The profit surrender ratio for central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has undergone a major adjustment after twelve years. Recently, the Ministry of Finance released the "2026 Central Government Budget" and a supporting document titled "Explanation on the 2026 Central State Capital Operating Budget," announcing the most significant adjustment in recent years to the post-tax profit surrender ratio for wholly state-owned non-financial enterprises.
The document specifies that starting in 2026, central SOEs in resource-intensive and core monopoly sectors—such as tobacco, petroleum and petrochemicals, power, telecommunications, and coal—will uniformly surrender 35% of their after-tax profits. This represents a substantial increase of 10 percentage points compared to the top tier rate of 25% implemented in 2025. Concurrently, the number of contribution tiers has been streamlined from five to four, resulting in clearer classification and more defined policy direction.
This move is not merely a technical adjustment to fiscal revenue and expenditure. It represents a profound restructuring of the state capital收益 distribution mechanism, occurring against a backdrop of tight fiscal balances, increasing pressure on social welfare保障, and rising demand for national strategic investments. It signals a pivotal upgrade in China's state capital management and fiscal coordination capabilities, shifting the priority from "enterprise accumulation first" to "balancing public sharing with strategic support."
The most notable change in this adjustment is the one-time 10-percentage-point increase in the top-tier ratio. It also brings pillar industries of the national economy—such as petroleum, power, telecommunications, and coal—into the highest contribution bracket, aligning them with the standards applied to tobacco companies.
According to the budget explanation, the budgeted revenue for the central state capital operating budget in 2026 is 371.632 billion yuan, a decrease of 18.642 billion yuan, or 4.8%, from the previous year's final accounts. Profit revenue is budgeted at 352.233 billion yuan, down by 22.844 billion yuan, or 6.1%. The collection ratios for after-tax profits of wholly state-owned non-financial enterprises are now categorized into four tiers:
- Tier 1: Tobacco enterprises, along with resource-based enterprises in petroleum/petrochemicals, power, telecommunications, and coal, have a surrender ratio of 35%. Their projected contribution for 2026 is 270.06 billion yuan, a decrease of 5.4%. - Tier 2: Enterprises in generally competitive sectors like non-ferrous and ferrous metal mining, transportation, electronics, trade, and construction have a ratio of 30%, contributing 63.317 billion yuan in 2026, down 7.8%. - Tier 3: This tier includes defense industry enterprises, transformed research institutes, China Post Group, China State Railway Group, Beidahuang Agricultural Reclamation Group, central cultural enterprises, and enterprises affiliated with central government departments. Their ratio is 20%, with a contribution of 17.856 billion yuan, falling 9.8%. - Tier 4: Policy-oriented enterprises are exempt from contributing state capital收益. Wholly state-owned enterprises that meet the criteria for small and micro enterprises and have payable profits of less than 100,000 yuan are also exempt.
Additionally, financial enterprises are projected to contribute 1 billion yuan in profit revenue.
A comparison with the five-tier system used in 2025 clearly shows the shift: previously, the top rate of 25% applied only to tobacco, while resource-based industries were at 20%. The 2026 adjustment not only significantly raises the rates but also brings core sectors vital to the national economy—such as energy, communications, and power—into the highest contribution bracket.
Historically, since its re-establishment in 2007, China's state capital收益 collection system has undergone several rounds of refinement. It started in 2008 with a 10% rate for resource-based enterprises, increased to a five-tier system with a top rate of 25% in 2014, and remained largely stable for years. This one-time hike of 10 percentage points breaks the pattern of gradual, minor adjustments, demonstrating the state's firm resolve to strengthen the统筹 of state capital收益.
The primary reasons are twofold: first, fiscal revenue growth has weakened, necessitating the broadening of revenue channels. Among the government's four main budgetary accounts, the state capital operating budget is the smallest, with its revenue primarily sourced from dividends surrendered by SOEs. Second, the total profits of central SOEs have experienced slow overall growth in recent years, failing to outpace GDP growth for the past two to three years. Given the reality of sluggish aggregate growth, raising the profit surrender ratio and the proportion transferred to the general public budget becomes a necessary measure to achieve related objectives.
From an industry perspective, leading enterprises such as PetroChina, Sinopec, State Grid, and the three major telecom operators, known for their stable profitability and ample cash flow, are the primary targets of this adjustment. A higher surrender ratio means these companies will have less profit available for discretionary use. This pressure is expected to compel them to focus more intensely on lean management, cost reduction, efficiency improvement, and concentrating on their core responsibilities, moving away from extensive expansion and inefficient investment towards high-quality development.
The scale of China's state-owned capital is immense. By the end of 2025, the total assets of central SOEs had surpassed 95 trillion yuan. When combined with the assets of local SOEs, the total assets of China's state-owned enterprises exceeded 400 trillion yuan. In 2025, central SOEs realized total profits of 2.5 trillion yuan, while the total profits for all state-owned enterprises nationwide exceeded 4 trillion yuan, underscoring their role as a stabilizing force in the national economy.
This increase in the contribution ratio presents both pressure and a strong catalyst for central SOEs to deepen reforms and enhance quality and efficiency. For a long time, some SOEs have relied on resource advantages and market position for scale growth, sometimes prioritizing investment over效益 and expansion over returns. This top-tier surrender requirement will fundamentally alter corporate behavior logic, driving a profound transformation in their development models.
At the operational level, SOEs must strengthen cost control, optimize asset-liability structures, and improve capital return rates, while reducing inefficient assets and non-core investments, thereby concentrating resources on core businesses and technological innovation. At the governance level, the higher收益 surrender requirement will push SOEs to improve internal control systems, standardize profit distribution, enhance transparency, and accelerate the establishment of modern enterprise systems with Chinese characteristics.
The policy also clarifies that support for high-quality central SOEs will continue through methods like capital injection and reform incentives, aiming to achieve a "balance between restraint and incentive, and unity between development and sharing."
For listed companies, central SOEs have recently begun emphasizing market value management, with increasing cash dividend ratios becoming an established policy. From this perspective, the Ministry of Finance's move to raise the state capital收益 collection ratio will likely prompt central SOEs to demand higher cash dividends from their listed subsidiaries, consequently altering the dividend distribution policies of these listed companies.
On a broader macro level, this fiscal adjustment sends a clear signal: not all industries warrant equal investment; state capital must be concentrated in the most essential and critical areas. Ultimately, this adjustment aims to guide state capital towards vital industries and key sectors.
This marks the first time in 12 years that the government work report has reiterated the goal of "increasing the proportion of state capital收益 handed over." Subsequently, the Ministry of Finance announced the latest increases, with various types of central SOEs seeing their ratios raised by 10 to 15 percentage points—the largest adjustment in history. This adjustment is expected to directly boost the scale of the state capital operating budget by over 100 billion yuan, effectively helping to cover the general public budget revenue-expenditure gap.
Concurrently, the policy will pressure listed SOEs to increase their dividend payout ratios. Sectors contributing significantly to the budget increase, such as petroleum/petrochemicals, power, and coal, warrant particular attention. Finally, while the current adjustment focuses on central SOEs supervised by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), subsequent policies are expected to extend to financial enterprises and local SOEs. Major state-owned banks and securities companies with high dividend yields may also become focal points.
