for founders at different stages-</p><p><b>The ability models required for entrepreneurship, business maintenance, and re-growth are very different. Only a few entrepreneurs can quickly iterate their own cognition and abilities, so as to truly lead the company from 0 to 1 and from 1 to N.</b></p><p>Let me give you an example. One of my former bosses never bought US stocks, but suddenly one day he bought Cheetah Mobile stocks.</p><p>I asked him why he bought cheetah, and he said he was optimistic about Fu Sheng.</p><p>He went on to add: Fu Sheng proved himself to be a top and excellent product manager in 360 before, and leading Cheetah to make a clean-up master overseas proved his strategic ability and execution ability. Fu Sheng is still very young, even though he may make mistakes, but he has great long-term potential.</p><p><b>However, if he bought this order, he lost the shit and doubted his life.</b></p><p>So is there really something wrong with his above logic?</p><p>Actually, not necessarily. Judging a person's ability through his history is a common method to recognize people. This logic is actually a basic operation in the field of venture capital.</p><p>This is why important directors of many big companies are usually sought after by angel capital and early-stage venture capital as soon as they announce their start-up.</p><p>A simple logic behind this is that the important directors of big factories are actually front-line fighters. They can hear the sound of guns and have done it in actual combat. Of course, the probability of success in voting for them will be greater.</p><p>So why do you lose a mess when you vote for Cheetah with the same logic?</p><p><b>The answer is the difference between the probability of casting the net in the primary market and the secondary market.</b></p><p>The logic of primary markets such as venture capital is to bet extensively, because we don't know who will be the next ByteDance, the next Pinduoduo, or the next Kuaishou. We would rather make a wrong investment than miss the big fish.</p><p>Its logical pursuit is the overall winning rate. It invests in 50 companies. In the end, as long as 2 companies can finally be successfully listed, it can Cover the failure of the remaining 48 companies, because the two listed companies may bring 100 times the return..</p><p>In terms of the success rate of a single investment, it is extremely low, that is, 96% of them are failures, but this does not affect his overall profit; (Of course, most venture capitalists can't actually achieve this probability, and these funds themselves are losing money)</p><p><b>If individual investors use the same logic to choose stocks, it is simply a nightmare, because the size of your funds basically determines that it is difficult for you to cast a wide net and diversify risks at all.</b></p><p>Looking at the company from the single dimension of \"people\" is licking blood on the tip of the knife, and the failure rate is extremely high.</p><p>Therefore, if an individual investor wants to buy stocks in a certain company, you can have countless logics, but don't just because of this one reason-\"I chose to buy it because I recognize its founder\".</p><p><b>Note that I'm not saying that founders are unimportant to a company, in fact, the importance of founders to a company cannot be overemphasized.</b></p><p>But what I want to say is that it is actually difficult for us to really judge all about a founder from an external perspective. Even for first-class venture capitalists, they can only judge a founder from a few dimensions, and sometimes this judgment is even extremely emotional.</p><p><b>Allen Zhu has publicly reviewed how he missed ByteDance many times-</b></p><p>At that time, ByteDance's theory B found Jinshajiang. After chatting with Zhang Yiming, Zhu Xiaohu intuitively judged that Zhang Yiming was too gentle and did not have the strong aura of Cheng Wei. In the end, he did not vote for ByteDance. Later, his intestines were full of regret.</p><p><b>People are complicated at all times, so don't be too confident in your own judgment.</b></p><p>OK, the above are the four dark logics of China's Internet summarized by Wei Xi. The Internet is a young industry and a changeable industry. It is evolving at an unprecedented speed, and its speed of evolution is so difficult to summarize a universal law.</p><p>The only thing this generation of young people should do is to join and embrace this industry, and feel and grasp the surging pulse of technology in practice.</p><p><b>Remember, don't lie flat.</b></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> source：<a href=\"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/b-pJUuDoniwtpA5Wo8vFvQ\">卫夕指北</a></p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/cea63431ce8de4033f967e80206303c3","relate_stocks":{"399001":"深证成指","399006":"创业板指","000001.SH":"上证指数"},"source_url":"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/b-pJUuDoniwtpA5Wo8vFvQ","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1163908633","content_text":"在中国互联网发展的短短20多年中，早已经历过多轮沧海桑田的变迁。从门户时代到Web2.0，从PC互联网到移动互联网再到产业互联网......在此过程中，行业的从业者和投资者其实一直在总结关于这个行业的逻辑和规律，的确，有很多规律和逻辑被普遍证明是有效的。然而今天我要和大家聊的其实是四条例外的暗逻辑。我之所以称之为暗逻辑，是因为它们的反面通常是正确的，而互联网的有趣之处在于：并没有放之四海而皆准的通用定理，任何一个大的逻辑仔细观察都会有例外；以下就是我总结的中国互联网的四条例外的暗逻辑——一、有护城河的公司不一定是好公司企业的护城河理论最早源于巴菲特的论述，即一个企业有没有其他企业难以逾越的优势。后来帕特·多尔西在《巴菲特的护城河》一书中将护城河总结成四类：1、企业的无形资产，比如品牌、专利等；2、高转换成本；3、成本优势；4、网络效应；通常我们认为拥有以上四类中的一类或多类优势的企业即拥有护城河，护城河当然非常重要，然而一家企业如果拥有护城河它就一定是一家值得投资的好公司吗？答案是不一定。微博就是一个非常典型的例子。今天，大部分人其实都会承认，微博是有护城河的——它作为传播平台，是任何新闻时事的第一发酵阵地；作为娱乐平台，它是粉丝追星第一应援阵地；而作为影响平台，它也坐拥了最广泛最多元的意见领袖；这三个维度几乎垄断的地位从微博一诞生其实就没有被撼动过，不可或缺，无可替代，这毫无疑问是护城河；然而，你今天敢买微博的股票吗？我想至少很多人不敢，根据最新的财报，微博2021年Q1的的月活5.3亿，同比下降4%，日活2.3亿，同比下降5%。尽管有疫情导致去年基数偏高的原因，但微博用户增长乏力已成为一个大概率事件。如果它没有新的第二曲线，它其实很难在接下来与字节跳动、腾讯等强悍公司的竞争中获得更多用户时长。护城河难以护住微博。一个容易理解的逻辑是——护城河可以让你难以很快衰落，但并不保证你继续增长；而对于互联网公司而言，增长永远是最优先的主题、最重要的命门。互联网公司没有一劳永逸，那些最终走向巨头的公司其实都不是一招鲜，而是不断拓展自己的作战半径，持续去抢新的地盘，腾讯如此、阿里如此、字节亦如此。百度抱着搜索这个护城河，当然是一时的王者，在搜索这个赛道至今没有对手，但它边界扩张速度稍微慢一点，就被无情地挤出第一集团了。关于护城河的另一个逻辑是——你在你所在领域的确有护城河，但你的领域本身不再重要了；陌陌、美图、豆瓣、天涯、迅雷.......在各自的领域都有着极高的护城河，它们一直稳坐钓鱼台，从来都没有被竞争对手颠覆过，然而它们各自的领域本身变得不再重要了，护城河还在，城没了。所以，护城河很重要，但迷恋护城河很危险，不要躺在护城河上睡觉。从这个意义上说，其实我还是稍微有点担心B站的，对二次元和年轻用户极强的黏性所构成的内容生产和消费生态当然是它的护城河，坚不可摧，西瓜视频多次强攻也不得要领。但B站能一直只讲这个单一的故事吗？它的市梦率能最终被兑现吗？二、大的赛道不一定是好赛道。“投赛道”是互联网投资领域一个极为重要的流派，它背后的逻辑是——如果一个赛道足够大，那么它一定会诞生优秀的公司，而只要投中了这个赛道的优秀公司，就一定会有长线收益；这个逻辑基本上是对的，或者说它在很大程度上是对的，然而，还是有一些赛道则并不符合这一原则。原因是这些赛道拥挤而缺乏护城河，残酷竞争却看不到终局，从而导致在相当长的一段时间内都让其头部玩家难以获得合理的收益。中国的长视频赛道就是一个典型。毫无疑问，这是一条大的赛道，这一赛道每年的总营收预计超过1000亿，不可谓不大。然而，从2006的先驱优酷算起，这个领域的主要玩家已经连续亏损15年了，比如爱奇艺，2020年全年营收297亿，亏损60亿，这还是在大幅改善之后取得的成绩。注意，很难说这些亏损属于战略型亏损，即便到今天，我们依然看不到这个领域的亏损还要持续多久，行业的终局最终何时尘埃落定。是滴，钱是这个行业唯一的壁垒。《晚点》曾经报道过优酷和腾讯视频当年争夺《如懿传》的过程——本来两家友好约定每家出6亿购买这部剧双平台同步播出的权益，但腾讯回去一思量，断定这部剧可能会像《甄嬛传》一样火遍全网，最终拍板以吓人的13亿天价拿下了这部剧的独播权。这是一个烧钱的游戏，如果仅靠烧钱就能终结战争就好了，这个行业的关键命门还在于——用钱根本买不来用户的忠诚度。有的平台花超过10亿+买下世界杯的转播权，一旦世界杯一过，用户又被其他平台的新鲜大局吸引走了。这个行业的大玩家都在硬抗，尽管大幅亏损，谁也不愿意第一个放弃，因为无法忽略天价的淹没成本，都在等着对手抗不住退出。但三大平台的背后是BAT，每一个都财大气粗，都一致认为这是卡位的战争，每一家都在做着“中国Netflix”的美梦。即便有玩家退出了，由于没有其他高壁垒，总会有虎视眈眈的新玩家参与进来，当年优酷并购土豆想一统江湖但最终很快落空就是一个明证。没错，大的赛道真的不一定是好的赛道，航空业是另一个例子。股神巴菲特关于航空业有两句名言——第一句是：“在莱特兄弟发明的飞机在北卡罗来纳州的小鹰镇第一次试飞成功之前，如果有个资本家击落它的话，那么全球各地的投资者也许会挽回很多的损失。”第二句是：“如果你想成为一名百万富翁，你可以先成为一名千万富翁，然后再买航空股。”那么，为什么在规模上属于巨无霸的航空业并不是一条好赛道呢？原因在于航空业有四大特点：1.固定成本高，负债率高；2.产品同质化，溢价能力弱；3.消费者选择多，品牌忠诚度极低；4.行业周期性强，受宏观经济影响强；正是基于以上几个特点，航空业需要投入大，利润率波动大，竞争激烈难以获得持续长期竞争力，以至于股神巴菲特也多次在航空股上载跟头。所以，衡量一条赛道是否优质，大其实并非唯一指标，增长性和健康度同样重要。三、一个赛道初期领先的公司不一定能长期领先关于这个点，我先从一个例子切入——年初新能源汽车股票最疯狂的时候，一位朋友告诉我说自己把一半的流动资金买了蔚来、理想和小鹏的三家的股票。我问他的投资逻辑，他说——“中国的新能源终将崛起是一个极其确定的事件，而我押宝这三家目前领先的公司，我当然不知道谁会最终胜出，但我的逻辑是，他们一定会有一家会胜出，那么只要这家胜出的公司股价涨三倍，另外两家哪怕归0死掉我也不会亏。”某种意义上，我是同意他的这种观点的，但我还是善意地提醒他，有没有可能中国新能源最终胜出的并不在这三家之内呢？他说，这我倒是没想过，这个可能性比较小吧。我告诉他，的确可能性会相对小，但并不是没有可能，于是我给他讲了短视频赛道的故事——在2015、2016年这个时间点，短视频这个赛道已经开始变得热闹起来，投资人开始判断这是一个成长快、规模大的赛道，但具体应该投哪些团队呢？当时的市场格局是——秒拍领先、美拍来势汹汹，快手还属于一家小公司，没有走入主流视线。于是领先的秒拍就变成了投资界的香饽饽，在那段时间，秒拍的母公司一下科技前后获得了5轮融资，其中最后的E轮融资规模高达5亿美金。在E轮融资的发布会上，创始人韩坤的兴奋溢于言表——“一下科技的视频矩阵，已经成为中国版的Youtube。”然而接下来的故事大家都知道了，一年后抖音快手崛起，秒拍毫无招架之力，被迅速边缘化。一起被拍倒在沙滩上的，还有当年气势如虹的美拍。至此，融资无数的短视频赛道的两个领先产品没有一个笑到了最后。我们稍微理一下背后的逻辑：早期领先的公司由于行业还没有发展成熟，赛道对创业公司能力要求其实是不一样的，这也能从一个侧面来解释为什么秒拍失败了而抖音成功了。这背后的原因当然很多，但其中一个重要的视角是二者的关注重点的差异：秒拍诞生发展的时期中国的4G还没有特别成熟，于是对不同网络环境下如何流程播放的技术要求是很高的，秒拍创始人韩坤其实一直非常得意的是秒拍的基础技术能力。在秒拍诞生前韩坤一直在带领团队开发一个叫Vitamio的多媒体框架系统，是多个互联网公司的视频技术供应商。事实上，新浪微博之所以投资秒拍，一个重要原因就是看重了其可以在很大程度上补齐自己视频技术的短板。所以在韩坤的认知框架里，技术是重要的壁垒，他自然就对其他决定这个赛道真正核心变量关注的少一些。但时间来到2017年，4G成熟、资费下降，技术壁垒被证明其实不堪一击，推荐算法、内容生产生态成为短视频真正的核心竞争力，某种意义上，这场战争的结局从一开始或许就早已注定。所以，投赛道早期领先公司当然没错，但也需要考虑这个赛道的核心逻辑会不会发生变化，变化之后所要求的核心要素现在领先的公司是否真正具备。四、创始人并不完全代表公司的竞争力上面谈到投资领域一个重要流派是投赛道，而另一个重要流派是投人，有的VC看准了一个人，无论他做什么都会投，甚至多次失败之后还会继续投。从概率的角度，投赛道投人这两个流派都有着非常自洽的逻辑，在很多情况下都是对的。然而，人是很复杂的，对人的判断出现偏差的概率其实非常大，更重要的是，人是一个动态的过程，创业是一场马拉松，漫长的过程在不同的阶段对创始人的要求是截然不同的——创业、守业、再增长所要求的能力模型差异非常大，只有凤毛麟角的创业者能快速迭代自己的认知和能力，从而真正带领公司从0到1、从1到N。我举一个例子，我之前的一个上司，从不买美股，但突然有一天买了猎豹移动的股票。我问他为什么买猎豹，他说看好傅盛这个人。他接着补充：傅盛之前在360证明了自己是顶级优秀的产品经理，而带领猎豹独辟蹊径在海外做出清理大师则证明了他的战略能力和执行力，而傅盛还很年轻，即便可能犯错，但长期潜力很大。然而，他这一单买下去，亏得屁滚尿流，亏得怀疑人生。那么是他以上的逻辑真的有问题吗？其实不见得，通过一个人的历史判断一个人的能力是识人常用的方法，这样的逻辑在风险投资领域其实属于基本操作。这也是为什么很多大厂的重要总监只要一宣布创业，通常会受到天使资本和早期风投的追捧。这背后一个简单的逻辑就是，大厂的重要总监们其实是一线的战斗者，他们听得见炮声，真枪实战地做过，投他们成功的概率当然会大一些。那么为什么以同样的逻辑投猎豹就输得一塌糊涂呢？答案是一级市场和二级市场撒网概率的区别。风险投资这类一级市场的逻辑是广泛押宝，因为根本不知道到底谁是下一个字节跳动，下一个拼多多，下一个快手，宁可投错也不能错过大鱼。它的逻辑追求的是整体的胜率，投50家企业，最终只要有2家能最终成功上市，就能Cover掉剩下48家的失败，因为上市的这两家可能带来100倍的回报。而从单笔投资成功率讲，它是极低的，即96%都是失败，但这不影响他整体赚钱；（当然大部分风投其实做不到这样的概率，这些基金本身也是亏钱的）如果个人投资者也用同样的逻辑去选股票，那简直就是噩梦，因为你的资金规模基本决定你很难广撒网，完全做不到分散风险。从“人”这一单一维度去看公司就是在刀尖上舔血、失败率极高。因此，个人投资者如果想要买某个公司的股票，你可以有无数种逻辑，但千万不要只因为这一个理由——“我选择买它是因为我认可它的创始人”。注意，我并不是说创始人对一家公司不重要，事实上，创始人对一家公司的重要性无论如何强调都不过分。但我要说的是，我们其实很难从一个外部视角真正判断一个创始人的全部，即便对于一流的风险投资人而言，他们在判断一个创始人的时候也仅仅只能从几个少数维度进行判断，有时候这种判断甚至是极其感性的。朱啸虎就多次公开检讨自己是如何错过字节跳动的——当时字节跳动B论找到金沙江，朱啸虎当时和张一鸣聊完之后凭直觉判断张一鸣这个人太斯文，没有程维那种强大的气场，最终没有投字节跳动，后来，他肠子都悔青了。人，任何时候都很复杂，不要对自己的判断力太自信。OK，以上就是卫夕总结的中国互联网的四大暗逻辑，互联网是一个年轻的产业，也是一个多变的行业，它在以前所未有的速度进化，它进化的速度以至于很难总结放之四海而皆准的规律。这一代年轻人唯一应该做的就是投身和拥抱这个行业，在实践中感受和把握技术汹涌澎湃的的脉搏。记住，别躺平。","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"399001":0.9,"399006":0.9,"000001.SH":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1355,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":115812932,"gmtCreate":1622969923626,"gmtModify":1704193945362,"author":{"id":"3586061661476454","authorId":"3586061661476454","name":"Zonghan8116","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3586061661476454","idStr":"3586061661476454"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"Like and comment","listText":"Like and comment","text":"Like and comment","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/115812932","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1188,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":115816757,"gmtCreate":1622969886579,"gmtModify":1704193945039,"author":{"id":"3586061661476454","authorId":"3586061661476454","name":"Zonghan8116","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3586061661476454","idStr":"3586061661476454"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"Like and comment","listText":"Like and comment","text":"Like and comment","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/115816757","repostId":"1163908633","repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1163908633","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1622948959,"share":"https://ttm.financial/m/news/1163908633?lang=en_US&edition=fundamental","pubTime":"2021-06-06 11:09","market":"sh","language":"zh","title":"Four Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1163908633","media":"卫夕指北","summary":"在中国互联网发展的短短20多年中，早已经历过多轮沧海桑田的变迁。从门户时代到Web2.0，从PC互联网到移动互联网再到产业互联网......在此过程中，行业的从业者和投资者其实一直在总结关于这个行业的","content":"<p><b>In the short 20 years of Internet development in China, it has already experienced many rounds of vicissitudes of life.</b></p><p>From the portal era to Web2.0, from PC Internet to mobile Internet to industrial Internet......</p><p>In this process, industry practitioners and investors have actually been summarizing the logic and laws about this industry. Indeed, many laws and logics have been generally proved to be effective.</p><p><b>However, what I want to talk to you about today is actually the dark logic outside the four regulations.</b></p><p>I call it dark logic because the opposite of them is usually true, and the interesting thing about the Internet is:<b>There is no one-size-fits-all universal theorem, and any big logic will have exceptions when carefully observed;</b></p><p>The following is the dark logic outside the four regulations of China's Internet that I summarized-</p><p><b>1. A company with a moat is not necessarily a good company</b></p><p><b>The moat theory of enterprises originated from Buffett's discussion, that is, whether an enterprise has insurmountable advantages for other enterprises.</b></p><p>Later, Pat Dorsey summarized moats into four categories in the book \"Buffett's Moat\": 1. Intangible assets of enterprises, such as brands, patents, etc.; 2. High conversion cost; 3. Cost advantage; 4. Network effect;</p><p>Usually, we think that a company that has one or more of the above four categories of advantages has a moat. The moat is of course very important, but if a company has a moat, is it necessarily a good company worth investing in?</p><p>The answer is not necessarily.</p><p>Weibo is a very typical example.</p><p><b>Today, most people will actually admit that Weibo has a moat</b>-As a communication platform, it is the first fermentation position of any news and current affairs; As an entertainment platform, it is the first support position for fans in idolize; As an influence platform, it also has the widest and most diverse opinion leaders;</p><p><b>The almost monopoly position of these three dimensions has not been shaken since the birth of Weibo. It is indispensable and irreplaceable, which is undoubtedly a moat;</b></p><p>However, do you dare to buy Weibo's stock today?</p><p>I think at least many people dare not. According to the latest financial report, Weibo's monthly active users in Q1 2021 are 530 million, a year-on-year decrease of 4%, and its daily active users are 230 million, a year-on-year decrease of 5%.</p><p>Despite the high base last year due to the epidemic, the weak growth of Weibo users has become a high probability event.</p><p>If it does not have a new second curve, it will actually be difficult for it to gain more user time in the next competition with powerful companies such as ByteDance and Tencent.</p><p>The moat is difficult to protect Weibo.</p><p>An easy to understand logic is-<b>A moat can make it difficult for you to decline quickly, but it doesn't guarantee that you will continue to grow;</b></p><p>For Internet companies, growth is always the top priority theme and the most important life gate.</p><p>Internet companies have not done it once and for all. Those companies that eventually become giants are actually not a new trick, but are constantly expanding their combat radius and continuing to grab new territory. This is true of Tencent, Ali, and Byte.</p><p>Holding the moat of search, Baidu is of course the temporary king. It has no opponents in the search track so far, but its boundary expansion speed is a little slower, and it has been ruthlessly squeezed out of the first group.</p><p><b>Another logic about moats is-you do have a moat in your field, but your field itself is no longer important;</b></p><p>Momo, Meitu, Douban, Tianya, Xunlei... all have extremely high moats in their respective fields. They have been sitting firmly on Diaoyutai and have never been subverted by competitors. However, their respective fields themselves have become It is no longer important, the moat is still there, and the city is gone.</p><p><b>Therefore, the moat is very important, but it is dangerous to be infatuated with the moat. Don't sleep on the moat.</b></p><p>In this sense, in fact, I am still a little worried about Bilibili. The content production and consumption ecology formed by its strong stickiness to the second dimension and young users is of course its moat, which is indestructible. Watermelon Video has been attacked many times. The point.</p><p><b>But can Station B always tell this single story? Can its market-to-market dream rate finally be fulfilled?</b></p><p><b>Second, a big track is not necessarily a good track.</b></p><p>\"Investment track\" is an extremely important genre in the field of Internet investment, and the logic behind it is-<b>If a track is big enough, then it will definitely give birth to excellent companies, and as long as the excellent companies that invest in this track will definitely have long-term benefits;</b></p><p>This logic is basically correct, or it is correct to a large extent. However, there are still some tracks that don't conform to this principle.</p><p>The reason is that these tracks are crowded and lack a moat, and the brutal competition has no endgame in sight, which makes it difficult for their top players to obtain reasonable returns for a long period of time.</p><p><b>China's long video track is a typical example.</b></p><p>There is no doubt that this is a big track, and the total annual revenue of this track is expected to exceed 100 billion, which is not insignificant.</p><p>However, counting from Youku, the pioneer in 2006, the major players in this field have been losing money for 15 consecutive years. For example, iQiyi, with a full-year revenue of 29.7 billion in 2020 and a loss of 6 billion. This is still an achievement after substantial improvement.</p><p>Note that it is difficult to say that these losses are strategic losses. Even today, we still cannot see how long the losses in this field will last and when the dust will finally be settled in the industry.</p><p><b>Yes, money is the only barrier in this industry.</b></p><p>\"Later\" once reported the process of Youku and Tencent Video competing for \"Ruyi's Royal Love in the Palace\"-</p><p>Originally, the two companies friendly agreed that each company would pay 600 million yuan to buy the rights and interests of the drama's simultaneous broadcast on both platforms, but Tencent went back and thought about it, and concluded that the drama might be as popular as Empresses in the Palace, and finally decided to win the exclusive broadcast rights of the drama at a frightening price of 1.3 billion yuan.</p><p>This is a game of burning money. If only the war could be ended by burning money alone, the key life of this industry lies in-<b>Money simply can't buy user loyalty.</b></p><p>Some platforms spend more than 1 billion + to buy the broadcasting rights of the World Cup. Once the World Cup is over, users are attracted by the fresh overall situation of other platforms.</p><p>The big players in this industry are all fighting hard. Despite the large losses, no one is willing to be the first to give up, because they can't ignore the sky-high drowning cost, and they are all waiting for their opponents to withdraw.</p><p>But behind the three major platforms is BAT. Each of them has deep pockets, and they all agree that this is a war of card positions. Each of them is dreaming of \"China Netflix\".</p><p>Even if some players quit, because there are no other high barriers, there will always be new players who are eyeing up. Youku's acquisition of Tudou wanted to unify the rivers and lakes, but it quickly failed, which is a proof.</p><p>That's right, big tracks really aren't necessarily good tracks, and the aviation industry is another example.</p><p>Warren Buffett has two famous sayings about the aviation industry-</p><p>The first sentence is:<i>\"Before the first successful test flight of the plane invented by the Wright brothers in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, if a capitalist shot down it, then investors around the world might recover a lot of losses.\"</i></p><p>The second sentence is:<i>\"If you want to be a millionaire, you can be a multi-millionaire first and then buy airline stocks.\"</i></p><p><b>So, why is the aviation industry, which is a giant in scale, not a good track?</b></p><p>The reason is that the aviation industry has four characteristics: 1. High fixed costs and high debt ratio; 2. Product homogeneity and weak premium ability; 3. Consumers have many choices and extremely low brand loyalty; 4. The industry is highly cyclical and strongly influenced by the macro economy;</p><p>Based on the above characteristics, the aviation industry needs large investment, profit margins fluctuate greatly, and it is difficult to obtain sustained and long-term competitiveness due to fierce competition, so that Warren Buffett, the stock god, has repeatedly stumbled in aviation stocks.</p><p><b>Therefore, to measure whether a track is of high quality, size is actually not the only indicator, growth and health are equally important.</b></p><p><b>3. A company that leads in the early stage of the track may not be able to lead in the long term</b></p><p>Regarding this point, let me start with an example-</p><p>At the beginning of the year, when new energy vehicle stocks were at their craziest, a friend told me that he bought half of his liquidity to buy the stocks of Nio, Ideal and XPeng.</p><p>I asked him about his investment logic, and he said-</p><p><i>\"It is an extremely certain event that China's new energy will eventually rise, and I bet on these three currently leading companies. Of course, I don't know who will win in the end, but my logic is that one of them will definitely win, so as long as The stock price of this winning company triples, and I won't lose money even if the other two die at 0.\"</i></p><p>In a sense, I agree with his view, but I still kindly remind him, is it possible that China's new energy companies will not win in the end among these three companies?</p><p>He said, I didn't think about it. This possibility is relatively small.</p><p><b>I told him that it was indeed relatively unlikely, but it was not impossible, so I told him the story of the short video track-</b></p><p>At this point in 2015 and 2016, the short video track has begun to become lively, and investors have begun to judge that this is a fast-growing and large-scale track, but which teams should they invest in?</p><p>At that time, the market structure was-Miaopai was leading, Meipai was menacing, and Kuaishou was still a small company and had not entered the mainstream sight.</p><p>As a result, the leading second shot became a hot cake in the investment community. During that time, the parent company of second shot received five rounds of financing before and after Technology, of which the final E-round financing scale was as high as 500 million US dollars.</p><p>At the press conference of Series E financing, the excitement of founder Han Kun was beyond words-<i>\"The video matrix of science and technology has become the Chinese version of Youtube.\"</i></p><p>However, everyone knows the following story. A year later, Douyin Kuaishou rose, and Miaopai was helpless and was quickly marginalized.</p><p>Together, they were photographed on the beach, as well as the magnificent beautiful shots of that year.</p><p><b>So far, none of the two leading products of the short video track with countless financing had the last laugh.</b></p><p>Let's sort out the logic behind it a little: because the industry of early leading companies has not yet matured, the track actually has different requirements for the capabilities of startups. This can also explain from one aspect why Miaopai failed and Douyin succeeded..</p><p><b>Of course, there are many reasons behind this, but one of the important perspectives is the difference in focus between the two:</b></p><p>During the period when Second Shot was born and developed, China's 4G was not particularly mature, so the technical requirements for how to play the process in different network environments were very high. Han Kun, the founder of Second Shot, has always been very proud of the basic technical capabilities of Second Shot.</p><p>Before the birth of Second Shot, Han Kun had been leading the team to develop a multimedia framework system called Vitamio, which was a video technology supplier to several Internet companies.</p><p>In fact, one of the important reasons why Sina Weibo invested in second shots is that it can largely make up for the shortcomings of its own video technology.</p><p><b>Therefore, in Han Kun's cognitive framework, technology is an important barrier, and he naturally pays less attention to other variables that determine the real core of this track.</b></p><p>But in 2017, 4G matured, tariffs dropped, and technical barriers proved to be vulnerable. Recommendation algorithms and content production ecology became the real core competitiveness of short videos. In a sense, the outcome of this war may have been doomed from the beginning.</p><p><b>Therefore, it is certainly true to invest in leading companies in the early stage of the track, but it is also necessary to consider whether the core logic of this track will change, and whether the core elements required after the change are truly possessed by the leading companies now.</b></p><p><b>4. The founder does not fully represent the company's competitiveness</b></p><p>As mentioned above, an important genre in the investment field is to invest in the track, while another important genre is to invest in people. Some VCs have targeted a person and will invest no matter what he does, and will even continue to invest after many failures.</p><p><b>From the perspective of probability, the two schools of voting on the track and voting on people have very self-consistent logic, which is right in many cases.</b></p><p>However, people are very complicated, and the probability of deviation in people's judgment is actually very high. More importantly, people are a dynamic process, and entrepreneurship is a marathon. The long process has completely different requirements for founders at different stages-</p><p><b>The ability models required for entrepreneurship, business maintenance, and re-growth are very different. Only a few entrepreneurs can quickly iterate their own cognition and abilities, so as to truly lead the company from 0 to 1 and from 1 to N.</b></p><p>Let me give you an example. One of my former bosses never bought US stocks, but suddenly one day he bought Cheetah Mobile stocks.</p><p>I asked him why he bought cheetah, and he said he was optimistic about Fu Sheng.</p><p>He went on to add: Fu Sheng proved himself to be a top and excellent product manager in 360 before, and leading Cheetah to make a clean-up master overseas proved his strategic ability and execution ability. Fu Sheng is still very young, even though he may make mistakes, but he has great long-term potential.</p><p><b>However, if he bought this order, he lost the shit and doubted his life.</b></p><p>So is there really something wrong with his above logic?</p><p>Actually, not necessarily. Judging a person's ability through his history is a common method to recognize people. This logic is actually a basic operation in the field of venture capital.</p><p>This is why important directors of many big companies are usually sought after by angel capital and early-stage venture capital as soon as they announce their start-up.</p><p>A simple logic behind this is that the important directors of big factories are actually front-line fighters. They can hear the sound of guns and have done it in actual combat. Of course, the probability of success in voting for them will be greater.</p><p>So why do you lose a mess when you vote for Cheetah with the same logic?</p><p><b>The answer is the difference between the probability of casting the net in the primary market and the secondary market.</b></p><p>The logic of primary markets such as venture capital is to bet extensively, because we don't know who will be the next ByteDance, the next Pinduoduo, or the next Kuaishou. We would rather make a wrong investment than miss the big fish.</p><p>Its logical pursuit is the overall winning rate. It invests in 50 companies. In the end, as long as 2 companies can finally be successfully listed, it can Cover the failure of the remaining 48 companies, because the two listed companies may bring 100 times the return..</p><p>In terms of the success rate of a single investment, it is extremely low, that is, 96% of them are failures, but this does not affect his overall profit; (Of course, most venture capitalists can't actually achieve this probability, and these funds themselves are losing money)</p><p><b>If individual investors use the same logic to choose stocks, it is simply a nightmare, because the size of your funds basically determines that it is difficult for you to cast a wide net and diversify risks at all.</b></p><p>Looking at the company from the single dimension of \"people\" is licking blood on the tip of the knife, and the failure rate is extremely high.</p><p>Therefore, if an individual investor wants to buy stocks in a certain company, you can have countless logics, but don't just because of this one reason-\"I chose to buy it because I recognize its founder\".</p><p><b>Note that I'm not saying that founders are unimportant to a company, in fact, the importance of founders to a company cannot be overemphasized.</b></p><p>But what I want to say is that it is actually difficult for us to really judge all about a founder from an external perspective. Even for first-class venture capitalists, they can only judge a founder from a few dimensions, and sometimes this judgment is even extremely emotional.</p><p><b>Allen Zhu has publicly reviewed how he missed ByteDance many times-</b></p><p>At that time, ByteDance's theory B found Jinshajiang. After chatting with Zhang Yiming, Zhu Xiaohu intuitively judged that Zhang Yiming was too gentle and did not have the strong aura of Cheng Wei. In the end, he did not vote for ByteDance. Later, his intestines were full of regret.</p><p><b>People are complicated at all times, so don't be too confident in your own judgment.</b></p><p>OK, the above are the four dark logics of China's Internet summarized by Wei Xi. The Internet is a young industry and a changeable industry. It is evolving at an unprecedented speed, and its speed of evolution is so difficult to summarize a universal law.</p><p>The only thing this generation of young people should do is to join and embrace this industry, and feel and grasp the surging pulse of technology in practice.</p><p><b>Remember, don't lie flat.</b></p>","source":"wxzb","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Four Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nFour Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">卫夕指北</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-06-06 11:09</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><b>In the short 20 years of Internet development in China, it has already experienced many rounds of vicissitudes of life.</b></p><p>From the portal era to Web2.0, from PC Internet to mobile Internet to industrial Internet......</p><p>In this process, industry practitioners and investors have actually been summarizing the logic and laws about this industry. Indeed, many laws and logics have been generally proved to be effective.</p><p><b>However, what I want to talk to you about today is actually the dark logic outside the four regulations.</b></p><p>I call it dark logic because the opposite of them is usually true, and the interesting thing about the Internet is:<b>There is no one-size-fits-all universal theorem, and any big logic will have exceptions when carefully observed;</b></p><p>The following is the dark logic outside the four regulations of China's Internet that I summarized-</p><p><b>1. A company with a moat is not necessarily a good company</b></p><p><b>The moat theory of enterprises originated from Buffett's discussion, that is, whether an enterprise has insurmountable advantages for other enterprises.</b></p><p>Later, Pat Dorsey summarized moats into four categories in the book \"Buffett's Moat\": 1. Intangible assets of enterprises, such as brands, patents, etc.; 2. High conversion cost; 3. Cost advantage; 4. Network effect;</p><p>Usually, we think that a company that has one or more of the above four categories of advantages has a moat. The moat is of course very important, but if a company has a moat, is it necessarily a good company worth investing in?</p><p>The answer is not necessarily.</p><p>Weibo is a very typical example.</p><p><b>Today, most people will actually admit that Weibo has a moat</b>-As a communication platform, it is the first fermentation position of any news and current affairs; As an entertainment platform, it is the first support position for fans in idolize; As an influence platform, it also has the widest and most diverse opinion leaders;</p><p><b>The almost monopoly position of these three dimensions has not been shaken since the birth of Weibo. It is indispensable and irreplaceable, which is undoubtedly a moat;</b></p><p>However, do you dare to buy Weibo's stock today?</p><p>I think at least many people dare not. According to the latest financial report, Weibo's monthly active users in Q1 2021 are 530 million, a year-on-year decrease of 4%, and its daily active users are 230 million, a year-on-year decrease of 5%.</p><p>Despite the high base last year due to the epidemic, the weak growth of Weibo users has become a high probability event.</p><p>If it does not have a new second curve, it will actually be difficult for it to gain more user time in the next competition with powerful companies such as ByteDance and Tencent.</p><p>The moat is difficult to protect Weibo.</p><p>An easy to understand logic is-<b>A moat can make it difficult for you to decline quickly, but it doesn't guarantee that you will continue to grow;</b></p><p>For Internet companies, growth is always the top priority theme and the most important life gate.</p><p>Internet companies have not done it once and for all. Those companies that eventually become giants are actually not a new trick, but are constantly expanding their combat radius and continuing to grab new territory. This is true of Tencent, Ali, and Byte.</p><p>Holding the moat of search, Baidu is of course the temporary king. It has no opponents in the search track so far, but its boundary expansion speed is a little slower, and it has been ruthlessly squeezed out of the first group.</p><p><b>Another logic about moats is-you do have a moat in your field, but your field itself is no longer important;</b></p><p>Momo, Meitu, Douban, Tianya, Xunlei... all have extremely high moats in their respective fields. They have been sitting firmly on Diaoyutai and have never been subverted by competitors. However, their respective fields themselves have become It is no longer important, the moat is still there, and the city is gone.</p><p><b>Therefore, the moat is very important, but it is dangerous to be infatuated with the moat. Don't sleep on the moat.</b></p><p>In this sense, in fact, I am still a little worried about Bilibili. The content production and consumption ecology formed by its strong stickiness to the second dimension and young users is of course its moat, which is indestructible. Watermelon Video has been attacked many times. The point.</p><p><b>But can Station B always tell this single story? Can its market-to-market dream rate finally be fulfilled?</b></p><p><b>Second, a big track is not necessarily a good track.</b></p><p>\"Investment track\" is an extremely important genre in the field of Internet investment, and the logic behind it is-<b>If a track is big enough, then it will definitely give birth to excellent companies, and as long as the excellent companies that invest in this track will definitely have long-term benefits;</b></p><p>This logic is basically correct, or it is correct to a large extent. However, there are still some tracks that don't conform to this principle.</p><p>The reason is that these tracks are crowded and lack a moat, and the brutal competition has no endgame in sight, which makes it difficult for their top players to obtain reasonable returns for a long period of time.</p><p><b>China's long video track is a typical example.</b></p><p>There is no doubt that this is a big track, and the total annual revenue of this track is expected to exceed 100 billion, which is not insignificant.</p><p>However, counting from Youku, the pioneer in 2006, the major players in this field have been losing money for 15 consecutive years. For example, iQiyi, with a full-year revenue of 29.7 billion in 2020 and a loss of 6 billion. This is still an achievement after substantial improvement.</p><p>Note that it is difficult to say that these losses are strategic losses. Even today, we still cannot see how long the losses in this field will last and when the dust will finally be settled in the industry.</p><p><b>Yes, money is the only barrier in this industry.</b></p><p>\"Later\" once reported the process of Youku and Tencent Video competing for \"Ruyi's Royal Love in the Palace\"-</p><p>Originally, the two companies friendly agreed that each company would pay 600 million yuan to buy the rights and interests of the drama's simultaneous broadcast on both platforms, but Tencent went back and thought about it, and concluded that the drama might be as popular as Empresses in the Palace, and finally decided to win the exclusive broadcast rights of the drama at a frightening price of 1.3 billion yuan.</p><p>This is a game of burning money. If only the war could be ended by burning money alone, the key life of this industry lies in-<b>Money simply can't buy user loyalty.</b></p><p>Some platforms spend more than 1 billion + to buy the broadcasting rights of the World Cup. Once the World Cup is over, users are attracted by the fresh overall situation of other platforms.</p><p>The big players in this industry are all fighting hard. Despite the large losses, no one is willing to be the first to give up, because they can't ignore the sky-high drowning cost, and they are all waiting for their opponents to withdraw.</p><p>But behind the three major platforms is BAT. Each of them has deep pockets, and they all agree that this is a war of card positions. Each of them is dreaming of \"China Netflix\".</p><p>Even if some players quit, because there are no other high barriers, there will always be new players who are eyeing up. Youku's acquisition of Tudou wanted to unify the rivers and lakes, but it quickly failed, which is a proof.</p><p>That's right, big tracks really aren't necessarily good tracks, and the aviation industry is another example.</p><p>Warren Buffett has two famous sayings about the aviation industry-</p><p>The first sentence is:<i>\"Before the first successful test flight of the plane invented by the Wright brothers in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, if a capitalist shot down it, then investors around the world might recover a lot of losses.\"</i></p><p>The second sentence is:<i>\"If you want to be a millionaire, you can be a multi-millionaire first and then buy airline stocks.\"</i></p><p><b>So, why is the aviation industry, which is a giant in scale, not a good track?</b></p><p>The reason is that the aviation industry has four characteristics: 1. High fixed costs and high debt ratio; 2. Product homogeneity and weak premium ability; 3. Consumers have many choices and extremely low brand loyalty; 4. The industry is highly cyclical and strongly influenced by the macro economy;</p><p>Based on the above characteristics, the aviation industry needs large investment, profit margins fluctuate greatly, and it is difficult to obtain sustained and long-term competitiveness due to fierce competition, so that Warren Buffett, the stock god, has repeatedly stumbled in aviation stocks.</p><p><b>Therefore, to measure whether a track is of high quality, size is actually not the only indicator, growth and health are equally important.</b></p><p><b>3. A company that leads in the early stage of the track may not be able to lead in the long term</b></p><p>Regarding this point, let me start with an example-</p><p>At the beginning of the year, when new energy vehicle stocks were at their craziest, a friend told me that he bought half of his liquidity to buy the stocks of Nio, Ideal and XPeng.</p><p>I asked him about his investment logic, and he said-</p><p><i>\"It is an extremely certain event that China's new energy will eventually rise, and I bet on these three currently leading companies. Of course, I don't know who will win in the end, but my logic is that one of them will definitely win, so as long as The stock price of this winning company triples, and I won't lose money even if the other two die at 0.\"</i></p><p>In a sense, I agree with his view, but I still kindly remind him, is it possible that China's new energy companies will not win in the end among these three companies?</p><p>He said, I didn't think about it. This possibility is relatively small.</p><p><b>I told him that it was indeed relatively unlikely, but it was not impossible, so I told him the story of the short video track-</b></p><p>At this point in 2015 and 2016, the short video track has begun to become lively, and investors have begun to judge that this is a fast-growing and large-scale track, but which teams should they invest in?</p><p>At that time, the market structure was-Miaopai was leading, Meipai was menacing, and Kuaishou was still a small company and had not entered the mainstream sight.</p><p>As a result, the leading second shot became a hot cake in the investment community. During that time, the parent company of second shot received five rounds of financing before and after Technology, of which the final E-round financing scale was as high as 500 million US dollars.</p><p>At the press conference of Series E financing, the excitement of founder Han Kun was beyond words-<i>\"The video matrix of science and technology has become the Chinese version of Youtube.\"</i></p><p>However, everyone knows the following story. A year later, Douyin Kuaishou rose, and Miaopai was helpless and was quickly marginalized.</p><p>Together, they were photographed on the beach, as well as the magnificent beautiful shots of that year.</p><p><b>So far, none of the two leading products of the short video track with countless financing had the last laugh.</b></p><p>Let's sort out the logic behind it a little: because the industry of early leading companies has not yet matured, the track actually has different requirements for the capabilities of startups. This can also explain from one aspect why Miaopai failed and Douyin succeeded..</p><p><b>Of course, there are many reasons behind this, but one of the important perspectives is the difference in focus between the two:</b></p><p>During the period when Second Shot was born and developed, China's 4G was not particularly mature, so the technical requirements for how to play the process in different network environments were very high. Han Kun, the founder of Second Shot, has always been very proud of the basic technical capabilities of Second Shot.</p><p>Before the birth of Second Shot, Han Kun had been leading the team to develop a multimedia framework system called Vitamio, which was a video technology supplier to several Internet companies.</p><p>In fact, one of the important reasons why Sina Weibo invested in second shots is that it can largely make up for the shortcomings of its own video technology.</p><p><b>Therefore, in Han Kun's cognitive framework, technology is an important barrier, and he naturally pays less attention to other variables that determine the real core of this track.</b></p><p>But in 2017, 4G matured, tariffs dropped, and technical barriers proved to be vulnerable. Recommendation algorithms and content production ecology became the real core competitiveness of short videos. In a sense, the outcome of this war may have been doomed from the beginning.</p><p><b>Therefore, it is certainly true to invest in leading companies in the early stage of the track, but it is also necessary to consider whether the core logic of this track will change, and whether the core elements required after the change are truly possessed by the leading companies now.</b></p><p><b>4. The founder does not fully represent the company's competitiveness</b></p><p>As mentioned above, an important genre in the investment field is to invest in the track, while another important genre is to invest in people. Some VCs have targeted a person and will invest no matter what he does, and will even continue to invest after many failures.</p><p><b>From the perspective of probability, the two schools of voting on the track and voting on people have very self-consistent logic, which is right in many cases.</b></p><p>However, people are very complicated, and the probability of deviation in people's judgment is actually very high. More importantly, people are a dynamic process, and entrepreneurship is a marathon. The long process has completely different requirements for founders at different stages-</p><p><b>The ability models required for entrepreneurship, business maintenance, and re-growth are very different. Only a few entrepreneurs can quickly iterate their own cognition and abilities, so as to truly lead the company from 0 to 1 and from 1 to N.</b></p><p>Let me give you an example. One of my former bosses never bought US stocks, but suddenly one day he bought Cheetah Mobile stocks.</p><p>I asked him why he bought cheetah, and he said he was optimistic about Fu Sheng.</p><p>He went on to add: Fu Sheng proved himself to be a top and excellent product manager in 360 before, and leading Cheetah to make a clean-up master overseas proved his strategic ability and execution ability. Fu Sheng is still very young, even though he may make mistakes, but he has great long-term potential.</p><p><b>However, if he bought this order, he lost the shit and doubted his life.</b></p><p>So is there really something wrong with his above logic?</p><p>Actually, not necessarily. Judging a person's ability through his history is a common method to recognize people. This logic is actually a basic operation in the field of venture capital.</p><p>This is why important directors of many big companies are usually sought after by angel capital and early-stage venture capital as soon as they announce their start-up.</p><p>A simple logic behind this is that the important directors of big factories are actually front-line fighters. They can hear the sound of guns and have done it in actual combat. Of course, the probability of success in voting for them will be greater.</p><p>So why do you lose a mess when you vote for Cheetah with the same logic?</p><p><b>The answer is the difference between the probability of casting the net in the primary market and the secondary market.</b></p><p>The logic of primary markets such as venture capital is to bet extensively, because we don't know who will be the next ByteDance, the next Pinduoduo, or the next Kuaishou. We would rather make a wrong investment than miss the big fish.</p><p>Its logical pursuit is the overall winning rate. It invests in 50 companies. In the end, as long as 2 companies can finally be successfully listed, it can Cover the failure of the remaining 48 companies, because the two listed companies may bring 100 times the return..</p><p>In terms of the success rate of a single investment, it is extremely low, that is, 96% of them are failures, but this does not affect his overall profit; (Of course, most venture capitalists can't actually achieve this probability, and these funds themselves are losing money)</p><p><b>If individual investors use the same logic to choose stocks, it is simply a nightmare, because the size of your funds basically determines that it is difficult for you to cast a wide net and diversify risks at all.</b></p><p>Looking at the company from the single dimension of \"people\" is licking blood on the tip of the knife, and the failure rate is extremely high.</p><p>Therefore, if an individual investor wants to buy stocks in a certain company, you can have countless logics, but don't just because of this one reason-\"I chose to buy it because I recognize its founder\".</p><p><b>Note that I'm not saying that founders are unimportant to a company, in fact, the importance of founders to a company cannot be overemphasized.</b></p><p>But what I want to say is that it is actually difficult for us to really judge all about a founder from an external perspective. Even for first-class venture capitalists, they can only judge a founder from a few dimensions, and sometimes this judgment is even extremely emotional.</p><p><b>Allen Zhu has publicly reviewed how he missed ByteDance many times-</b></p><p>At that time, ByteDance's theory B found Jinshajiang. After chatting with Zhang Yiming, Zhu Xiaohu intuitively judged that Zhang Yiming was too gentle and did not have the strong aura of Cheng Wei. In the end, he did not vote for ByteDance. Later, his intestines were full of regret.</p><p><b>People are complicated at all times, so don't be too confident in your own judgment.</b></p><p>OK, the above are the four dark logics of China's Internet summarized by Wei Xi. The Internet is a young industry and a changeable industry. It is evolving at an unprecedented speed, and its speed of evolution is so difficult to summarize a universal law.</p><p>The only thing this generation of young people should do is to join and embrace this industry, and feel and grasp the surging pulse of technology in practice.</p><p><b>Remember, don't lie flat.</b></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> source：<a href=\"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/b-pJUuDoniwtpA5Wo8vFvQ\">卫夕指北</a></p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/cea63431ce8de4033f967e80206303c3","relate_stocks":{"399001":"深证成指","399006":"创业板指","000001.SH":"上证指数"},"source_url":"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/b-pJUuDoniwtpA5Wo8vFvQ","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1163908633","content_text":"在中国互联网发展的短短20多年中，早已经历过多轮沧海桑田的变迁。从门户时代到Web2.0，从PC互联网到移动互联网再到产业互联网......在此过程中，行业的从业者和投资者其实一直在总结关于这个行业的逻辑和规律，的确，有很多规律和逻辑被普遍证明是有效的。然而今天我要和大家聊的其实是四条例外的暗逻辑。我之所以称之为暗逻辑，是因为它们的反面通常是正确的，而互联网的有趣之处在于：并没有放之四海而皆准的通用定理，任何一个大的逻辑仔细观察都会有例外；以下就是我总结的中国互联网的四条例外的暗逻辑——一、有护城河的公司不一定是好公司企业的护城河理论最早源于巴菲特的论述，即一个企业有没有其他企业难以逾越的优势。后来帕特·多尔西在《巴菲特的护城河》一书中将护城河总结成四类：1、企业的无形资产，比如品牌、专利等；2、高转换成本；3、成本优势；4、网络效应；通常我们认为拥有以上四类中的一类或多类优势的企业即拥有护城河，护城河当然非常重要，然而一家企业如果拥有护城河它就一定是一家值得投资的好公司吗？答案是不一定。微博就是一个非常典型的例子。今天，大部分人其实都会承认，微博是有护城河的——它作为传播平台，是任何新闻时事的第一发酵阵地；作为娱乐平台，它是粉丝追星第一应援阵地；而作为影响平台，它也坐拥了最广泛最多元的意见领袖；这三个维度几乎垄断的地位从微博一诞生其实就没有被撼动过，不可或缺，无可替代，这毫无疑问是护城河；然而，你今天敢买微博的股票吗？我想至少很多人不敢，根据最新的财报，微博2021年Q1的的月活5.3亿，同比下降4%，日活2.3亿，同比下降5%。尽管有疫情导致去年基数偏高的原因，但微博用户增长乏力已成为一个大概率事件。如果它没有新的第二曲线，它其实很难在接下来与字节跳动、腾讯等强悍公司的竞争中获得更多用户时长。护城河难以护住微博。一个容易理解的逻辑是——护城河可以让你难以很快衰落，但并不保证你继续增长；而对于互联网公司而言，增长永远是最优先的主题、最重要的命门。互联网公司没有一劳永逸，那些最终走向巨头的公司其实都不是一招鲜，而是不断拓展自己的作战半径，持续去抢新的地盘，腾讯如此、阿里如此、字节亦如此。百度抱着搜索这个护城河，当然是一时的王者，在搜索这个赛道至今没有对手，但它边界扩张速度稍微慢一点，就被无情地挤出第一集团了。关于护城河的另一个逻辑是——你在你所在领域的确有护城河，但你的领域本身不再重要了；陌陌、美图、豆瓣、天涯、迅雷.......在各自的领域都有着极高的护城河，它们一直稳坐钓鱼台，从来都没有被竞争对手颠覆过，然而它们各自的领域本身变得不再重要了，护城河还在，城没了。所以，护城河很重要，但迷恋护城河很危险，不要躺在护城河上睡觉。从这个意义上说，其实我还是稍微有点担心B站的，对二次元和年轻用户极强的黏性所构成的内容生产和消费生态当然是它的护城河，坚不可摧，西瓜视频多次强攻也不得要领。但B站能一直只讲这个单一的故事吗？它的市梦率能最终被兑现吗？二、大的赛道不一定是好赛道。“投赛道”是互联网投资领域一个极为重要的流派，它背后的逻辑是——如果一个赛道足够大，那么它一定会诞生优秀的公司，而只要投中了这个赛道的优秀公司，就一定会有长线收益；这个逻辑基本上是对的，或者说它在很大程度上是对的，然而，还是有一些赛道则并不符合这一原则。原因是这些赛道拥挤而缺乏护城河，残酷竞争却看不到终局，从而导致在相当长的一段时间内都让其头部玩家难以获得合理的收益。中国的长视频赛道就是一个典型。毫无疑问，这是一条大的赛道，这一赛道每年的总营收预计超过1000亿，不可谓不大。然而，从2006的先驱优酷算起，这个领域的主要玩家已经连续亏损15年了，比如爱奇艺，2020年全年营收297亿，亏损60亿，这还是在大幅改善之后取得的成绩。注意，很难说这些亏损属于战略型亏损，即便到今天，我们依然看不到这个领域的亏损还要持续多久，行业的终局最终何时尘埃落定。是滴，钱是这个行业唯一的壁垒。《晚点》曾经报道过优酷和腾讯视频当年争夺《如懿传》的过程——本来两家友好约定每家出6亿购买这部剧双平台同步播出的权益，但腾讯回去一思量，断定这部剧可能会像《甄嬛传》一样火遍全网，最终拍板以吓人的13亿天价拿下了这部剧的独播权。这是一个烧钱的游戏，如果仅靠烧钱就能终结战争就好了，这个行业的关键命门还在于——用钱根本买不来用户的忠诚度。有的平台花超过10亿+买下世界杯的转播权，一旦世界杯一过，用户又被其他平台的新鲜大局吸引走了。这个行业的大玩家都在硬抗，尽管大幅亏损，谁也不愿意第一个放弃，因为无法忽略天价的淹没成本，都在等着对手抗不住退出。但三大平台的背后是BAT，每一个都财大气粗，都一致认为这是卡位的战争，每一家都在做着“中国Netflix”的美梦。即便有玩家退出了，由于没有其他高壁垒，总会有虎视眈眈的新玩家参与进来，当年优酷并购土豆想一统江湖但最终很快落空就是一个明证。没错，大的赛道真的不一定是好的赛道，航空业是另一个例子。股神巴菲特关于航空业有两句名言——第一句是：“在莱特兄弟发明的飞机在北卡罗来纳州的小鹰镇第一次试飞成功之前，如果有个资本家击落它的话，那么全球各地的投资者也许会挽回很多的损失。”第二句是：“如果你想成为一名百万富翁，你可以先成为一名千万富翁，然后再买航空股。”那么，为什么在规模上属于巨无霸的航空业并不是一条好赛道呢？原因在于航空业有四大特点：1.固定成本高，负债率高；2.产品同质化，溢价能力弱；3.消费者选择多，品牌忠诚度极低；4.行业周期性强，受宏观经济影响强；正是基于以上几个特点，航空业需要投入大，利润率波动大，竞争激烈难以获得持续长期竞争力，以至于股神巴菲特也多次在航空股上载跟头。所以，衡量一条赛道是否优质，大其实并非唯一指标，增长性和健康度同样重要。三、一个赛道初期领先的公司不一定能长期领先关于这个点，我先从一个例子切入——年初新能源汽车股票最疯狂的时候，一位朋友告诉我说自己把一半的流动资金买了蔚来、理想和小鹏的三家的股票。我问他的投资逻辑，他说——“中国的新能源终将崛起是一个极其确定的事件，而我押宝这三家目前领先的公司，我当然不知道谁会最终胜出，但我的逻辑是，他们一定会有一家会胜出，那么只要这家胜出的公司股价涨三倍，另外两家哪怕归0死掉我也不会亏。”某种意义上，我是同意他的这种观点的，但我还是善意地提醒他，有没有可能中国新能源最终胜出的并不在这三家之内呢？他说，这我倒是没想过，这个可能性比较小吧。我告诉他，的确可能性会相对小，但并不是没有可能，于是我给他讲了短视频赛道的故事——在2015、2016年这个时间点，短视频这个赛道已经开始变得热闹起来，投资人开始判断这是一个成长快、规模大的赛道，但具体应该投哪些团队呢？当时的市场格局是——秒拍领先、美拍来势汹汹，快手还属于一家小公司，没有走入主流视线。于是领先的秒拍就变成了投资界的香饽饽，在那段时间，秒拍的母公司一下科技前后获得了5轮融资，其中最后的E轮融资规模高达5亿美金。在E轮融资的发布会上，创始人韩坤的兴奋溢于言表——“一下科技的视频矩阵，已经成为中国版的Youtube。”然而接下来的故事大家都知道了，一年后抖音快手崛起，秒拍毫无招架之力，被迅速边缘化。一起被拍倒在沙滩上的，还有当年气势如虹的美拍。至此，融资无数的短视频赛道的两个领先产品没有一个笑到了最后。我们稍微理一下背后的逻辑：早期领先的公司由于行业还没有发展成熟，赛道对创业公司能力要求其实是不一样的，这也能从一个侧面来解释为什么秒拍失败了而抖音成功了。这背后的原因当然很多，但其中一个重要的视角是二者的关注重点的差异：秒拍诞生发展的时期中国的4G还没有特别成熟，于是对不同网络环境下如何流程播放的技术要求是很高的，秒拍创始人韩坤其实一直非常得意的是秒拍的基础技术能力。在秒拍诞生前韩坤一直在带领团队开发一个叫Vitamio的多媒体框架系统，是多个互联网公司的视频技术供应商。事实上，新浪微博之所以投资秒拍，一个重要原因就是看重了其可以在很大程度上补齐自己视频技术的短板。所以在韩坤的认知框架里，技术是重要的壁垒，他自然就对其他决定这个赛道真正核心变量关注的少一些。但时间来到2017年，4G成熟、资费下降，技术壁垒被证明其实不堪一击，推荐算法、内容生产生态成为短视频真正的核心竞争力，某种意义上，这场战争的结局从一开始或许就早已注定。所以，投赛道早期领先公司当然没错，但也需要考虑这个赛道的核心逻辑会不会发生变化，变化之后所要求的核心要素现在领先的公司是否真正具备。四、创始人并不完全代表公司的竞争力上面谈到投资领域一个重要流派是投赛道，而另一个重要流派是投人，有的VC看准了一个人，无论他做什么都会投，甚至多次失败之后还会继续投。从概率的角度，投赛道投人这两个流派都有着非常自洽的逻辑，在很多情况下都是对的。然而，人是很复杂的，对人的判断出现偏差的概率其实非常大，更重要的是，人是一个动态的过程，创业是一场马拉松，漫长的过程在不同的阶段对创始人的要求是截然不同的——创业、守业、再增长所要求的能力模型差异非常大，只有凤毛麟角的创业者能快速迭代自己的认知和能力，从而真正带领公司从0到1、从1到N。我举一个例子，我之前的一个上司，从不买美股，但突然有一天买了猎豹移动的股票。我问他为什么买猎豹，他说看好傅盛这个人。他接着补充：傅盛之前在360证明了自己是顶级优秀的产品经理，而带领猎豹独辟蹊径在海外做出清理大师则证明了他的战略能力和执行力，而傅盛还很年轻，即便可能犯错，但长期潜力很大。然而，他这一单买下去，亏得屁滚尿流，亏得怀疑人生。那么是他以上的逻辑真的有问题吗？其实不见得，通过一个人的历史判断一个人的能力是识人常用的方法，这样的逻辑在风险投资领域其实属于基本操作。这也是为什么很多大厂的重要总监只要一宣布创业，通常会受到天使资本和早期风投的追捧。这背后一个简单的逻辑就是，大厂的重要总监们其实是一线的战斗者，他们听得见炮声，真枪实战地做过，投他们成功的概率当然会大一些。那么为什么以同样的逻辑投猎豹就输得一塌糊涂呢？答案是一级市场和二级市场撒网概率的区别。风险投资这类一级市场的逻辑是广泛押宝，因为根本不知道到底谁是下一个字节跳动，下一个拼多多，下一个快手，宁可投错也不能错过大鱼。它的逻辑追求的是整体的胜率，投50家企业，最终只要有2家能最终成功上市，就能Cover掉剩下48家的失败，因为上市的这两家可能带来100倍的回报。而从单笔投资成功率讲，它是极低的，即96%都是失败，但这不影响他整体赚钱；（当然大部分风投其实做不到这样的概率，这些基金本身也是亏钱的）如果个人投资者也用同样的逻辑去选股票，那简直就是噩梦，因为你的资金规模基本决定你很难广撒网，完全做不到分散风险。从“人”这一单一维度去看公司就是在刀尖上舔血、失败率极高。因此，个人投资者如果想要买某个公司的股票，你可以有无数种逻辑，但千万不要只因为这一个理由——“我选择买它是因为我认可它的创始人”。注意，我并不是说创始人对一家公司不重要，事实上，创始人对一家公司的重要性无论如何强调都不过分。但我要说的是，我们其实很难从一个外部视角真正判断一个创始人的全部，即便对于一流的风险投资人而言，他们在判断一个创始人的时候也仅仅只能从几个少数维度进行判断，有时候这种判断甚至是极其感性的。朱啸虎就多次公开检讨自己是如何错过字节跳动的——当时字节跳动B论找到金沙江，朱啸虎当时和张一鸣聊完之后凭直觉判断张一鸣这个人太斯文，没有程维那种强大的气场，最终没有投字节跳动，后来，他肠子都悔青了。人，任何时候都很复杂，不要对自己的判断力太自信。OK，以上就是卫夕总结的中国互联网的四大暗逻辑，互联网是一个年轻的产业，也是一个多变的行业，它在以前所未有的速度进化，它进化的速度以至于很难总结放之四海而皆准的规律。这一代年轻人唯一应该做的就是投身和拥抱这个行业，在实践中感受和把握技术汹涌澎湃的的脉搏。记住，别躺平。","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"399001":0.9,"399006":0.9,"000001.SH":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1343,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0}],"hots":[{"id":115814098,"gmtCreate":1622970154314,"gmtModify":1704193947824,"author":{"id":"3586061661476454","authorId":"3586061661476454","name":"Zonghan8116","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3586061661476454","idStr":"3586061661476454"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"Like and comment","listText":"Like and comment","text":"Like and comment","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/115814098","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1109,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":115815683,"gmtCreate":1622970084442,"gmtModify":1704193947333,"author":{"id":"3586061661476454","authorId":"3586061661476454","name":"Zonghan8116","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3586061661476454","idStr":"3586061661476454"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"Like and comment","listText":"Like and comment","text":"Like and comment","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/115815683","repostId":"1163908633","repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1163908633","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1622948959,"share":"https://ttm.financial/m/news/1163908633?lang=en_US&edition=fundamental","pubTime":"2021-06-06 11:09","market":"sh","language":"zh","title":"Four Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1163908633","media":"卫夕指北","summary":"在中国互联网发展的短短20多年中，早已经历过多轮沧海桑田的变迁。从门户时代到Web2.0，从PC互联网到移动互联网再到产业互联网......在此过程中，行业的从业者和投资者其实一直在总结关于这个行业的","content":"<p><b>In the short 20 years of Internet development in China, it has already experienced many rounds of vicissitudes of life.</b></p><p>From the portal era to Web2.0, from PC Internet to mobile Internet to industrial Internet......</p><p>In this process, industry practitioners and investors have actually been summarizing the logic and laws about this industry. Indeed, many laws and logics have been generally proved to be effective.</p><p><b>However, what I want to talk to you about today is actually the dark logic outside the four regulations.</b></p><p>I call it dark logic because the opposite of them is usually true, and the interesting thing about the Internet is:<b>There is no one-size-fits-all universal theorem, and any big logic will have exceptions when carefully observed;</b></p><p>The following is the dark logic outside the four regulations of China's Internet that I summarized-</p><p><b>1. A company with a moat is not necessarily a good company</b></p><p><b>The moat theory of enterprises originated from Buffett's discussion, that is, whether an enterprise has insurmountable advantages for other enterprises.</b></p><p>Later, Pat Dorsey summarized moats into four categories in the book \"Buffett's Moat\": 1. Intangible assets of enterprises, such as brands, patents, etc.; 2. High conversion cost; 3. Cost advantage; 4. Network effect;</p><p>Usually, we think that a company that has one or more of the above four categories of advantages has a moat. The moat is of course very important, but if a company has a moat, is it necessarily a good company worth investing in?</p><p>The answer is not necessarily.</p><p>Weibo is a very typical example.</p><p><b>Today, most people will actually admit that Weibo has a moat</b>-As a communication platform, it is the first fermentation position of any news and current affairs; As an entertainment platform, it is the first support position for fans in idolize; As an influence platform, it also has the widest and most diverse opinion leaders;</p><p><b>The almost monopoly position of these three dimensions has not been shaken since the birth of Weibo. It is indispensable and irreplaceable, which is undoubtedly a moat;</b></p><p>However, do you dare to buy Weibo's stock today?</p><p>I think at least many people dare not. According to the latest financial report, Weibo's monthly active users in Q1 2021 are 530 million, a year-on-year decrease of 4%, and its daily active users are 230 million, a year-on-year decrease of 5%.</p><p>Despite the high base last year due to the epidemic, the weak growth of Weibo users has become a high probability event.</p><p>If it does not have a new second curve, it will actually be difficult for it to gain more user time in the next competition with powerful companies such as ByteDance and Tencent.</p><p>The moat is difficult to protect Weibo.</p><p>An easy to understand logic is-<b>A moat can make it difficult for you to decline quickly, but it doesn't guarantee that you will continue to grow;</b></p><p>For Internet companies, growth is always the top priority theme and the most important life gate.</p><p>Internet companies have not done it once and for all. Those companies that eventually become giants are actually not a new trick, but are constantly expanding their combat radius and continuing to grab new territory. This is true of Tencent, Ali, and Byte.</p><p>Holding the moat of search, Baidu is of course the temporary king. It has no opponents in the search track so far, but its boundary expansion speed is a little slower, and it has been ruthlessly squeezed out of the first group.</p><p><b>Another logic about moats is-you do have a moat in your field, but your field itself is no longer important;</b></p><p>Momo, Meitu, Douban, Tianya, Xunlei... all have extremely high moats in their respective fields. They have been sitting firmly on Diaoyutai and have never been subverted by competitors. However, their respective fields themselves have become It is no longer important, the moat is still there, and the city is gone.</p><p><b>Therefore, the moat is very important, but it is dangerous to be infatuated with the moat. Don't sleep on the moat.</b></p><p>In this sense, in fact, I am still a little worried about Bilibili. The content production and consumption ecology formed by its strong stickiness to the second dimension and young users is of course its moat, which is indestructible. Watermelon Video has been attacked many times. The point.</p><p><b>But can Station B always tell this single story? Can its market-to-market dream rate finally be fulfilled?</b></p><p><b>Second, a big track is not necessarily a good track.</b></p><p>\"Investment track\" is an extremely important genre in the field of Internet investment, and the logic behind it is-<b>If a track is big enough, then it will definitely give birth to excellent companies, and as long as the excellent companies that invest in this track will definitely have long-term benefits;</b></p><p>This logic is basically correct, or it is correct to a large extent. However, there are still some tracks that don't conform to this principle.</p><p>The reason is that these tracks are crowded and lack a moat, and the brutal competition has no endgame in sight, which makes it difficult for their top players to obtain reasonable returns for a long period of time.</p><p><b>China's long video track is a typical example.</b></p><p>There is no doubt that this is a big track, and the total annual revenue of this track is expected to exceed 100 billion, which is not insignificant.</p><p>However, counting from Youku, the pioneer in 2006, the major players in this field have been losing money for 15 consecutive years. For example, iQiyi, with a full-year revenue of 29.7 billion in 2020 and a loss of 6 billion. This is still an achievement after substantial improvement.</p><p>Note that it is difficult to say that these losses are strategic losses. Even today, we still cannot see how long the losses in this field will last and when the dust will finally be settled in the industry.</p><p><b>Yes, money is the only barrier in this industry.</b></p><p>\"Later\" once reported the process of Youku and Tencent Video competing for \"Ruyi's Royal Love in the Palace\"-</p><p>Originally, the two companies friendly agreed that each company would pay 600 million yuan to buy the rights and interests of the drama's simultaneous broadcast on both platforms, but Tencent went back and thought about it, and concluded that the drama might be as popular as Empresses in the Palace, and finally decided to win the exclusive broadcast rights of the drama at a frightening price of 1.3 billion yuan.</p><p>This is a game of burning money. If only the war could be ended by burning money alone, the key life of this industry lies in-<b>Money simply can't buy user loyalty.</b></p><p>Some platforms spend more than 1 billion + to buy the broadcasting rights of the World Cup. Once the World Cup is over, users are attracted by the fresh overall situation of other platforms.</p><p>The big players in this industry are all fighting hard. Despite the large losses, no one is willing to be the first to give up, because they can't ignore the sky-high drowning cost, and they are all waiting for their opponents to withdraw.</p><p>But behind the three major platforms is BAT. Each of them has deep pockets, and they all agree that this is a war of card positions. Each of them is dreaming of \"China Netflix\".</p><p>Even if some players quit, because there are no other high barriers, there will always be new players who are eyeing up. Youku's acquisition of Tudou wanted to unify the rivers and lakes, but it quickly failed, which is a proof.</p><p>That's right, big tracks really aren't necessarily good tracks, and the aviation industry is another example.</p><p>Warren Buffett has two famous sayings about the aviation industry-</p><p>The first sentence is:<i>\"Before the first successful test flight of the plane invented by the Wright brothers in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, if a capitalist shot down it, then investors around the world might recover a lot of losses.\"</i></p><p>The second sentence is:<i>\"If you want to be a millionaire, you can be a multi-millionaire first and then buy airline stocks.\"</i></p><p><b>So, why is the aviation industry, which is a giant in scale, not a good track?</b></p><p>The reason is that the aviation industry has four characteristics: 1. High fixed costs and high debt ratio; 2. Product homogeneity and weak premium ability; 3. Consumers have many choices and extremely low brand loyalty; 4. The industry is highly cyclical and strongly influenced by the macro economy;</p><p>Based on the above characteristics, the aviation industry needs large investment, profit margins fluctuate greatly, and it is difficult to obtain sustained and long-term competitiveness due to fierce competition, so that Warren Buffett, the stock god, has repeatedly stumbled in aviation stocks.</p><p><b>Therefore, to measure whether a track is of high quality, size is actually not the only indicator, growth and health are equally important.</b></p><p><b>3. A company that leads in the early stage of the track may not be able to lead in the long term</b></p><p>Regarding this point, let me start with an example-</p><p>At the beginning of the year, when new energy vehicle stocks were at their craziest, a friend told me that he bought half of his liquidity to buy the stocks of Nio, Ideal and XPeng.</p><p>I asked him about his investment logic, and he said-</p><p><i>\"It is an extremely certain event that China's new energy will eventually rise, and I bet on these three currently leading companies. Of course, I don't know who will win in the end, but my logic is that one of them will definitely win, so as long as The stock price of this winning company triples, and I won't lose money even if the other two die at 0.\"</i></p><p>In a sense, I agree with his view, but I still kindly remind him, is it possible that China's new energy companies will not win in the end among these three companies?</p><p>He said, I didn't think about it. This possibility is relatively small.</p><p><b>I told him that it was indeed relatively unlikely, but it was not impossible, so I told him the story of the short video track-</b></p><p>At this point in 2015 and 2016, the short video track has begun to become lively, and investors have begun to judge that this is a fast-growing and large-scale track, but which teams should they invest in?</p><p>At that time, the market structure was-Miaopai was leading, Meipai was menacing, and Kuaishou was still a small company and had not entered the mainstream sight.</p><p>As a result, the leading second shot became a hot cake in the investment community. During that time, the parent company of second shot received five rounds of financing before and after Technology, of which the final E-round financing scale was as high as 500 million US dollars.</p><p>At the press conference of Series E financing, the excitement of founder Han Kun was beyond words-<i>\"The video matrix of science and technology has become the Chinese version of Youtube.\"</i></p><p>However, everyone knows the following story. A year later, Douyin Kuaishou rose, and Miaopai was helpless and was quickly marginalized.</p><p>Together, they were photographed on the beach, as well as the magnificent beautiful shots of that year.</p><p><b>So far, none of the two leading products of the short video track with countless financing had the last laugh.</b></p><p>Let's sort out the logic behind it a little: because the industry of early leading companies has not yet matured, the track actually has different requirements for the capabilities of startups. This can also explain from one aspect why Miaopai failed and Douyin succeeded..</p><p><b>Of course, there are many reasons behind this, but one of the important perspectives is the difference in focus between the two:</b></p><p>During the period when Second Shot was born and developed, China's 4G was not particularly mature, so the technical requirements for how to play the process in different network environments were very high. Han Kun, the founder of Second Shot, has always been very proud of the basic technical capabilities of Second Shot.</p><p>Before the birth of Second Shot, Han Kun had been leading the team to develop a multimedia framework system called Vitamio, which was a video technology supplier to several Internet companies.</p><p>In fact, one of the important reasons why Sina Weibo invested in second shots is that it can largely make up for the shortcomings of its own video technology.</p><p><b>Therefore, in Han Kun's cognitive framework, technology is an important barrier, and he naturally pays less attention to other variables that determine the real core of this track.</b></p><p>But in 2017, 4G matured, tariffs dropped, and technical barriers proved to be vulnerable. Recommendation algorithms and content production ecology became the real core competitiveness of short videos. In a sense, the outcome of this war may have been doomed from the beginning.</p><p><b>Therefore, it is certainly true to invest in leading companies in the early stage of the track, but it is also necessary to consider whether the core logic of this track will change, and whether the core elements required after the change are truly possessed by the leading companies now.</b></p><p><b>4. The founder does not fully represent the company's competitiveness</b></p><p>As mentioned above, an important genre in the investment field is to invest in the track, while another important genre is to invest in people. Some VCs have targeted a person and will invest no matter what he does, and will even continue to invest after many failures.</p><p><b>From the perspective of probability, the two schools of voting on the track and voting on people have very self-consistent logic, which is right in many cases.</b></p><p>However, people are very complicated, and the probability of deviation in people's judgment is actually very high. More importantly, people are a dynamic process, and entrepreneurship is a marathon. The long process has completely different requirements for founders at different stages-</p><p><b>The ability models required for entrepreneurship, business maintenance, and re-growth are very different. Only a few entrepreneurs can quickly iterate their own cognition and abilities, so as to truly lead the company from 0 to 1 and from 1 to N.</b></p><p>Let me give you an example. One of my former bosses never bought US stocks, but suddenly one day he bought Cheetah Mobile stocks.</p><p>I asked him why he bought cheetah, and he said he was optimistic about Fu Sheng.</p><p>He went on to add: Fu Sheng proved himself to be a top and excellent product manager in 360 before, and leading Cheetah to make a clean-up master overseas proved his strategic ability and execution ability. Fu Sheng is still very young, even though he may make mistakes, but he has great long-term potential.</p><p><b>However, if he bought this order, he lost the shit and doubted his life.</b></p><p>So is there really something wrong with his above logic?</p><p>Actually, not necessarily. Judging a person's ability through his history is a common method to recognize people. This logic is actually a basic operation in the field of venture capital.</p><p>This is why important directors of many big companies are usually sought after by angel capital and early-stage venture capital as soon as they announce their start-up.</p><p>A simple logic behind this is that the important directors of big factories are actually front-line fighters. They can hear the sound of guns and have done it in actual combat. Of course, the probability of success in voting for them will be greater.</p><p>So why do you lose a mess when you vote for Cheetah with the same logic?</p><p><b>The answer is the difference between the probability of casting the net in the primary market and the secondary market.</b></p><p>The logic of primary markets such as venture capital is to bet extensively, because we don't know who will be the next ByteDance, the next Pinduoduo, or the next Kuaishou. We would rather make a wrong investment than miss the big fish.</p><p>Its logical pursuit is the overall winning rate. It invests in 50 companies. In the end, as long as 2 companies can finally be successfully listed, it can Cover the failure of the remaining 48 companies, because the two listed companies may bring 100 times the return..</p><p>In terms of the success rate of a single investment, it is extremely low, that is, 96% of them are failures, but this does not affect his overall profit; (Of course, most venture capitalists can't actually achieve this probability, and these funds themselves are losing money)</p><p><b>If individual investors use the same logic to choose stocks, it is simply a nightmare, because the size of your funds basically determines that it is difficult for you to cast a wide net and diversify risks at all.</b></p><p>Looking at the company from the single dimension of \"people\" is licking blood on the tip of the knife, and the failure rate is extremely high.</p><p>Therefore, if an individual investor wants to buy stocks in a certain company, you can have countless logics, but don't just because of this one reason-\"I chose to buy it because I recognize its founder\".</p><p><b>Note that I'm not saying that founders are unimportant to a company, in fact, the importance of founders to a company cannot be overemphasized.</b></p><p>But what I want to say is that it is actually difficult for us to really judge all about a founder from an external perspective. Even for first-class venture capitalists, they can only judge a founder from a few dimensions, and sometimes this judgment is even extremely emotional.</p><p><b>Allen Zhu has publicly reviewed how he missed ByteDance many times-</b></p><p>At that time, ByteDance's theory B found Jinshajiang. After chatting with Zhang Yiming, Zhu Xiaohu intuitively judged that Zhang Yiming was too gentle and did not have the strong aura of Cheng Wei. In the end, he did not vote for ByteDance. Later, his intestines were full of regret.</p><p><b>People are complicated at all times, so don't be too confident in your own judgment.</b></p><p>OK, the above are the four dark logics of China's Internet summarized by Wei Xi. The Internet is a young industry and a changeable industry. It is evolving at an unprecedented speed, and its speed of evolution is so difficult to summarize a universal law.</p><p>The only thing this generation of young people should do is to join and embrace this industry, and feel and grasp the surging pulse of technology in practice.</p><p><b>Remember, don't lie flat.</b></p>","source":"wxzb","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Four Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nFour Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">卫夕指北</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-06-06 11:09</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><b>In the short 20 years of Internet development in China, it has already experienced many rounds of vicissitudes of life.</b></p><p>From the portal era to Web2.0, from PC Internet to mobile Internet to industrial Internet......</p><p>In this process, industry practitioners and investors have actually been summarizing the logic and laws about this industry. Indeed, many laws and logics have been generally proved to be effective.</p><p><b>However, what I want to talk to you about today is actually the dark logic outside the four regulations.</b></p><p>I call it dark logic because the opposite of them is usually true, and the interesting thing about the Internet is:<b>There is no one-size-fits-all universal theorem, and any big logic will have exceptions when carefully observed;</b></p><p>The following is the dark logic outside the four regulations of China's Internet that I summarized-</p><p><b>1. A company with a moat is not necessarily a good company</b></p><p><b>The moat theory of enterprises originated from Buffett's discussion, that is, whether an enterprise has insurmountable advantages for other enterprises.</b></p><p>Later, Pat Dorsey summarized moats into four categories in the book \"Buffett's Moat\": 1. Intangible assets of enterprises, such as brands, patents, etc.; 2. High conversion cost; 3. Cost advantage; 4. Network effect;</p><p>Usually, we think that a company that has one or more of the above four categories of advantages has a moat. The moat is of course very important, but if a company has a moat, is it necessarily a good company worth investing in?</p><p>The answer is not necessarily.</p><p>Weibo is a very typical example.</p><p><b>Today, most people will actually admit that Weibo has a moat</b>-As a communication platform, it is the first fermentation position of any news and current affairs; As an entertainment platform, it is the first support position for fans in idolize; As an influence platform, it also has the widest and most diverse opinion leaders;</p><p><b>The almost monopoly position of these three dimensions has not been shaken since the birth of Weibo. It is indispensable and irreplaceable, which is undoubtedly a moat;</b></p><p>However, do you dare to buy Weibo's stock today?</p><p>I think at least many people dare not. According to the latest financial report, Weibo's monthly active users in Q1 2021 are 530 million, a year-on-year decrease of 4%, and its daily active users are 230 million, a year-on-year decrease of 5%.</p><p>Despite the high base last year due to the epidemic, the weak growth of Weibo users has become a high probability event.</p><p>If it does not have a new second curve, it will actually be difficult for it to gain more user time in the next competition with powerful companies such as ByteDance and Tencent.</p><p>The moat is difficult to protect Weibo.</p><p>An easy to understand logic is-<b>A moat can make it difficult for you to decline quickly, but it doesn't guarantee that you will continue to grow;</b></p><p>For Internet companies, growth is always the top priority theme and the most important life gate.</p><p>Internet companies have not done it once and for all. Those companies that eventually become giants are actually not a new trick, but are constantly expanding their combat radius and continuing to grab new territory. This is true of Tencent, Ali, and Byte.</p><p>Holding the moat of search, Baidu is of course the temporary king. It has no opponents in the search track so far, but its boundary expansion speed is a little slower, and it has been ruthlessly squeezed out of the first group.</p><p><b>Another logic about moats is-you do have a moat in your field, but your field itself is no longer important;</b></p><p>Momo, Meitu, Douban, Tianya, Xunlei... all have extremely high moats in their respective fields. They have been sitting firmly on Diaoyutai and have never been subverted by competitors. However, their respective fields themselves have become It is no longer important, the moat is still there, and the city is gone.</p><p><b>Therefore, the moat is very important, but it is dangerous to be infatuated with the moat. Don't sleep on the moat.</b></p><p>In this sense, in fact, I am still a little worried about Bilibili. The content production and consumption ecology formed by its strong stickiness to the second dimension and young users is of course its moat, which is indestructible. Watermelon Video has been attacked many times. The point.</p><p><b>But can Station B always tell this single story? Can its market-to-market dream rate finally be fulfilled?</b></p><p><b>Second, a big track is not necessarily a good track.</b></p><p>\"Investment track\" is an extremely important genre in the field of Internet investment, and the logic behind it is-<b>If a track is big enough, then it will definitely give birth to excellent companies, and as long as the excellent companies that invest in this track will definitely have long-term benefits;</b></p><p>This logic is basically correct, or it is correct to a large extent. However, there are still some tracks that don't conform to this principle.</p><p>The reason is that these tracks are crowded and lack a moat, and the brutal competition has no endgame in sight, which makes it difficult for their top players to obtain reasonable returns for a long period of time.</p><p><b>China's long video track is a typical example.</b></p><p>There is no doubt that this is a big track, and the total annual revenue of this track is expected to exceed 100 billion, which is not insignificant.</p><p>However, counting from Youku, the pioneer in 2006, the major players in this field have been losing money for 15 consecutive years. For example, iQiyi, with a full-year revenue of 29.7 billion in 2020 and a loss of 6 billion. This is still an achievement after substantial improvement.</p><p>Note that it is difficult to say that these losses are strategic losses. Even today, we still cannot see how long the losses in this field will last and when the dust will finally be settled in the industry.</p><p><b>Yes, money is the only barrier in this industry.</b></p><p>\"Later\" once reported the process of Youku and Tencent Video competing for \"Ruyi's Royal Love in the Palace\"-</p><p>Originally, the two companies friendly agreed that each company would pay 600 million yuan to buy the rights and interests of the drama's simultaneous broadcast on both platforms, but Tencent went back and thought about it, and concluded that the drama might be as popular as Empresses in the Palace, and finally decided to win the exclusive broadcast rights of the drama at a frightening price of 1.3 billion yuan.</p><p>This is a game of burning money. If only the war could be ended by burning money alone, the key life of this industry lies in-<b>Money simply can't buy user loyalty.</b></p><p>Some platforms spend more than 1 billion + to buy the broadcasting rights of the World Cup. Once the World Cup is over, users are attracted by the fresh overall situation of other platforms.</p><p>The big players in this industry are all fighting hard. Despite the large losses, no one is willing to be the first to give up, because they can't ignore the sky-high drowning cost, and they are all waiting for their opponents to withdraw.</p><p>But behind the three major platforms is BAT. Each of them has deep pockets, and they all agree that this is a war of card positions. Each of them is dreaming of \"China Netflix\".</p><p>Even if some players quit, because there are no other high barriers, there will always be new players who are eyeing up. Youku's acquisition of Tudou wanted to unify the rivers and lakes, but it quickly failed, which is a proof.</p><p>That's right, big tracks really aren't necessarily good tracks, and the aviation industry is another example.</p><p>Warren Buffett has two famous sayings about the aviation industry-</p><p>The first sentence is:<i>\"Before the first successful test flight of the plane invented by the Wright brothers in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, if a capitalist shot down it, then investors around the world might recover a lot of losses.\"</i></p><p>The second sentence is:<i>\"If you want to be a millionaire, you can be a multi-millionaire first and then buy airline stocks.\"</i></p><p><b>So, why is the aviation industry, which is a giant in scale, not a good track?</b></p><p>The reason is that the aviation industry has four characteristics: 1. High fixed costs and high debt ratio; 2. Product homogeneity and weak premium ability; 3. Consumers have many choices and extremely low brand loyalty; 4. The industry is highly cyclical and strongly influenced by the macro economy;</p><p>Based on the above characteristics, the aviation industry needs large investment, profit margins fluctuate greatly, and it is difficult to obtain sustained and long-term competitiveness due to fierce competition, so that Warren Buffett, the stock god, has repeatedly stumbled in aviation stocks.</p><p><b>Therefore, to measure whether a track is of high quality, size is actually not the only indicator, growth and health are equally important.</b></p><p><b>3. A company that leads in the early stage of the track may not be able to lead in the long term</b></p><p>Regarding this point, let me start with an example-</p><p>At the beginning of the year, when new energy vehicle stocks were at their craziest, a friend told me that he bought half of his liquidity to buy the stocks of Nio, Ideal and XPeng.</p><p>I asked him about his investment logic, and he said-</p><p><i>\"It is an extremely certain event that China's new energy will eventually rise, and I bet on these three currently leading companies. Of course, I don't know who will win in the end, but my logic is that one of them will definitely win, so as long as The stock price of this winning company triples, and I won't lose money even if the other two die at 0.\"</i></p><p>In a sense, I agree with his view, but I still kindly remind him, is it possible that China's new energy companies will not win in the end among these three companies?</p><p>He said, I didn't think about it. This possibility is relatively small.</p><p><b>I told him that it was indeed relatively unlikely, but it was not impossible, so I told him the story of the short video track-</b></p><p>At this point in 2015 and 2016, the short video track has begun to become lively, and investors have begun to judge that this is a fast-growing and large-scale track, but which teams should they invest in?</p><p>At that time, the market structure was-Miaopai was leading, Meipai was menacing, and Kuaishou was still a small company and had not entered the mainstream sight.</p><p>As a result, the leading second shot became a hot cake in the investment community. During that time, the parent company of second shot received five rounds of financing before and after Technology, of which the final E-round financing scale was as high as 500 million US dollars.</p><p>At the press conference of Series E financing, the excitement of founder Han Kun was beyond words-<i>\"The video matrix of science and technology has become the Chinese version of Youtube.\"</i></p><p>However, everyone knows the following story. A year later, Douyin Kuaishou rose, and Miaopai was helpless and was quickly marginalized.</p><p>Together, they were photographed on the beach, as well as the magnificent beautiful shots of that year.</p><p><b>So far, none of the two leading products of the short video track with countless financing had the last laugh.</b></p><p>Let's sort out the logic behind it a little: because the industry of early leading companies has not yet matured, the track actually has different requirements for the capabilities of startups. This can also explain from one aspect why Miaopai failed and Douyin succeeded..</p><p><b>Of course, there are many reasons behind this, but one of the important perspectives is the difference in focus between the two:</b></p><p>During the period when Second Shot was born and developed, China's 4G was not particularly mature, so the technical requirements for how to play the process in different network environments were very high. Han Kun, the founder of Second Shot, has always been very proud of the basic technical capabilities of Second Shot.</p><p>Before the birth of Second Shot, Han Kun had been leading the team to develop a multimedia framework system called Vitamio, which was a video technology supplier to several Internet companies.</p><p>In fact, one of the important reasons why Sina Weibo invested in second shots is that it can largely make up for the shortcomings of its own video technology.</p><p><b>Therefore, in Han Kun's cognitive framework, technology is an important barrier, and he naturally pays less attention to other variables that determine the real core of this track.</b></p><p>But in 2017, 4G matured, tariffs dropped, and technical barriers proved to be vulnerable. Recommendation algorithms and content production ecology became the real core competitiveness of short videos. In a sense, the outcome of this war may have been doomed from the beginning.</p><p><b>Therefore, it is certainly true to invest in leading companies in the early stage of the track, but it is also necessary to consider whether the core logic of this track will change, and whether the core elements required after the change are truly possessed by the leading companies now.</b></p><p><b>4. The founder does not fully represent the company's competitiveness</b></p><p>As mentioned above, an important genre in the investment field is to invest in the track, while another important genre is to invest in people. Some VCs have targeted a person and will invest no matter what he does, and will even continue to invest after many failures.</p><p><b>From the perspective of probability, the two schools of voting on the track and voting on people have very self-consistent logic, which is right in many cases.</b></p><p>However, people are very complicated, and the probability of deviation in people's judgment is actually very high. More importantly, people are a dynamic process, and entrepreneurship is a marathon. The long process has completely different requirements for founders at different stages-</p><p><b>The ability models required for entrepreneurship, business maintenance, and re-growth are very different. Only a few entrepreneurs can quickly iterate their own cognition and abilities, so as to truly lead the company from 0 to 1 and from 1 to N.</b></p><p>Let me give you an example. One of my former bosses never bought US stocks, but suddenly one day he bought Cheetah Mobile stocks.</p><p>I asked him why he bought cheetah, and he said he was optimistic about Fu Sheng.</p><p>He went on to add: Fu Sheng proved himself to be a top and excellent product manager in 360 before, and leading Cheetah to make a clean-up master overseas proved his strategic ability and execution ability. Fu Sheng is still very young, even though he may make mistakes, but he has great long-term potential.</p><p><b>However, if he bought this order, he lost the shit and doubted his life.</b></p><p>So is there really something wrong with his above logic?</p><p>Actually, not necessarily. Judging a person's ability through his history is a common method to recognize people. This logic is actually a basic operation in the field of venture capital.</p><p>This is why important directors of many big companies are usually sought after by angel capital and early-stage venture capital as soon as they announce their start-up.</p><p>A simple logic behind this is that the important directors of big factories are actually front-line fighters. They can hear the sound of guns and have done it in actual combat. Of course, the probability of success in voting for them will be greater.</p><p>So why do you lose a mess when you vote for Cheetah with the same logic?</p><p><b>The answer is the difference between the probability of casting the net in the primary market and the secondary market.</b></p><p>The logic of primary markets such as venture capital is to bet extensively, because we don't know who will be the next ByteDance, the next Pinduoduo, or the next Kuaishou. We would rather make a wrong investment than miss the big fish.</p><p>Its logical pursuit is the overall winning rate. It invests in 50 companies. In the end, as long as 2 companies can finally be successfully listed, it can Cover the failure of the remaining 48 companies, because the two listed companies may bring 100 times the return..</p><p>In terms of the success rate of a single investment, it is extremely low, that is, 96% of them are failures, but this does not affect his overall profit; (Of course, most venture capitalists can't actually achieve this probability, and these funds themselves are losing money)</p><p><b>If individual investors use the same logic to choose stocks, it is simply a nightmare, because the size of your funds basically determines that it is difficult for you to cast a wide net and diversify risks at all.</b></p><p>Looking at the company from the single dimension of \"people\" is licking blood on the tip of the knife, and the failure rate is extremely high.</p><p>Therefore, if an individual investor wants to buy stocks in a certain company, you can have countless logics, but don't just because of this one reason-\"I chose to buy it because I recognize its founder\".</p><p><b>Note that I'm not saying that founders are unimportant to a company, in fact, the importance of founders to a company cannot be overemphasized.</b></p><p>But what I want to say is that it is actually difficult for us to really judge all about a founder from an external perspective. Even for first-class venture capitalists, they can only judge a founder from a few dimensions, and sometimes this judgment is even extremely emotional.</p><p><b>Allen Zhu has publicly reviewed how he missed ByteDance many times-</b></p><p>At that time, ByteDance's theory B found Jinshajiang. After chatting with Zhang Yiming, Zhu Xiaohu intuitively judged that Zhang Yiming was too gentle and did not have the strong aura of Cheng Wei. In the end, he did not vote for ByteDance. Later, his intestines were full of regret.</p><p><b>People are complicated at all times, so don't be too confident in your own judgment.</b></p><p>OK, the above are the four dark logics of China's Internet summarized by Wei Xi. The Internet is a young industry and a changeable industry. It is evolving at an unprecedented speed, and its speed of evolution is so difficult to summarize a universal law.</p><p>The only thing this generation of young people should do is to join and embrace this industry, and feel and grasp the surging pulse of technology in practice.</p><p><b>Remember, don't lie flat.</b></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> source：<a href=\"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/b-pJUuDoniwtpA5Wo8vFvQ\">卫夕指北</a></p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/cea63431ce8de4033f967e80206303c3","relate_stocks":{"399001":"深证成指","399006":"创业板指","000001.SH":"上证指数"},"source_url":"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/b-pJUuDoniwtpA5Wo8vFvQ","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1163908633","content_text":"在中国互联网发展的短短20多年中，早已经历过多轮沧海桑田的变迁。从门户时代到Web2.0，从PC互联网到移动互联网再到产业互联网......在此过程中，行业的从业者和投资者其实一直在总结关于这个行业的逻辑和规律，的确，有很多规律和逻辑被普遍证明是有效的。然而今天我要和大家聊的其实是四条例外的暗逻辑。我之所以称之为暗逻辑，是因为它们的反面通常是正确的，而互联网的有趣之处在于：并没有放之四海而皆准的通用定理，任何一个大的逻辑仔细观察都会有例外；以下就是我总结的中国互联网的四条例外的暗逻辑——一、有护城河的公司不一定是好公司企业的护城河理论最早源于巴菲特的论述，即一个企业有没有其他企业难以逾越的优势。后来帕特·多尔西在《巴菲特的护城河》一书中将护城河总结成四类：1、企业的无形资产，比如品牌、专利等；2、高转换成本；3、成本优势；4、网络效应；通常我们认为拥有以上四类中的一类或多类优势的企业即拥有护城河，护城河当然非常重要，然而一家企业如果拥有护城河它就一定是一家值得投资的好公司吗？答案是不一定。微博就是一个非常典型的例子。今天，大部分人其实都会承认，微博是有护城河的——它作为传播平台，是任何新闻时事的第一发酵阵地；作为娱乐平台，它是粉丝追星第一应援阵地；而作为影响平台，它也坐拥了最广泛最多元的意见领袖；这三个维度几乎垄断的地位从微博一诞生其实就没有被撼动过，不可或缺，无可替代，这毫无疑问是护城河；然而，你今天敢买微博的股票吗？我想至少很多人不敢，根据最新的财报，微博2021年Q1的的月活5.3亿，同比下降4%，日活2.3亿，同比下降5%。尽管有疫情导致去年基数偏高的原因，但微博用户增长乏力已成为一个大概率事件。如果它没有新的第二曲线，它其实很难在接下来与字节跳动、腾讯等强悍公司的竞争中获得更多用户时长。护城河难以护住微博。一个容易理解的逻辑是——护城河可以让你难以很快衰落，但并不保证你继续增长；而对于互联网公司而言，增长永远是最优先的主题、最重要的命门。互联网公司没有一劳永逸，那些最终走向巨头的公司其实都不是一招鲜，而是不断拓展自己的作战半径，持续去抢新的地盘，腾讯如此、阿里如此、字节亦如此。百度抱着搜索这个护城河，当然是一时的王者，在搜索这个赛道至今没有对手，但它边界扩张速度稍微慢一点，就被无情地挤出第一集团了。关于护城河的另一个逻辑是——你在你所在领域的确有护城河，但你的领域本身不再重要了；陌陌、美图、豆瓣、天涯、迅雷.......在各自的领域都有着极高的护城河，它们一直稳坐钓鱼台，从来都没有被竞争对手颠覆过，然而它们各自的领域本身变得不再重要了，护城河还在，城没了。所以，护城河很重要，但迷恋护城河很危险，不要躺在护城河上睡觉。从这个意义上说，其实我还是稍微有点担心B站的，对二次元和年轻用户极强的黏性所构成的内容生产和消费生态当然是它的护城河，坚不可摧，西瓜视频多次强攻也不得要领。但B站能一直只讲这个单一的故事吗？它的市梦率能最终被兑现吗？二、大的赛道不一定是好赛道。“投赛道”是互联网投资领域一个极为重要的流派，它背后的逻辑是——如果一个赛道足够大，那么它一定会诞生优秀的公司，而只要投中了这个赛道的优秀公司，就一定会有长线收益；这个逻辑基本上是对的，或者说它在很大程度上是对的，然而，还是有一些赛道则并不符合这一原则。原因是这些赛道拥挤而缺乏护城河，残酷竞争却看不到终局，从而导致在相当长的一段时间内都让其头部玩家难以获得合理的收益。中国的长视频赛道就是一个典型。毫无疑问，这是一条大的赛道，这一赛道每年的总营收预计超过1000亿，不可谓不大。然而，从2006的先驱优酷算起，这个领域的主要玩家已经连续亏损15年了，比如爱奇艺，2020年全年营收297亿，亏损60亿，这还是在大幅改善之后取得的成绩。注意，很难说这些亏损属于战略型亏损，即便到今天，我们依然看不到这个领域的亏损还要持续多久，行业的终局最终何时尘埃落定。是滴，钱是这个行业唯一的壁垒。《晚点》曾经报道过优酷和腾讯视频当年争夺《如懿传》的过程——本来两家友好约定每家出6亿购买这部剧双平台同步播出的权益，但腾讯回去一思量，断定这部剧可能会像《甄嬛传》一样火遍全网，最终拍板以吓人的13亿天价拿下了这部剧的独播权。这是一个烧钱的游戏，如果仅靠烧钱就能终结战争就好了，这个行业的关键命门还在于——用钱根本买不来用户的忠诚度。有的平台花超过10亿+买下世界杯的转播权，一旦世界杯一过，用户又被其他平台的新鲜大局吸引走了。这个行业的大玩家都在硬抗，尽管大幅亏损，谁也不愿意第一个放弃，因为无法忽略天价的淹没成本，都在等着对手抗不住退出。但三大平台的背后是BAT，每一个都财大气粗，都一致认为这是卡位的战争，每一家都在做着“中国Netflix”的美梦。即便有玩家退出了，由于没有其他高壁垒，总会有虎视眈眈的新玩家参与进来，当年优酷并购土豆想一统江湖但最终很快落空就是一个明证。没错，大的赛道真的不一定是好的赛道，航空业是另一个例子。股神巴菲特关于航空业有两句名言——第一句是：“在莱特兄弟发明的飞机在北卡罗来纳州的小鹰镇第一次试飞成功之前，如果有个资本家击落它的话，那么全球各地的投资者也许会挽回很多的损失。”第二句是：“如果你想成为一名百万富翁，你可以先成为一名千万富翁，然后再买航空股。”那么，为什么在规模上属于巨无霸的航空业并不是一条好赛道呢？原因在于航空业有四大特点：1.固定成本高，负债率高；2.产品同质化，溢价能力弱；3.消费者选择多，品牌忠诚度极低；4.行业周期性强，受宏观经济影响强；正是基于以上几个特点，航空业需要投入大，利润率波动大，竞争激烈难以获得持续长期竞争力，以至于股神巴菲特也多次在航空股上载跟头。所以，衡量一条赛道是否优质，大其实并非唯一指标，增长性和健康度同样重要。三、一个赛道初期领先的公司不一定能长期领先关于这个点，我先从一个例子切入——年初新能源汽车股票最疯狂的时候，一位朋友告诉我说自己把一半的流动资金买了蔚来、理想和小鹏的三家的股票。我问他的投资逻辑，他说——“中国的新能源终将崛起是一个极其确定的事件，而我押宝这三家目前领先的公司，我当然不知道谁会最终胜出，但我的逻辑是，他们一定会有一家会胜出，那么只要这家胜出的公司股价涨三倍，另外两家哪怕归0死掉我也不会亏。”某种意义上，我是同意他的这种观点的，但我还是善意地提醒他，有没有可能中国新能源最终胜出的并不在这三家之内呢？他说，这我倒是没想过，这个可能性比较小吧。我告诉他，的确可能性会相对小，但并不是没有可能，于是我给他讲了短视频赛道的故事——在2015、2016年这个时间点，短视频这个赛道已经开始变得热闹起来，投资人开始判断这是一个成长快、规模大的赛道，但具体应该投哪些团队呢？当时的市场格局是——秒拍领先、美拍来势汹汹，快手还属于一家小公司，没有走入主流视线。于是领先的秒拍就变成了投资界的香饽饽，在那段时间，秒拍的母公司一下科技前后获得了5轮融资，其中最后的E轮融资规模高达5亿美金。在E轮融资的发布会上，创始人韩坤的兴奋溢于言表——“一下科技的视频矩阵，已经成为中国版的Youtube。”然而接下来的故事大家都知道了，一年后抖音快手崛起，秒拍毫无招架之力，被迅速边缘化。一起被拍倒在沙滩上的，还有当年气势如虹的美拍。至此，融资无数的短视频赛道的两个领先产品没有一个笑到了最后。我们稍微理一下背后的逻辑：早期领先的公司由于行业还没有发展成熟，赛道对创业公司能力要求其实是不一样的，这也能从一个侧面来解释为什么秒拍失败了而抖音成功了。这背后的原因当然很多，但其中一个重要的视角是二者的关注重点的差异：秒拍诞生发展的时期中国的4G还没有特别成熟，于是对不同网络环境下如何流程播放的技术要求是很高的，秒拍创始人韩坤其实一直非常得意的是秒拍的基础技术能力。在秒拍诞生前韩坤一直在带领团队开发一个叫Vitamio的多媒体框架系统，是多个互联网公司的视频技术供应商。事实上，新浪微博之所以投资秒拍，一个重要原因就是看重了其可以在很大程度上补齐自己视频技术的短板。所以在韩坤的认知框架里，技术是重要的壁垒，他自然就对其他决定这个赛道真正核心变量关注的少一些。但时间来到2017年，4G成熟、资费下降，技术壁垒被证明其实不堪一击，推荐算法、内容生产生态成为短视频真正的核心竞争力，某种意义上，这场战争的结局从一开始或许就早已注定。所以，投赛道早期领先公司当然没错，但也需要考虑这个赛道的核心逻辑会不会发生变化，变化之后所要求的核心要素现在领先的公司是否真正具备。四、创始人并不完全代表公司的竞争力上面谈到投资领域一个重要流派是投赛道，而另一个重要流派是投人，有的VC看准了一个人，无论他做什么都会投，甚至多次失败之后还会继续投。从概率的角度，投赛道投人这两个流派都有着非常自洽的逻辑，在很多情况下都是对的。然而，人是很复杂的，对人的判断出现偏差的概率其实非常大，更重要的是，人是一个动态的过程，创业是一场马拉松，漫长的过程在不同的阶段对创始人的要求是截然不同的——创业、守业、再增长所要求的能力模型差异非常大，只有凤毛麟角的创业者能快速迭代自己的认知和能力，从而真正带领公司从0到1、从1到N。我举一个例子，我之前的一个上司，从不买美股，但突然有一天买了猎豹移动的股票。我问他为什么买猎豹，他说看好傅盛这个人。他接着补充：傅盛之前在360证明了自己是顶级优秀的产品经理，而带领猎豹独辟蹊径在海外做出清理大师则证明了他的战略能力和执行力，而傅盛还很年轻，即便可能犯错，但长期潜力很大。然而，他这一单买下去，亏得屁滚尿流，亏得怀疑人生。那么是他以上的逻辑真的有问题吗？其实不见得，通过一个人的历史判断一个人的能力是识人常用的方法，这样的逻辑在风险投资领域其实属于基本操作。这也是为什么很多大厂的重要总监只要一宣布创业，通常会受到天使资本和早期风投的追捧。这背后一个简单的逻辑就是，大厂的重要总监们其实是一线的战斗者，他们听得见炮声，真枪实战地做过，投他们成功的概率当然会大一些。那么为什么以同样的逻辑投猎豹就输得一塌糊涂呢？答案是一级市场和二级市场撒网概率的区别。风险投资这类一级市场的逻辑是广泛押宝，因为根本不知道到底谁是下一个字节跳动，下一个拼多多，下一个快手，宁可投错也不能错过大鱼。它的逻辑追求的是整体的胜率，投50家企业，最终只要有2家能最终成功上市，就能Cover掉剩下48家的失败，因为上市的这两家可能带来100倍的回报。而从单笔投资成功率讲，它是极低的，即96%都是失败，但这不影响他整体赚钱；（当然大部分风投其实做不到这样的概率，这些基金本身也是亏钱的）如果个人投资者也用同样的逻辑去选股票，那简直就是噩梦，因为你的资金规模基本决定你很难广撒网，完全做不到分散风险。从“人”这一单一维度去看公司就是在刀尖上舔血、失败率极高。因此，个人投资者如果想要买某个公司的股票，你可以有无数种逻辑，但千万不要只因为这一个理由——“我选择买它是因为我认可它的创始人”。注意，我并不是说创始人对一家公司不重要，事实上，创始人对一家公司的重要性无论如何强调都不过分。但我要说的是，我们其实很难从一个外部视角真正判断一个创始人的全部，即便对于一流的风险投资人而言，他们在判断一个创始人的时候也仅仅只能从几个少数维度进行判断，有时候这种判断甚至是极其感性的。朱啸虎就多次公开检讨自己是如何错过字节跳动的——当时字节跳动B论找到金沙江，朱啸虎当时和张一鸣聊完之后凭直觉判断张一鸣这个人太斯文，没有程维那种强大的气场，最终没有投字节跳动，后来，他肠子都悔青了。人，任何时候都很复杂，不要对自己的判断力太自信。OK，以上就是卫夕总结的中国互联网的四大暗逻辑，互联网是一个年轻的产业，也是一个多变的行业，它在以前所未有的速度进化，它进化的速度以至于很难总结放之四海而皆准的规律。这一代年轻人唯一应该做的就是投身和拥抱这个行业，在实践中感受和把握技术汹涌澎湃的的脉搏。记住，别躺平。","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"399001":0.9,"399006":0.9,"000001.SH":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1355,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":115812932,"gmtCreate":1622969923626,"gmtModify":1704193945362,"author":{"id":"3586061661476454","authorId":"3586061661476454","name":"Zonghan8116","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3586061661476454","idStr":"3586061661476454"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"Like and comment","listText":"Like and comment","text":"Like and comment","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/115812932","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1188,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":115816757,"gmtCreate":1622969886579,"gmtModify":1704193945039,"author":{"id":"3586061661476454","authorId":"3586061661476454","name":"Zonghan8116","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3586061661476454","idStr":"3586061661476454"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"Like and comment","listText":"Like and comment","text":"Like and comment","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/115816757","repostId":"1163908633","repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1163908633","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1622948959,"share":"https://ttm.financial/m/news/1163908633?lang=en_US&edition=fundamental","pubTime":"2021-06-06 11:09","market":"sh","language":"zh","title":"Four Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1163908633","media":"卫夕指北","summary":"在中国互联网发展的短短20多年中，早已经历过多轮沧海桑田的变迁。从门户时代到Web2.0，从PC互联网到移动互联网再到产业互联网......在此过程中，行业的从业者和投资者其实一直在总结关于这个行业的","content":"<p><b>In the short 20 years of Internet development in China, it has already experienced many rounds of vicissitudes of life.</b></p><p>From the portal era to Web2.0, from PC Internet to mobile Internet to industrial Internet......</p><p>In this process, industry practitioners and investors have actually been summarizing the logic and laws about this industry. Indeed, many laws and logics have been generally proved to be effective.</p><p><b>However, what I want to talk to you about today is actually the dark logic outside the four regulations.</b></p><p>I call it dark logic because the opposite of them is usually true, and the interesting thing about the Internet is:<b>There is no one-size-fits-all universal theorem, and any big logic will have exceptions when carefully observed;</b></p><p>The following is the dark logic outside the four regulations of China's Internet that I summarized-</p><p><b>1. A company with a moat is not necessarily a good company</b></p><p><b>The moat theory of enterprises originated from Buffett's discussion, that is, whether an enterprise has insurmountable advantages for other enterprises.</b></p><p>Later, Pat Dorsey summarized moats into four categories in the book \"Buffett's Moat\": 1. Intangible assets of enterprises, such as brands, patents, etc.; 2. High conversion cost; 3. Cost advantage; 4. Network effect;</p><p>Usually, we think that a company that has one or more of the above four categories of advantages has a moat. The moat is of course very important, but if a company has a moat, is it necessarily a good company worth investing in?</p><p>The answer is not necessarily.</p><p>Weibo is a very typical example.</p><p><b>Today, most people will actually admit that Weibo has a moat</b>-As a communication platform, it is the first fermentation position of any news and current affairs; As an entertainment platform, it is the first support position for fans in idolize; As an influence platform, it also has the widest and most diverse opinion leaders;</p><p><b>The almost monopoly position of these three dimensions has not been shaken since the birth of Weibo. It is indispensable and irreplaceable, which is undoubtedly a moat;</b></p><p>However, do you dare to buy Weibo's stock today?</p><p>I think at least many people dare not. According to the latest financial report, Weibo's monthly active users in Q1 2021 are 530 million, a year-on-year decrease of 4%, and its daily active users are 230 million, a year-on-year decrease of 5%.</p><p>Despite the high base last year due to the epidemic, the weak growth of Weibo users has become a high probability event.</p><p>If it does not have a new second curve, it will actually be difficult for it to gain more user time in the next competition with powerful companies such as ByteDance and Tencent.</p><p>The moat is difficult to protect Weibo.</p><p>An easy to understand logic is-<b>A moat can make it difficult for you to decline quickly, but it doesn't guarantee that you will continue to grow;</b></p><p>For Internet companies, growth is always the top priority theme and the most important life gate.</p><p>Internet companies have not done it once and for all. Those companies that eventually become giants are actually not a new trick, but are constantly expanding their combat radius and continuing to grab new territory. This is true of Tencent, Ali, and Byte.</p><p>Holding the moat of search, Baidu is of course the temporary king. It has no opponents in the search track so far, but its boundary expansion speed is a little slower, and it has been ruthlessly squeezed out of the first group.</p><p><b>Another logic about moats is-you do have a moat in your field, but your field itself is no longer important;</b></p><p>Momo, Meitu, Douban, Tianya, Xunlei... all have extremely high moats in their respective fields. They have been sitting firmly on Diaoyutai and have never been subverted by competitors. However, their respective fields themselves have become It is no longer important, the moat is still there, and the city is gone.</p><p><b>Therefore, the moat is very important, but it is dangerous to be infatuated with the moat. Don't sleep on the moat.</b></p><p>In this sense, in fact, I am still a little worried about Bilibili. The content production and consumption ecology formed by its strong stickiness to the second dimension and young users is of course its moat, which is indestructible. Watermelon Video has been attacked many times. The point.</p><p><b>But can Station B always tell this single story? Can its market-to-market dream rate finally be fulfilled?</b></p><p><b>Second, a big track is not necessarily a good track.</b></p><p>\"Investment track\" is an extremely important genre in the field of Internet investment, and the logic behind it is-<b>If a track is big enough, then it will definitely give birth to excellent companies, and as long as the excellent companies that invest in this track will definitely have long-term benefits;</b></p><p>This logic is basically correct, or it is correct to a large extent. However, there are still some tracks that don't conform to this principle.</p><p>The reason is that these tracks are crowded and lack a moat, and the brutal competition has no endgame in sight, which makes it difficult for their top players to obtain reasonable returns for a long period of time.</p><p><b>China's long video track is a typical example.</b></p><p>There is no doubt that this is a big track, and the total annual revenue of this track is expected to exceed 100 billion, which is not insignificant.</p><p>However, counting from Youku, the pioneer in 2006, the major players in this field have been losing money for 15 consecutive years. For example, iQiyi, with a full-year revenue of 29.7 billion in 2020 and a loss of 6 billion. This is still an achievement after substantial improvement.</p><p>Note that it is difficult to say that these losses are strategic losses. Even today, we still cannot see how long the losses in this field will last and when the dust will finally be settled in the industry.</p><p><b>Yes, money is the only barrier in this industry.</b></p><p>\"Later\" once reported the process of Youku and Tencent Video competing for \"Ruyi's Royal Love in the Palace\"-</p><p>Originally, the two companies friendly agreed that each company would pay 600 million yuan to buy the rights and interests of the drama's simultaneous broadcast on both platforms, but Tencent went back and thought about it, and concluded that the drama might be as popular as Empresses in the Palace, and finally decided to win the exclusive broadcast rights of the drama at a frightening price of 1.3 billion yuan.</p><p>This is a game of burning money. If only the war could be ended by burning money alone, the key life of this industry lies in-<b>Money simply can't buy user loyalty.</b></p><p>Some platforms spend more than 1 billion + to buy the broadcasting rights of the World Cup. Once the World Cup is over, users are attracted by the fresh overall situation of other platforms.</p><p>The big players in this industry are all fighting hard. Despite the large losses, no one is willing to be the first to give up, because they can't ignore the sky-high drowning cost, and they are all waiting for their opponents to withdraw.</p><p>But behind the three major platforms is BAT. Each of them has deep pockets, and they all agree that this is a war of card positions. Each of them is dreaming of \"China Netflix\".</p><p>Even if some players quit, because there are no other high barriers, there will always be new players who are eyeing up. Youku's acquisition of Tudou wanted to unify the rivers and lakes, but it quickly failed, which is a proof.</p><p>That's right, big tracks really aren't necessarily good tracks, and the aviation industry is another example.</p><p>Warren Buffett has two famous sayings about the aviation industry-</p><p>The first sentence is:<i>\"Before the first successful test flight of the plane invented by the Wright brothers in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, if a capitalist shot down it, then investors around the world might recover a lot of losses.\"</i></p><p>The second sentence is:<i>\"If you want to be a millionaire, you can be a multi-millionaire first and then buy airline stocks.\"</i></p><p><b>So, why is the aviation industry, which is a giant in scale, not a good track?</b></p><p>The reason is that the aviation industry has four characteristics: 1. High fixed costs and high debt ratio; 2. Product homogeneity and weak premium ability; 3. Consumers have many choices and extremely low brand loyalty; 4. The industry is highly cyclical and strongly influenced by the macro economy;</p><p>Based on the above characteristics, the aviation industry needs large investment, profit margins fluctuate greatly, and it is difficult to obtain sustained and long-term competitiveness due to fierce competition, so that Warren Buffett, the stock god, has repeatedly stumbled in aviation stocks.</p><p><b>Therefore, to measure whether a track is of high quality, size is actually not the only indicator, growth and health are equally important.</b></p><p><b>3. A company that leads in the early stage of the track may not be able to lead in the long term</b></p><p>Regarding this point, let me start with an example-</p><p>At the beginning of the year, when new energy vehicle stocks were at their craziest, a friend told me that he bought half of his liquidity to buy the stocks of Nio, Ideal and XPeng.</p><p>I asked him about his investment logic, and he said-</p><p><i>\"It is an extremely certain event that China's new energy will eventually rise, and I bet on these three currently leading companies. Of course, I don't know who will win in the end, but my logic is that one of them will definitely win, so as long as The stock price of this winning company triples, and I won't lose money even if the other two die at 0.\"</i></p><p>In a sense, I agree with his view, but I still kindly remind him, is it possible that China's new energy companies will not win in the end among these three companies?</p><p>He said, I didn't think about it. This possibility is relatively small.</p><p><b>I told him that it was indeed relatively unlikely, but it was not impossible, so I told him the story of the short video track-</b></p><p>At this point in 2015 and 2016, the short video track has begun to become lively, and investors have begun to judge that this is a fast-growing and large-scale track, but which teams should they invest in?</p><p>At that time, the market structure was-Miaopai was leading, Meipai was menacing, and Kuaishou was still a small company and had not entered the mainstream sight.</p><p>As a result, the leading second shot became a hot cake in the investment community. During that time, the parent company of second shot received five rounds of financing before and after Technology, of which the final E-round financing scale was as high as 500 million US dollars.</p><p>At the press conference of Series E financing, the excitement of founder Han Kun was beyond words-<i>\"The video matrix of science and technology has become the Chinese version of Youtube.\"</i></p><p>However, everyone knows the following story. A year later, Douyin Kuaishou rose, and Miaopai was helpless and was quickly marginalized.</p><p>Together, they were photographed on the beach, as well as the magnificent beautiful shots of that year.</p><p><b>So far, none of the two leading products of the short video track with countless financing had the last laugh.</b></p><p>Let's sort out the logic behind it a little: because the industry of early leading companies has not yet matured, the track actually has different requirements for the capabilities of startups. This can also explain from one aspect why Miaopai failed and Douyin succeeded..</p><p><b>Of course, there are many reasons behind this, but one of the important perspectives is the difference in focus between the two:</b></p><p>During the period when Second Shot was born and developed, China's 4G was not particularly mature, so the technical requirements for how to play the process in different network environments were very high. Han Kun, the founder of Second Shot, has always been very proud of the basic technical capabilities of Second Shot.</p><p>Before the birth of Second Shot, Han Kun had been leading the team to develop a multimedia framework system called Vitamio, which was a video technology supplier to several Internet companies.</p><p>In fact, one of the important reasons why Sina Weibo invested in second shots is that it can largely make up for the shortcomings of its own video technology.</p><p><b>Therefore, in Han Kun's cognitive framework, technology is an important barrier, and he naturally pays less attention to other variables that determine the real core of this track.</b></p><p>But in 2017, 4G matured, tariffs dropped, and technical barriers proved to be vulnerable. Recommendation algorithms and content production ecology became the real core competitiveness of short videos. In a sense, the outcome of this war may have been doomed from the beginning.</p><p><b>Therefore, it is certainly true to invest in leading companies in the early stage of the track, but it is also necessary to consider whether the core logic of this track will change, and whether the core elements required after the change are truly possessed by the leading companies now.</b></p><p><b>4. The founder does not fully represent the company's competitiveness</b></p><p>As mentioned above, an important genre in the investment field is to invest in the track, while another important genre is to invest in people. Some VCs have targeted a person and will invest no matter what he does, and will even continue to invest after many failures.</p><p><b>From the perspective of probability, the two schools of voting on the track and voting on people have very self-consistent logic, which is right in many cases.</b></p><p>However, people are very complicated, and the probability of deviation in people's judgment is actually very high. More importantly, people are a dynamic process, and entrepreneurship is a marathon. The long process has completely different requirements for founders at different stages-</p><p><b>The ability models required for entrepreneurship, business maintenance, and re-growth are very different. Only a few entrepreneurs can quickly iterate their own cognition and abilities, so as to truly lead the company from 0 to 1 and from 1 to N.</b></p><p>Let me give you an example. One of my former bosses never bought US stocks, but suddenly one day he bought Cheetah Mobile stocks.</p><p>I asked him why he bought cheetah, and he said he was optimistic about Fu Sheng.</p><p>He went on to add: Fu Sheng proved himself to be a top and excellent product manager in 360 before, and leading Cheetah to make a clean-up master overseas proved his strategic ability and execution ability. Fu Sheng is still very young, even though he may make mistakes, but he has great long-term potential.</p><p><b>However, if he bought this order, he lost the shit and doubted his life.</b></p><p>So is there really something wrong with his above logic?</p><p>Actually, not necessarily. Judging a person's ability through his history is a common method to recognize people. This logic is actually a basic operation in the field of venture capital.</p><p>This is why important directors of many big companies are usually sought after by angel capital and early-stage venture capital as soon as they announce their start-up.</p><p>A simple logic behind this is that the important directors of big factories are actually front-line fighters. They can hear the sound of guns and have done it in actual combat. Of course, the probability of success in voting for them will be greater.</p><p>So why do you lose a mess when you vote for Cheetah with the same logic?</p><p><b>The answer is the difference between the probability of casting the net in the primary market and the secondary market.</b></p><p>The logic of primary markets such as venture capital is to bet extensively, because we don't know who will be the next ByteDance, the next Pinduoduo, or the next Kuaishou. We would rather make a wrong investment than miss the big fish.</p><p>Its logical pursuit is the overall winning rate. It invests in 50 companies. In the end, as long as 2 companies can finally be successfully listed, it can Cover the failure of the remaining 48 companies, because the two listed companies may bring 100 times the return..</p><p>In terms of the success rate of a single investment, it is extremely low, that is, 96% of them are failures, but this does not affect his overall profit; (Of course, most venture capitalists can't actually achieve this probability, and these funds themselves are losing money)</p><p><b>If individual investors use the same logic to choose stocks, it is simply a nightmare, because the size of your funds basically determines that it is difficult for you to cast a wide net and diversify risks at all.</b></p><p>Looking at the company from the single dimension of \"people\" is licking blood on the tip of the knife, and the failure rate is extremely high.</p><p>Therefore, if an individual investor wants to buy stocks in a certain company, you can have countless logics, but don't just because of this one reason-\"I chose to buy it because I recognize its founder\".</p><p><b>Note that I'm not saying that founders are unimportant to a company, in fact, the importance of founders to a company cannot be overemphasized.</b></p><p>But what I want to say is that it is actually difficult for us to really judge all about a founder from an external perspective. Even for first-class venture capitalists, they can only judge a founder from a few dimensions, and sometimes this judgment is even extremely emotional.</p><p><b>Allen Zhu has publicly reviewed how he missed ByteDance many times-</b></p><p>At that time, ByteDance's theory B found Jinshajiang. After chatting with Zhang Yiming, Zhu Xiaohu intuitively judged that Zhang Yiming was too gentle and did not have the strong aura of Cheng Wei. In the end, he did not vote for ByteDance. Later, his intestines were full of regret.</p><p><b>People are complicated at all times, so don't be too confident in your own judgment.</b></p><p>OK, the above are the four dark logics of China's Internet summarized by Wei Xi. The Internet is a young industry and a changeable industry. It is evolving at an unprecedented speed, and its speed of evolution is so difficult to summarize a universal law.</p><p>The only thing this generation of young people should do is to join and embrace this industry, and feel and grasp the surging pulse of technology in practice.</p><p><b>Remember, don't lie flat.</b></p>","source":"wxzb","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Four Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nFour Dark Logics of China's Internet: Each Subverts Cognition\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">卫夕指北</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-06-06 11:09</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><b>In the short 20 years of Internet development in China, it has already experienced many rounds of vicissitudes of life.</b></p><p>From the portal era to Web2.0, from PC Internet to mobile Internet to industrial Internet......</p><p>In this process, industry practitioners and investors have actually been summarizing the logic and laws about this industry. Indeed, many laws and logics have been generally proved to be effective.</p><p><b>However, what I want to talk to you about today is actually the dark logic outside the four regulations.</b></p><p>I call it dark logic because the opposite of them is usually true, and the interesting thing about the Internet is:<b>There is no one-size-fits-all universal theorem, and any big logic will have exceptions when carefully observed;</b></p><p>The following is the dark logic outside the four regulations of China's Internet that I summarized-</p><p><b>1. A company with a moat is not necessarily a good company</b></p><p><b>The moat theory of enterprises originated from Buffett's discussion, that is, whether an enterprise has insurmountable advantages for other enterprises.</b></p><p>Later, Pat Dorsey summarized moats into four categories in the book \"Buffett's Moat\": 1. Intangible assets of enterprises, such as brands, patents, etc.; 2. High conversion cost; 3. Cost advantage; 4. Network effect;</p><p>Usually, we think that a company that has one or more of the above four categories of advantages has a moat. The moat is of course very important, but if a company has a moat, is it necessarily a good company worth investing in?</p><p>The answer is not necessarily.</p><p>Weibo is a very typical example.</p><p><b>Today, most people will actually admit that Weibo has a moat</b>-As a communication platform, it is the first fermentation position of any news and current affairs; As an entertainment platform, it is the first support position for fans in idolize; As an influence platform, it also has the widest and most diverse opinion leaders;</p><p><b>The almost monopoly position of these three dimensions has not been shaken since the birth of Weibo. It is indispensable and irreplaceable, which is undoubtedly a moat;</b></p><p>However, do you dare to buy Weibo's stock today?</p><p>I think at least many people dare not. According to the latest financial report, Weibo's monthly active users in Q1 2021 are 530 million, a year-on-year decrease of 4%, and its daily active users are 230 million, a year-on-year decrease of 5%.</p><p>Despite the high base last year due to the epidemic, the weak growth of Weibo users has become a high probability event.</p><p>If it does not have a new second curve, it will actually be difficult for it to gain more user time in the next competition with powerful companies such as ByteDance and Tencent.</p><p>The moat is difficult to protect Weibo.</p><p>An easy to understand logic is-<b>A moat can make it difficult for you to decline quickly, but it doesn't guarantee that you will continue to grow;</b></p><p>For Internet companies, growth is always the top priority theme and the most important life gate.</p><p>Internet companies have not done it once and for all. Those companies that eventually become giants are actually not a new trick, but are constantly expanding their combat radius and continuing to grab new territory. This is true of Tencent, Ali, and Byte.</p><p>Holding the moat of search, Baidu is of course the temporary king. It has no opponents in the search track so far, but its boundary expansion speed is a little slower, and it has been ruthlessly squeezed out of the first group.</p><p><b>Another logic about moats is-you do have a moat in your field, but your field itself is no longer important;</b></p><p>Momo, Meitu, Douban, Tianya, Xunlei... all have extremely high moats in their respective fields. They have been sitting firmly on Diaoyutai and have never been subverted by competitors. However, their respective fields themselves have become It is no longer important, the moat is still there, and the city is gone.</p><p><b>Therefore, the moat is very important, but it is dangerous to be infatuated with the moat. Don't sleep on the moat.</b></p><p>In this sense, in fact, I am still a little worried about Bilibili. The content production and consumption ecology formed by its strong stickiness to the second dimension and young users is of course its moat, which is indestructible. Watermelon Video has been attacked many times. The point.</p><p><b>But can Station B always tell this single story? Can its market-to-market dream rate finally be fulfilled?</b></p><p><b>Second, a big track is not necessarily a good track.</b></p><p>\"Investment track\" is an extremely important genre in the field of Internet investment, and the logic behind it is-<b>If a track is big enough, then it will definitely give birth to excellent companies, and as long as the excellent companies that invest in this track will definitely have long-term benefits;</b></p><p>This logic is basically correct, or it is correct to a large extent. However, there are still some tracks that don't conform to this principle.</p><p>The reason is that these tracks are crowded and lack a moat, and the brutal competition has no endgame in sight, which makes it difficult for their top players to obtain reasonable returns for a long period of time.</p><p><b>China's long video track is a typical example.</b></p><p>There is no doubt that this is a big track, and the total annual revenue of this track is expected to exceed 100 billion, which is not insignificant.</p><p>However, counting from Youku, the pioneer in 2006, the major players in this field have been losing money for 15 consecutive years. For example, iQiyi, with a full-year revenue of 29.7 billion in 2020 and a loss of 6 billion. This is still an achievement after substantial improvement.</p><p>Note that it is difficult to say that these losses are strategic losses. Even today, we still cannot see how long the losses in this field will last and when the dust will finally be settled in the industry.</p><p><b>Yes, money is the only barrier in this industry.</b></p><p>\"Later\" once reported the process of Youku and Tencent Video competing for \"Ruyi's Royal Love in the Palace\"-</p><p>Originally, the two companies friendly agreed that each company would pay 600 million yuan to buy the rights and interests of the drama's simultaneous broadcast on both platforms, but Tencent went back and thought about it, and concluded that the drama might be as popular as Empresses in the Palace, and finally decided to win the exclusive broadcast rights of the drama at a frightening price of 1.3 billion yuan.</p><p>This is a game of burning money. If only the war could be ended by burning money alone, the key life of this industry lies in-<b>Money simply can't buy user loyalty.</b></p><p>Some platforms spend more than 1 billion + to buy the broadcasting rights of the World Cup. Once the World Cup is over, users are attracted by the fresh overall situation of other platforms.</p><p>The big players in this industry are all fighting hard. Despite the large losses, no one is willing to be the first to give up, because they can't ignore the sky-high drowning cost, and they are all waiting for their opponents to withdraw.</p><p>But behind the three major platforms is BAT. Each of them has deep pockets, and they all agree that this is a war of card positions. Each of them is dreaming of \"China Netflix\".</p><p>Even if some players quit, because there are no other high barriers, there will always be new players who are eyeing up. Youku's acquisition of Tudou wanted to unify the rivers and lakes, but it quickly failed, which is a proof.</p><p>That's right, big tracks really aren't necessarily good tracks, and the aviation industry is another example.</p><p>Warren Buffett has two famous sayings about the aviation industry-</p><p>The first sentence is:<i>\"Before the first successful test flight of the plane invented by the Wright brothers in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, if a capitalist shot down it, then investors around the world might recover a lot of losses.\"</i></p><p>The second sentence is:<i>\"If you want to be a millionaire, you can be a multi-millionaire first and then buy airline stocks.\"</i></p><p><b>So, why is the aviation industry, which is a giant in scale, not a good track?</b></p><p>The reason is that the aviation industry has four characteristics: 1. High fixed costs and high debt ratio; 2. Product homogeneity and weak premium ability; 3. Consumers have many choices and extremely low brand loyalty; 4. The industry is highly cyclical and strongly influenced by the macro economy;</p><p>Based on the above characteristics, the aviation industry needs large investment, profit margins fluctuate greatly, and it is difficult to obtain sustained and long-term competitiveness due to fierce competition, so that Warren Buffett, the stock god, has repeatedly stumbled in aviation stocks.</p><p><b>Therefore, to measure whether a track is of high quality, size is actually not the only indicator, growth and health are equally important.</b></p><p><b>3. A company that leads in the early stage of the track may not be able to lead in the long term</b></p><p>Regarding this point, let me start with an example-</p><p>At the beginning of the year, when new energy vehicle stocks were at their craziest, a friend told me that he bought half of his liquidity to buy the stocks of Nio, Ideal and XPeng.</p><p>I asked him about his investment logic, and he said-</p><p><i>\"It is an extremely certain event that China's new energy will eventually rise, and I bet on these three currently leading companies. Of course, I don't know who will win in the end, but my logic is that one of them will definitely win, so as long as The stock price of this winning company triples, and I won't lose money even if the other two die at 0.\"</i></p><p>In a sense, I agree with his view, but I still kindly remind him, is it possible that China's new energy companies will not win in the end among these three companies?</p><p>He said, I didn't think about it. This possibility is relatively small.</p><p><b>I told him that it was indeed relatively unlikely, but it was not impossible, so I told him the story of the short video track-</b></p><p>At this point in 2015 and 2016, the short video track has begun to become lively, and investors have begun to judge that this is a fast-growing and large-scale track, but which teams should they invest in?</p><p>At that time, the market structure was-Miaopai was leading, Meipai was menacing, and Kuaishou was still a small company and had not entered the mainstream sight.</p><p>As a result, the leading second shot became a hot cake in the investment community. During that time, the parent company of second shot received five rounds of financing before and after Technology, of which the final E-round financing scale was as high as 500 million US dollars.</p><p>At the press conference of Series E financing, the excitement of founder Han Kun was beyond words-<i>\"The video matrix of science and technology has become the Chinese version of Youtube.\"</i></p><p>However, everyone knows the following story. A year later, Douyin Kuaishou rose, and Miaopai was helpless and was quickly marginalized.</p><p>Together, they were photographed on the beach, as well as the magnificent beautiful shots of that year.</p><p><b>So far, none of the two leading products of the short video track with countless financing had the last laugh.</b></p><p>Let's sort out the logic behind it a little: because the industry of early leading companies has not yet matured, the track actually has different requirements for the capabilities of startups. This can also explain from one aspect why Miaopai failed and Douyin succeeded..</p><p><b>Of course, there are many reasons behind this, but one of the important perspectives is the difference in focus between the two:</b></p><p>During the period when Second Shot was born and developed, China's 4G was not particularly mature, so the technical requirements for how to play the process in different network environments were very high. Han Kun, the founder of Second Shot, has always been very proud of the basic technical capabilities of Second Shot.</p><p>Before the birth of Second Shot, Han Kun had been leading the team to develop a multimedia framework system called Vitamio, which was a video technology supplier to several Internet companies.</p><p>In fact, one of the important reasons why Sina Weibo invested in second shots is that it can largely make up for the shortcomings of its own video technology.</p><p><b>Therefore, in Han Kun's cognitive framework, technology is an important barrier, and he naturally pays less attention to other variables that determine the real core of this track.</b></p><p>But in 2017, 4G matured, tariffs dropped, and technical barriers proved to be vulnerable. Recommendation algorithms and content production ecology became the real core competitiveness of short videos. In a sense, the outcome of this war may have been doomed from the beginning.</p><p><b>Therefore, it is certainly true to invest in leading companies in the early stage of the track, but it is also necessary to consider whether the core logic of this track will change, and whether the core elements required after the change are truly possessed by the leading companies now.</b></p><p><b>4. The founder does not fully represent the company's competitiveness</b></p><p>As mentioned above, an important genre in the investment field is to invest in the track, while another important genre is to invest in people. Some VCs have targeted a person and will invest no matter what he does, and will even continue to invest after many failures.</p><p><b>From the perspective of probability, the two schools of voting on the track and voting on people have very self-consistent logic, which is right in many cases.</b></p><p>However, people are very complicated, and the probability of deviation in people's judgment is actually very high. More importantly, people are a dynamic process, and entrepreneurship is a marathon. The long process has completely different requirements for founders at different stages-</p><p><b>The ability models required for entrepreneurship, business maintenance, and re-growth are very different. Only a few entrepreneurs can quickly iterate their own cognition and abilities, so as to truly lead the company from 0 to 1 and from 1 to N.</b></p><p>Let me give you an example. One of my former bosses never bought US stocks, but suddenly one day he bought Cheetah Mobile stocks.</p><p>I asked him why he bought cheetah, and he said he was optimistic about Fu Sheng.</p><p>He went on to add: Fu Sheng proved himself to be a top and excellent product manager in 360 before, and leading Cheetah to make a clean-up master overseas proved his strategic ability and execution ability. Fu Sheng is still very young, even though he may make mistakes, but he has great long-term potential.</p><p><b>However, if he bought this order, he lost the shit and doubted his life.</b></p><p>So is there really something wrong with his above logic?</p><p>Actually, not necessarily. Judging a person's ability through his history is a common method to recognize people. This logic is actually a basic operation in the field of venture capital.</p><p>This is why important directors of many big companies are usually sought after by angel capital and early-stage venture capital as soon as they announce their start-up.</p><p>A simple logic behind this is that the important directors of big factories are actually front-line fighters. They can hear the sound of guns and have done it in actual combat. Of course, the probability of success in voting for them will be greater.</p><p>So why do you lose a mess when you vote for Cheetah with the same logic?</p><p><b>The answer is the difference between the probability of casting the net in the primary market and the secondary market.</b></p><p>The logic of primary markets such as venture capital is to bet extensively, because we don't know who will be the next ByteDance, the next Pinduoduo, or the next Kuaishou. We would rather make a wrong investment than miss the big fish.</p><p>Its logical pursuit is the overall winning rate. It invests in 50 companies. In the end, as long as 2 companies can finally be successfully listed, it can Cover the failure of the remaining 48 companies, because the two listed companies may bring 100 times the return..</p><p>In terms of the success rate of a single investment, it is extremely low, that is, 96% of them are failures, but this does not affect his overall profit; (Of course, most venture capitalists can't actually achieve this probability, and these funds themselves are losing money)</p><p><b>If individual investors use the same logic to choose stocks, it is simply a nightmare, because the size of your funds basically determines that it is difficult for you to cast a wide net and diversify risks at all.</b></p><p>Looking at the company from the single dimension of \"people\" is licking blood on the tip of the knife, and the failure rate is extremely high.</p><p>Therefore, if an individual investor wants to buy stocks in a certain company, you can have countless logics, but don't just because of this one reason-\"I chose to buy it because I recognize its founder\".</p><p><b>Note that I'm not saying that founders are unimportant to a company, in fact, the importance of founders to a company cannot be overemphasized.</b></p><p>But what I want to say is that it is actually difficult for us to really judge all about a founder from an external perspective. Even for first-class venture capitalists, they can only judge a founder from a few dimensions, and sometimes this judgment is even extremely emotional.</p><p><b>Allen Zhu has publicly reviewed how he missed ByteDance many times-</b></p><p>At that time, ByteDance's theory B found Jinshajiang. After chatting with Zhang Yiming, Zhu Xiaohu intuitively judged that Zhang Yiming was too gentle and did not have the strong aura of Cheng Wei. In the end, he did not vote for ByteDance. Later, his intestines were full of regret.</p><p><b>People are complicated at all times, so don't be too confident in your own judgment.</b></p><p>OK, the above are the four dark logics of China's Internet summarized by Wei Xi. The Internet is a young industry and a changeable industry. It is evolving at an unprecedented speed, and its speed of evolution is so difficult to summarize a universal law.</p><p>The only thing this generation of young people should do is to join and embrace this industry, and feel and grasp the surging pulse of technology in practice.</p><p><b>Remember, don't lie flat.</b></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> source：<a href=\"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/b-pJUuDoniwtpA5Wo8vFvQ\">卫夕指北</a></p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/cea63431ce8de4033f967e80206303c3","relate_stocks":{"399001":"深证成指","399006":"创业板指","000001.SH":"上证指数"},"source_url":"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/b-pJUuDoniwtpA5Wo8vFvQ","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1163908633","content_text":"在中国互联网发展的短短20多年中，早已经历过多轮沧海桑田的变迁。从门户时代到Web2.0，从PC互联网到移动互联网再到产业互联网......在此过程中，行业的从业者和投资者其实一直在总结关于这个行业的逻辑和规律，的确，有很多规律和逻辑被普遍证明是有效的。然而今天我要和大家聊的其实是四条例外的暗逻辑。我之所以称之为暗逻辑，是因为它们的反面通常是正确的，而互联网的有趣之处在于：并没有放之四海而皆准的通用定理，任何一个大的逻辑仔细观察都会有例外；以下就是我总结的中国互联网的四条例外的暗逻辑——一、有护城河的公司不一定是好公司企业的护城河理论最早源于巴菲特的论述，即一个企业有没有其他企业难以逾越的优势。后来帕特·多尔西在《巴菲特的护城河》一书中将护城河总结成四类：1、企业的无形资产，比如品牌、专利等；2、高转换成本；3、成本优势；4、网络效应；通常我们认为拥有以上四类中的一类或多类优势的企业即拥有护城河，护城河当然非常重要，然而一家企业如果拥有护城河它就一定是一家值得投资的好公司吗？答案是不一定。微博就是一个非常典型的例子。今天，大部分人其实都会承认，微博是有护城河的——它作为传播平台，是任何新闻时事的第一发酵阵地；作为娱乐平台，它是粉丝追星第一应援阵地；而作为影响平台，它也坐拥了最广泛最多元的意见领袖；这三个维度几乎垄断的地位从微博一诞生其实就没有被撼动过，不可或缺，无可替代，这毫无疑问是护城河；然而，你今天敢买微博的股票吗？我想至少很多人不敢，根据最新的财报，微博2021年Q1的的月活5.3亿，同比下降4%，日活2.3亿，同比下降5%。尽管有疫情导致去年基数偏高的原因，但微博用户增长乏力已成为一个大概率事件。如果它没有新的第二曲线，它其实很难在接下来与字节跳动、腾讯等强悍公司的竞争中获得更多用户时长。护城河难以护住微博。一个容易理解的逻辑是——护城河可以让你难以很快衰落，但并不保证你继续增长；而对于互联网公司而言，增长永远是最优先的主题、最重要的命门。互联网公司没有一劳永逸，那些最终走向巨头的公司其实都不是一招鲜，而是不断拓展自己的作战半径，持续去抢新的地盘，腾讯如此、阿里如此、字节亦如此。百度抱着搜索这个护城河，当然是一时的王者，在搜索这个赛道至今没有对手，但它边界扩张速度稍微慢一点，就被无情地挤出第一集团了。关于护城河的另一个逻辑是——你在你所在领域的确有护城河，但你的领域本身不再重要了；陌陌、美图、豆瓣、天涯、迅雷.......在各自的领域都有着极高的护城河，它们一直稳坐钓鱼台，从来都没有被竞争对手颠覆过，然而它们各自的领域本身变得不再重要了，护城河还在，城没了。所以，护城河很重要，但迷恋护城河很危险，不要躺在护城河上睡觉。从这个意义上说，其实我还是稍微有点担心B站的，对二次元和年轻用户极强的黏性所构成的内容生产和消费生态当然是它的护城河，坚不可摧，西瓜视频多次强攻也不得要领。但B站能一直只讲这个单一的故事吗？它的市梦率能最终被兑现吗？二、大的赛道不一定是好赛道。“投赛道”是互联网投资领域一个极为重要的流派，它背后的逻辑是——如果一个赛道足够大，那么它一定会诞生优秀的公司，而只要投中了这个赛道的优秀公司，就一定会有长线收益；这个逻辑基本上是对的，或者说它在很大程度上是对的，然而，还是有一些赛道则并不符合这一原则。原因是这些赛道拥挤而缺乏护城河，残酷竞争却看不到终局，从而导致在相当长的一段时间内都让其头部玩家难以获得合理的收益。中国的长视频赛道就是一个典型。毫无疑问，这是一条大的赛道，这一赛道每年的总营收预计超过1000亿，不可谓不大。然而，从2006的先驱优酷算起，这个领域的主要玩家已经连续亏损15年了，比如爱奇艺，2020年全年营收297亿，亏损60亿，这还是在大幅改善之后取得的成绩。注意，很难说这些亏损属于战略型亏损，即便到今天，我们依然看不到这个领域的亏损还要持续多久，行业的终局最终何时尘埃落定。是滴，钱是这个行业唯一的壁垒。《晚点》曾经报道过优酷和腾讯视频当年争夺《如懿传》的过程——本来两家友好约定每家出6亿购买这部剧双平台同步播出的权益，但腾讯回去一思量，断定这部剧可能会像《甄嬛传》一样火遍全网，最终拍板以吓人的13亿天价拿下了这部剧的独播权。这是一个烧钱的游戏，如果仅靠烧钱就能终结战争就好了，这个行业的关键命门还在于——用钱根本买不来用户的忠诚度。有的平台花超过10亿+买下世界杯的转播权，一旦世界杯一过，用户又被其他平台的新鲜大局吸引走了。这个行业的大玩家都在硬抗，尽管大幅亏损，谁也不愿意第一个放弃，因为无法忽略天价的淹没成本，都在等着对手抗不住退出。但三大平台的背后是BAT，每一个都财大气粗，都一致认为这是卡位的战争，每一家都在做着“中国Netflix”的美梦。即便有玩家退出了，由于没有其他高壁垒，总会有虎视眈眈的新玩家参与进来，当年优酷并购土豆想一统江湖但最终很快落空就是一个明证。没错，大的赛道真的不一定是好的赛道，航空业是另一个例子。股神巴菲特关于航空业有两句名言——第一句是：“在莱特兄弟发明的飞机在北卡罗来纳州的小鹰镇第一次试飞成功之前，如果有个资本家击落它的话，那么全球各地的投资者也许会挽回很多的损失。”第二句是：“如果你想成为一名百万富翁，你可以先成为一名千万富翁，然后再买航空股。”那么，为什么在规模上属于巨无霸的航空业并不是一条好赛道呢？原因在于航空业有四大特点：1.固定成本高，负债率高；2.产品同质化，溢价能力弱；3.消费者选择多，品牌忠诚度极低；4.行业周期性强，受宏观经济影响强；正是基于以上几个特点，航空业需要投入大，利润率波动大，竞争激烈难以获得持续长期竞争力，以至于股神巴菲特也多次在航空股上载跟头。所以，衡量一条赛道是否优质，大其实并非唯一指标，增长性和健康度同样重要。三、一个赛道初期领先的公司不一定能长期领先关于这个点，我先从一个例子切入——年初新能源汽车股票最疯狂的时候，一位朋友告诉我说自己把一半的流动资金买了蔚来、理想和小鹏的三家的股票。我问他的投资逻辑，他说——“中国的新能源终将崛起是一个极其确定的事件，而我押宝这三家目前领先的公司，我当然不知道谁会最终胜出，但我的逻辑是，他们一定会有一家会胜出，那么只要这家胜出的公司股价涨三倍，另外两家哪怕归0死掉我也不会亏。”某种意义上，我是同意他的这种观点的，但我还是善意地提醒他，有没有可能中国新能源最终胜出的并不在这三家之内呢？他说，这我倒是没想过，这个可能性比较小吧。我告诉他，的确可能性会相对小，但并不是没有可能，于是我给他讲了短视频赛道的故事——在2015、2016年这个时间点，短视频这个赛道已经开始变得热闹起来，投资人开始判断这是一个成长快、规模大的赛道，但具体应该投哪些团队呢？当时的市场格局是——秒拍领先、美拍来势汹汹，快手还属于一家小公司，没有走入主流视线。于是领先的秒拍就变成了投资界的香饽饽，在那段时间，秒拍的母公司一下科技前后获得了5轮融资，其中最后的E轮融资规模高达5亿美金。在E轮融资的发布会上，创始人韩坤的兴奋溢于言表——“一下科技的视频矩阵，已经成为中国版的Youtube。”然而接下来的故事大家都知道了，一年后抖音快手崛起，秒拍毫无招架之力，被迅速边缘化。一起被拍倒在沙滩上的，还有当年气势如虹的美拍。至此，融资无数的短视频赛道的两个领先产品没有一个笑到了最后。我们稍微理一下背后的逻辑：早期领先的公司由于行业还没有发展成熟，赛道对创业公司能力要求其实是不一样的，这也能从一个侧面来解释为什么秒拍失败了而抖音成功了。这背后的原因当然很多，但其中一个重要的视角是二者的关注重点的差异：秒拍诞生发展的时期中国的4G还没有特别成熟，于是对不同网络环境下如何流程播放的技术要求是很高的，秒拍创始人韩坤其实一直非常得意的是秒拍的基础技术能力。在秒拍诞生前韩坤一直在带领团队开发一个叫Vitamio的多媒体框架系统，是多个互联网公司的视频技术供应商。事实上，新浪微博之所以投资秒拍，一个重要原因就是看重了其可以在很大程度上补齐自己视频技术的短板。所以在韩坤的认知框架里，技术是重要的壁垒，他自然就对其他决定这个赛道真正核心变量关注的少一些。但时间来到2017年，4G成熟、资费下降，技术壁垒被证明其实不堪一击，推荐算法、内容生产生态成为短视频真正的核心竞争力，某种意义上，这场战争的结局从一开始或许就早已注定。所以，投赛道早期领先公司当然没错，但也需要考虑这个赛道的核心逻辑会不会发生变化，变化之后所要求的核心要素现在领先的公司是否真正具备。四、创始人并不完全代表公司的竞争力上面谈到投资领域一个重要流派是投赛道，而另一个重要流派是投人，有的VC看准了一个人，无论他做什么都会投，甚至多次失败之后还会继续投。从概率的角度，投赛道投人这两个流派都有着非常自洽的逻辑，在很多情况下都是对的。然而，人是很复杂的，对人的判断出现偏差的概率其实非常大，更重要的是，人是一个动态的过程，创业是一场马拉松，漫长的过程在不同的阶段对创始人的要求是截然不同的——创业、守业、再增长所要求的能力模型差异非常大，只有凤毛麟角的创业者能快速迭代自己的认知和能力，从而真正带领公司从0到1、从1到N。我举一个例子，我之前的一个上司，从不买美股，但突然有一天买了猎豹移动的股票。我问他为什么买猎豹，他说看好傅盛这个人。他接着补充：傅盛之前在360证明了自己是顶级优秀的产品经理，而带领猎豹独辟蹊径在海外做出清理大师则证明了他的战略能力和执行力，而傅盛还很年轻，即便可能犯错，但长期潜力很大。然而，他这一单买下去，亏得屁滚尿流，亏得怀疑人生。那么是他以上的逻辑真的有问题吗？其实不见得，通过一个人的历史判断一个人的能力是识人常用的方法，这样的逻辑在风险投资领域其实属于基本操作。这也是为什么很多大厂的重要总监只要一宣布创业，通常会受到天使资本和早期风投的追捧。这背后一个简单的逻辑就是，大厂的重要总监们其实是一线的战斗者，他们听得见炮声，真枪实战地做过，投他们成功的概率当然会大一些。那么为什么以同样的逻辑投猎豹就输得一塌糊涂呢？答案是一级市场和二级市场撒网概率的区别。风险投资这类一级市场的逻辑是广泛押宝，因为根本不知道到底谁是下一个字节跳动，下一个拼多多，下一个快手，宁可投错也不能错过大鱼。它的逻辑追求的是整体的胜率，投50家企业，最终只要有2家能最终成功上市，就能Cover掉剩下48家的失败，因为上市的这两家可能带来100倍的回报。而从单笔投资成功率讲，它是极低的，即96%都是失败，但这不影响他整体赚钱；（当然大部分风投其实做不到这样的概率，这些基金本身也是亏钱的）如果个人投资者也用同样的逻辑去选股票，那简直就是噩梦，因为你的资金规模基本决定你很难广撒网，完全做不到分散风险。从“人”这一单一维度去看公司就是在刀尖上舔血、失败率极高。因此，个人投资者如果想要买某个公司的股票，你可以有无数种逻辑，但千万不要只因为这一个理由——“我选择买它是因为我认可它的创始人”。注意，我并不是说创始人对一家公司不重要，事实上，创始人对一家公司的重要性无论如何强调都不过分。但我要说的是，我们其实很难从一个外部视角真正判断一个创始人的全部，即便对于一流的风险投资人而言，他们在判断一个创始人的时候也仅仅只能从几个少数维度进行判断，有时候这种判断甚至是极其感性的。朱啸虎就多次公开检讨自己是如何错过字节跳动的——当时字节跳动B论找到金沙江，朱啸虎当时和张一鸣聊完之后凭直觉判断张一鸣这个人太斯文，没有程维那种强大的气场，最终没有投字节跳动，后来，他肠子都悔青了。人，任何时候都很复杂，不要对自己的判断力太自信。OK，以上就是卫夕总结的中国互联网的四大暗逻辑，互联网是一个年轻的产业，也是一个多变的行业，它在以前所未有的速度进化，它进化的速度以至于很难总结放之四海而皆准的规律。这一代年轻人唯一应该做的就是投身和拥抱这个行业，在实践中感受和把握技术汹涌澎湃的的脉搏。记住，别躺平。","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"399001":0.9,"399006":0.9,"000001.SH":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1343,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0}],"lives":[]}
