In late November, at Shenzhen Bay, the luxury project Shenzhen Bay Yunxi, jointly developed by China Resources Land and China Overseas Land & Investment, made its market debut, raking in 13 billion yuan in a single day. Sky-high penthouses worth hundreds of millions were snapped up by wealthy buyers as if they were bargain vegetables, with the sales center awash in a feverish wave of money that seemed to declare the return of the once-unbeatable "top player in Shenzhen."
However, the revelry of the luxury market cannot conceal China Resources Land's overall decline in Shenzhen. In this former cash cow, China Resources Land continues to lose speed.
According to data from the China Index Academy, China Resources Land ranked seventh in sales performance among Shenzhen real estate enterprises for the first eleven months, with sales of 8.032 billion yuan, a significant gap behind the top-ranked Hongrongyuan (18.255 billion yuan) and the second-ranked China Merchants Shekou (14.396 billion yuan).
Shenzhen Bay Yunxi, co-developed by China Resources Land and China Overseas Land & Investment, is estimated to contribute over 7 billion yuan in sales to China Resources Land based on the current net signing rate of nearly 80%, but this is insufficient to restore it to the throne.
From being the undisputed,断层领先的 "number one in Shenzhen" for three consecutive years from 2021 to 2023, China Resources Land plummeted to fourth place in 2024, and has been hovering between seventh and ninth place in the first eleven months, unable to even break into the top five. It took just over a year for the company to fall from its pedestal.
Once, Shenzhen was China Resources Land's most crucial "cash cow," contributing nearly 20% of the group's performance; now, this proportion has shrunk to less than 5% for the first eleven months of this year.
China Resources Land's poor performance in Shenzhen is primarily due to its own engine stalling.
Over the past decade, China Resources' strategy in Shenzhen involved focusing on "super projects" in core areas (such as China Resources Town) with one hand, while developing in peripheral areas with the other.
For many years, the most desired property for many of Shenzhen's middle class and property speculators was China Resources Town. Since its launch in 2014, the project's prices soared from an initial 47,000 yuan per square meter to 131,000 yuan per square meter. This made every launch of China Resources Town highly sought-after, spawning viral memes like "millionaires squatting in corners."
This also drove the hot sales of the "Runfu" series products in areas outside the core districts. However, starting in 2023, market differentiation led to a cold reception for China Resources' products in peripheral areas, subsequently impacting half of its sales in Shenzhen.
Currently, China Resources Land in Shenzhen relies more heavily on a very few "super projects." While the current Shenzhen Bay Yunxi is selling well, it lacks the staying power of a project like China Resources Town. This project is not only a joint venture with China Overseas (with only a 50% equity stake), but also faces significant future sales pressure – the highly sought-after hundred-million-yuan penthouses are nearly sold out, leaving behind the most fiercely competitive 30-50 million yuan "entry-level products."
A senior executive from a leading real estate company in South China noted that Yunxi's plot ratio of 7.59 far exceeds that of traditional luxury homes. The investment decision-making of the current buyers for Yunxi is also different from those who queued for Runxi; this group will carefully consider spending over 30 million yuan on a unit that is purely residential, lacks sea views, and has an uncertain value outlook.
With projects like CITIC Xinyue Bay, Liantai Super Headquarters Bay, and China Merchants Houhai Xi陆续入市, Shenzhen's luxury home market is set for a fierce battle.
After Shenzhen Bay Yunxi, the supply of "super projects" from China Resources Land in Shenzhen appears somewhat weak. This year, Shenzhen auctioned 12 land parcels, and China Resources Land, jointly with China Merchants Shekou, secured only one plot (with a 50% equity stake). This plot, with a land cost of 59,586 yuan per square meter and a premium rate of 34.81%, was the highest total price land king in Shenzhen this year and is highly likely to be developed into high-end residential property. Beyond this, China Resources gained nothing in the public land market.
With reduced public land acquisitions, China Resources Land's vast urban renewal reserves in Shenzhen have also not been effectively released.
Following the Nanshan Dachong Village urban renewal project, the Hubei urban renewal project, with an estimated total investment exceeding 70 billion yuan, is a crucial card in China Resources Land's hand.
This mega-project, which China Resources began involvement in as early as 2011, once carried the ambition of creating a "world-class urban complex," even planning a 500-meter-high landmark "Hubei Tower."
At the end of November this year, the plan for the core A9 plot of the Hubei project was adjusted, changing the land use from purely commercial to "mixed commercial and residential," and significantly reducing the plot ratio from 13.1 to 8.7. This signifies the abandonment of some commercial ambitions in favor of seeking rapid capital return through residential sales. After all, the original plan was for the project to be delivered by 2027, yet only one plot (A4) has been delivered so far.
The Hubei urban renewal project is also a microcosm of China Resources Land's past business model. Behind its proud positioning as an "urban investment and development operator," its operational assets represent a second growth curve, but also a massive pool of capital沉淀.
Data shows that by the end of 2022, China Resources Land's asset management scale was 358.6 billion yuan; by mid-2025, this figure had reached 483.5 billion yuan. To "lighten the load," China Resources Land has been among the most proactive major developers in advancing asset securitization, but this path is currently not smooth. Since March this year, the China Resources Mixc Business REIT has frequently announced plans to include multiple projects for expansion, but the expansion has not been completed to date.
Under immense pressure from capital沉淀, China Resources can no longer afford to wait.
In late October this year, Xu Rong succeeded Li Xin as the chairman of China Resources Land Holdings (the core debt issuance platform). As early as 2023, this senior executive with a strong government background had already taken on the role of chairman of the Hubei urban renewal project company.
The fact that the group president is personally taking charge of an urban renewal project and managing the purse strings, alongside a portfolio of other responsibilities, makes Xu Rong's current role particularly intriguing.
Data reveals China Resources Land's extreme thirst for capital. In November, breaking a six-year silence, China Resources Land issued $3.9 billion in US dollar bonds; three days later, it raised HK$2 billion by placing shares of China Resources Mixc Lifestyle Services at a discount. By November, China Resources Land's public financing for the year had exceeded 60 billion yuan, hitting a decade-high.
Behind this lies China Resources Land's soaring debt pressure. By mid-2025, its comprehensive borrowing scale had climbed to 281.27 billion yuan, and its net interest-bearing debt ratio surged by 7.3 percentage points within half a year. Debt maturing within one year reached a high of 61.6 billion yuan, while cash on hand shrank, decreasing by 9.8% year-on-year to 120.24 billion yuan.
China Resources Land also needs to maneuver its finances and revitalize its urban renewal projects to weather this winter.
The ten-billion-yuan hot sales of Shenzhen Bay Yunxi are a high-concentration adrenaline shot for China Resources Land. Once the effect wears off, it will still have to face a harsh reality.
The era of the "all-conquering,断层领先"霸主 is gone. How to balance profit realization from core assets with the capital沉淀 of massive urban renewal projects will be a long-term challenge this state-owned enterprise must confront in Shenzhen.
