To The Moon

The internal struggles of DingTalk and the external storm it faces have been brought to light by a lengthy resignation letter, which has also thrust the giant Alibaba back into the spotlight. The explosive 75,000-word insider account, "Inside DingTalk," has rapidly triggered a tsunami within the industry. After reading it, a former vice president of DingTalk expressed "heartache," while Alibaba's top decision-makers issued severe criticism. The outcome was the removal of DingTalk's CEO, Chen Hang (nicknamed Wuzhao), who stepped down quietly. From the viral spread of "Inside DingTalk" on June 4th to Chen Yusen's succession on June 11th, Alibaba temporarily drew a close to this turmoil in just seven days. However, has this storm truly ended? Far from it. This is merely a cross-section; the underlying issues it exposes—high-pressure control, "cold-blooded" management, organizational inefficiency, psychological manipulation, pointless internal competition, and product positioning problems—are what truly warrant reflection.

High-Pressure "Old-School" Management That Drives Employees Mad

What kind of management do modern enterprises truly need? There are many answers, but regardless of the model, Wuzhao undoubtedly ranks among them—as a cautionary tale. The author of "Inside DingTalk," Teng Yaxin (nicknamed Yousu), meticulously detailed in the article the entire process of the DingTalk ONE project from inception, to its peak, and then to its contraction. The high-pressure management style of Wuzhao that was exposed has sparked widespread criticism.

For instance, regarding intense overtime, Yousu wrote that during the closed development period for ONE, workdays typically stretched from 9 a.m. until generally after 11:30 p.m. "The most extreme month, I only had one and a half days off. Excluding that, the average daily working hours reflected by clock-in data were around 15 hours." This serves as a "mirror," reminding people of Alibaba's much-criticized "overtime culture"—the notion that "996 is a blessing." In April 2019, Jack Ma made the controversial statement that "996 is a blessing." Although he later explained his remarks, it is widely known that overtime seems to have become Alibaba's default corporate culture. Judging from Wuzhao's management, the overtime intensity at DingTalk was even more severe, far exceeding the 996 standard.

So, could one avoid overtime? That was impossible. "Tech Planet" cited a story from a former employee about overtime in its report: "One night at 11 p.m., I left the project room to go home. The next morning, during a meeting in the CEO Office on the fifth floor, Wuzhao said in front of everyone, 'You, a product manager, leaving at 11 p.m.? Do I need to buy you a camp bed to put in the project room?'" Wuzhao's "joke" sent chills down the spine.

In fact, since Wuzhao returned last year, he implemented a series of drastic measures. These included mandatory morning and evening meetings, shortened lunch breaks, and single-day weekends... Even harsher were measures like "mandatory Python exams for all employees, reduction of holiday benefits, and salary adjustments for certain job levels." Yousu detailed in the article, "There was also a requirement not to add colleagues on WeChat privately." Given that WeChat has become one of the default essential communication tools, how does one communicate without it?—"Sorry, I only use DingTalk," Yousu stated.

From an employee's perspective, 996 itself is exhausting, but what's even more detestable is making employees work 996 while simultaneously manipulating them into believing they are volunteering for overtime, "calling them brothers to their faces while scheming behind their backs." While employees worked overtime, what was Wuzhao doing? Former employees complained that Wuzhao would check on staff, sometimes even patrolling the building late at night. Overtime was one thing; demanding employees provide a "loyalty pledge" was even more astonishing. Yousu mentioned that during an interview, because she had not set up a DingTalk organization with more than six family members, Wuzhao repeatedly questioned her: Why couldn't she do it? Are there still people in your father's family? Your mother's family? Are your grandparents still alive? Really can't find anyone? Really can't gather six family members who can use DingTalk?

The consequences of long-term, high-intensity overtime are predictable. Yousu wrote in the article, "During the ONE project period, I fainted twice. The second time, a colleague called 120, and an ambulance took me to Zhejiang First Hospital for emergency treatment. The core reasons were likely the excessively long late-night working hours and the confined environment of the project room." Occasional overtime during special periods might be understandable, but if it comes at the cost of health or even life, it's unlikely anyone would sacrifice themselves for a meager salary. In the article "Inside DingTalk," Wuzhao's name appears approximately 73 times, highlighting how inseparable DingTalk's current state is from his management. While personal emotional complaints are superficial, the core reason "Inside DingTalk" caused such an uproar is that it thoroughly exposed DingTalk's fundamental problems, conducting a full-body "health check" on the platform.

DingTalk Overtaken, Wuzhao Plays His "Trump Card"

In the fast-paced, iterative environment of major internet companies, managers like Wuzhao are not uncommon. Why do they act this way? In September 2013, Alibaba also wanted a piece of the social networking pie and launched the mobile instant messaging product "Laiwang," with then-CEO Lu Zhaoxi personally leading the charge. Unfortunately, "Laiwang" failed. Sometimes, the flower you carefully plant doesn't bloom. After the failure, Wuzhao led his team to pivot to the enterprise office software field, which unexpectedly gave birth to DingTalk. It must be said that the initial DingTalk was very successful, and Wuzhao made significant contributions. After DingTalk launched in 2015, features like read/unread receipts, corporate address books, and approval workflows—especially capabilities like clock-in and check-in that perfectly met enterprise management needs during the pandemic—allowed DingTalk to grow rapidly. However, many of these features inherently carry a "strong management" color, leaning more towards the "sender's" perspective, which sowed the seeds for future troubles.

In 2020, Alibaba announced the "Cloud-Ding Integration" strategy. The following year, Wuzhao transferred positions and later left the company. "Back then, the group wanted Cloud-Ding integration, so I had to leave," Wuzhao stated in a media interview in 2023. After leaving Alibaba, Wuzhao founded Two Hydrogen One Oxygen (Hangzhou) Digital Technology Co., Ltd., focusing on cross-border e-commerce, but its development can hardly be called successful. Research on Tianyancha shows that Two Hydrogen One Oxygen completed seed round and angel round financing, with investors including IDG Capital, Shenjian Capital, and Yuanjing Capital. Notably, Yuanjing Capital was founded by Wu Yongming. The relationship between Wuzhao and Wu Yongming goes without saying; as early as 1999 during an internship, Wu Yongming was Wuzhao's superior, and they have known each other for 27 years. Wu Yongming has promoted Wuzhao more than once. According to "Jiaziguangnian," "He left Alibaba twice and returned twice at Wu Yongming's invitation." The first time was in 2010 when Wuzhao joined Taobao, facilitated by Wu Yongming's recommendation. On March 31, 2025, media reports emerged that Alibaba planned to acquire Two Hydrogen One Oxygen, sparking news of Wuzhao's return to Alibaba.

This history is one of the keys to interpreting Wuzhao's implementation of high-pressure management over DingTalk employees. Precisely because of his early success and the circumstances of his recall, Wuzhao felt an even greater urgency to deliver results and prove to the outside world that he was "still capable!" Thus, internally, he enforced strict attendance and management, while externally, he pushed aggressively for AI strategic transformation. A Wuzhao emerged who was desperate for success, adopting an almost fanatical and extreme management approach. This "old-school" management style might be effective in a startup's early stages but is highly likely to backfire during a mature phase. It's crucial to remember that today's DingTalk is no longer a small team with just a few employees but a large organization with thousands of people, where proper organizational management is essential.

Of course, objective factors also exist. During Wuzhao's absence from DingTalk, the platform was overtaken by Feishu in terms of commercialization. According to comprehensive information from public reports by "Pencil Dao" and "Shenwang Tencent News," DingTalk boasts 700 million registered users and 26 million enterprise organizations, but only about 190,000 are paying enterprises, resulting in a payment conversion rate of less than 1%. As of September 2024, DingTalk's software subscription ARR (Annual Recurring Revenue) exceeded $200 million. In contrast, Feishu has only 30 million monthly active users but achieved an ARR of $200 million in 2023, projected to exceed $300 million in 2024. The disparity in their commercialization capabilities is clear. Based on observations, on the user experience side, an increasing number of people report that Feishu's product feedback is superior to DingTalk's. Multiple media outlets have reported that Wuzhao is a "workaholic" with extremely stringent product demands. DingTalk's current turmoil is inseparable from Wuzhao's personal style.

Furthermore, the market environment is also forcing DingTalk to accelerate its transformation. From the news of his return on March 31, 2025, to his resignation on June 11th of this year, Wuzhao served as CEO of DingTalk for 437 days. During this period, DingTalk held three major launch events. In August last year, it introduced DingTalk ONE, AI Tables, AI Note-Taking, AI Search & Ask, and more. In December, it released Agent OS and over 20 new AI products. This March, it unveiled "Wukong." In addition to products, this period also gave rise to the 75,000-word resignation letter, severe criticism from the highest decision-making levels, and a triggered public opinion storm. This is everything Wuzhao created for Alibaba and for DingTalk.

A Shared Dilemma for Office Software?

Looking deeper, as a典型案例, the turmoil erupting at DingTalk has long surpassed its own scope. What deserves even more scrutiny is the awkward situation faced not only by DingTalk but also by collaborative office software like Feishu and WeCom. The first issue is positioning mismatch. DingTalk is the most representative. Features like read/unread receipts and the "DING" function suggest that DingTalk has long leaned towards the "sender" role. In reality, the "recipient" constitutes a vast user base. The result is that functions like read receipts have gradually fostered a "read-receipt anxiety" that employees resist, creating a clear mismatch. In this regard, WeCom faces a similar problem.

The second issue is "ineffective" burden reduction. Why do enterprises use office software? Why is AI functionality continuously embedded during software development? In truth, both enterprise management and recipient employees hope to reduce their workload. However, the reality is awkward. Taking DingTalk as an example, while developing AI is ostensibly for burden reduction, its own employees have been subjected to high-intensity overtime. Blindly charging in one direction has ultimately made employees miserable, triggering the 75,000-word exposé. Extending from DingTalk, do Feishu and WeCom have similar problems? A product that promises AI will help people work efficiently faces a paradox and its greatest crisis if it internally relies on employees' overloaded operation to sustain itself.

The third issue is the impact of AI Agents. Functionally, DingTalk, Feishu, and WeCom all aim to achieve simple, efficient, secure, and intelligent digital work methods, meeting the needs for efficient collaboration. In the past, they indeed provided significant convenience. However, entering the AI era, especially with the rapid application of Agents, office software no longer faces just the incremental problem of "embedding AI into products." The real problem is: when AI Agents can directly call communication tools, approval workflows, and knowledge bases, and can execute tasks on behalf of users, why would users still need to open software step by step, switch pages, and send messages? This is a disruptive impact. In other words, the original product positioning already has issues, coupled with the不明显 AI burden reduction. Where is the way out for collaborative office software under the冲击 of AI Agents in the future?

The new CEO replacing Wuzhao is Chen Yusen, born in 1992. This appointment makes him the youngest business unit CEO at Alibaba. Now, the outside world is questioning whether Chen Yusen can steer DingTalk's carriage in a new direction and find a more precise定位 for the platform. Chen Yusen comes from a technical background. If it's about solving complex technical challenges,相信 Chen Yusen can handle it with ease. However, what DingTalk faces is not a singular technical challenge. Needs are错综复杂, interests are纵横交织, and merely having technical capabilities will likely be insufficient. Removing Wuzhao was Alibaba's "move." So, what might Chen Yusen's "move" be? Expectations for changes in the "new DingTalk" are growing increasingly strong.