The 2025 report cards for life insurance companies are gradually being revealed, starting with the non-listed company segment. Data from 56 non-listed companies that disclosed summaries of their solvency reports shows: They collectively achieved a net profit of 66.602 billion yuan, an increase of 41.730 billion yuan compared to 2024. This is truly astonishing! For small and medium-sized life insurers, which have typically struggled for survival, this figure was -10.409 billion yuan in 2023. The surge from a loss of over ten billion to substantial profitability represents an epic turnaround in the profits of these small and medium-sized life insurers. This strongly echoes the booming performance and continuously rising stock prices of the listed insurance giants since the beginning of last year. Some attribute this net profit figure primarily to Taikang Life Insurance. Indeed, Taikang Life Insurance, with a profit of 27.159 billion yuan, continued to lead as the most profitable non-listed company, accounting for approximately 40.78% of the total net profit of the 56 companies. However, two aspects also demonstrate the improved profitability of the remaining 55 non-listed companies.
First, the number of companies reporting losses decreased. In 2023, 31 companies were loss-making; this number fell to just 16 in 2024, and further reduced to only 10 in 2025. Second, the magnitude of losses has shrunk significantly. In 2025, the company with the largest loss only lost around 500 million yuan, a figure that would have been insignificant compared to previous years. It is worth recalling that in 2023, the top loss-maker incurred a loss of 11.468 billion yuan; in 2024, the top loss was 2.170 billion yuan... Yet, some argue that the profits of life insurers today are not particularly meaningful. This seems plausible, as at various conferences and forums, there are numerous critics who vehemently claim that life insurers' profits are distorted. Taking these 56 companies as an example, roughly 30 use the new accounting standards, while 26 use the old standards. Strictly speaking, they are not entirely comparable. Perhaps this final aggregated data is merely a number, inherently lacking significant meaning. As we have consistently emphasized, large companies, leveraging their substantial existing asset bases, have access to superior investment projects and cost support, making them highly competitive on both the investment and liability sides. Consequently, the entire industry exhibits an extremely pronounced K-shaped development trend. Under this K-shaped divergence, aggregate indicators primarily reflect the situation of the leading companies, and it is even possible that the better the industry-wide indicators appear, the more extreme the internal divergence becomes. A typical example is that three more companies—Xintai Life Insurance, Ruihua Health Insurance, and Dingcheng Life Insurance—did not disclose solvency report summaries in 2025... Furthermore, companies failing to meet solvency standards have reappeared: Changsheng Life Insurance's comprehensive solvency adequacy ratio is only 79.70%, below the 100% requirement.
Therefore, it is difficult to assert that the profit figure of 66.602 billion yuan accurately reflects the current operational conditions of the life insurance industry. 1 -Insurance Today- The Liability Side Emerges from the Gloom Double-digit premium growth continues 'Sales suspension' speculation and bancassurance play pivotal roles The 56 non-listed companies collectively achieved premium income of 1,197.635 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of +11.34%. The previous value, which was the growth rate for 2024, was 12.95%. Excluding Taikang, which accounts for about 20% of the total, the remaining 55 companies achieved premium income of 958.971 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of +13.18%, compared to a previous value of 13.11%. Another set of data shows that the overall growth rate for the life insurance industry was approximately 9.11%. By comparison, this growth rate for non-listed insurers appears quite respectable. The reasons behind this are partly attributable to the wave of 'sales suspension' speculation around August 31st. However, the bancassurance channel is likely the more significant factor. The bancassurance channel in 2025 was characterized by a low start followed by a strong finish. In the first quarter, new bancassurance premiums fell by -20% year-on-year, performing as poorly as the agency channel. But quickly, with major companies and joint-venture/foreign insurers stepping up efforts, by the end of June, the year-on-year growth rate for new bancassurance premiums had turned positive, reaching +2%. At that same time, new premiums from the agency channel were down -14.59% year-on-year. After the 'sales suspension' speculation period ended on August 31st, data from the end of September showed that the year-on-year growth rate for new bancassurance premiums had reached 17.84%. In contrast, while the growth rate for new agency premiums had improved, it remained in negative territory: -6.04%. Although the agency channel, bolstered by substantial renewal premiums, still accounted for 47.61% of total premiums, this year's developments saw the bancassurance channel's share reach 41.50%, and its total premium growth rate was a full 10 percentage points higher than that of the agency channel. Among the non-listed insurers, it is also evident that following Taikang Life, the next highest earners are almost exclusively bank-affiliated insurers. Examples include China Post Life Insurance (159.166 billion yuan, +17.95%), ICBC-AXA Life Insurance (50.864 billion yuan, +11.04%), CCB Life Insurance (49.269 billion yuan, +20.18%), and ABC Life Insurance (46.238 billion yuan, +24.99%). Further down the list are several joint-venture and foreign companies that have been active in the bancassurance channel in recent years. Examples include Zhongyi Life Insurance (42.485 billion yuan, +31.19%), Manulife-Sinochem (37.654 billion yuan, +23.78%), and Sino-US United MetLife (36.260 billion yuan, +39.63%). This trend is similarly reflected among listed companies. Although currently only CPIC Life, New China Life, and China Life (with total premiums exceeding 700 billion yuan) have disclosed their 2025 premium figures, data from mid-2025 and the high growth seen in the bancassurance channel during the 2026 'good start' period indicate that bancassurance is a major driver for listed insurers as well. Looking at CPIC Life, which has disclosed its 2025 premium income structure: Although its bancassurance channel premium of 56.528 billion yuan still lags behind the agency channel's 182.751 billion yuan, the 42.0% premium growth, adding 23.742 billion yuan, is undoubtedly far stronger than the agency channel's -0.7% growth, which contributed a mere 1.279 billion yuan and acted as a drag.
2 -Insurance Today- The Closely Watched Investment Sector Remains Hot 35 companies see improved investment yields, median reaches 4.62% But the 3-year average declines for 40 companies Since September 2024, following the introduction of a series of policies supporting long-term capital market entry, the A-share market rebounded sharply, with the CSI 300 Index rising by 14.68% in 2024 and 17.66% in 2025. Some insurance companies profited handsomely, with investment income even becoming a major contributor to profits. The significant performance pre-announcements (often around 200% growth) from several listed insurers at the beginning of 2025 were largely driven by the market surge in the fourth quarter of 2024. This, of course, is reflected in investment yield figures, which directly impact current period profits. Returning to these 56 companies. Data shows that the median investment yield for these companies was approximately 3.70% in 2023, about 4.35% in 2024, and reached 4.62% in 2025. Looking at individual companies, 35 companies saw their investment yields improve compared to the previous year, 19 companies achieved investment yields exceeding 5.0%, and 51 companies were above the 3.5% level. Among them, King Dragon Life Insurance led with an investment yield of 10.85%. It was followed by Xiaokang Life Insurance, whose investment yield, although down 0.7 percentage points from the previous year, still reached a high 8.17%. From a liability perspective, even if a company is small, having strong investment capabilities might represent an alternative development strategy in the short term.
However, the picture for the average investment yield over the past three years is different: the median for the 56 companies declined by 0.2 percentage points, with 40 companies showing a year-on-year decrease. For the three-year average yield, a significant decline is certainly problematic, but a substantial increase isn't necessarily ideal either. As the saying goes, the weather is unpredictable. For investments, sustained outperformance is not simple. The key is that volatility should not be too high. Data shows that for 30 companies, the fluctuation in the disclosed three-year average investment yield over the 2024-2025 period was within ±0.5 percentage points. This also implies that 26 companies experienced volatility exceeding this level. Examples include Peking University Founder Group (-2.28 ppts), Xiaokang (+2.17 ppts), Haibao (-1.90 ppts), and Huahui (-1.67 ppts). However, fluctuations in the three-year average might also be influenced by other factors. For instance, Aviva-COFCO Life Insurance's investment yield was 7.54% in 2024, ranking second among the 56 companies, but it fell by 3.9 percentage points year-on-year in 2025 to just 3.69%, dropping to 51st place. Yet, its three-year average investment yield actually increased by 0.53 percentage points. This might be related to the company switching its accounting standards in 2025.
3 -Insurance Today- The Alarming Reality 51 companies report negative growth in comprehensive investment yield Median is only 2.68% Compounded by a high base effect, it plummets by 5.7 percentage points The story for comprehensive investment yield is entirely different. Data from the 56 companies reveals: Four companies, including Sino-Dutch Life Insurance (-2.26%), Huahui Life Insurance (-1.49%), Tongfang Global Life Insurance (-1.13%), and Deutsche BSH Life Insurance (-0.85%), reported negative comprehensive investment yields. Only 5 companies showed positive growth in this metric, while 51 reported negative growth. Thirty-one companies experienced a year-on-year decline exceeding 5 percentage points, with 11 of those seeing declines over 10 percentage points. Tongfang Global saw a drop of 19.1 ppts, Sino-Dutch Life fell by 16.7 ppts, and companies like Heng An Standard Life, Fosun United Health, Deutsche BSH Life, Aviva-COFCO Life, Huatai Life Insurance, China Merchants Life, Skandia-BSAM Life, Lujiazui International, and China Post Life all saw declines exceeding 10 percentage points.
On the surface, the high base from 2024 appears to be one reason for such significant declines: the median was 3.80% in 2023, surged to 8.42% in 2024, and then fell to 2.68% in 2025. In 2024, 20 companies had comprehensive investment yields exceeding 10%, while only 4 were below 5%. It's worth noting that this also resulted in exceptionally high disclosed three-year average comprehensive investment yields for the past two years.
There are two possible explanations for these high comprehensive investment yields. One is a market-related explanation. At that time, government bond yields were continuously declining, corresponding to rising bond prices. Insurers holding these bonds naturally profited significantly. Financial assets like government bonds are typically measured at fair value through other comprehensive income (FVOCI), which naturally inflated the comprehensive investment yield. The second is a technical explanation related to accounting standards. As is well known, a major event in recent years has been the transition from old to new accounting standards. Under the old standards, Held-to-Maturity (HTM) investments were measured at amortized cost, making them minimally affected by market interest rate fluctuations. Many bonds were classified here. However, the new standards set stricter criteria for assets measured at amortized cost, requiring them to pass both the contractual cash flow characteristics test and the business model test. Coupled with insurers' need to consider liability hedging, this led to a reduction in the scale of such assets, thereby increasing the sensitivity of life insurers' assets to interest rate changes. Furthermore, in a low-interest-rate environment, most insurers reclassified their existing such assets to financial assets at FVOCI. But some companies first reclassified HTM assets to Available-for-Sale (AFS) financial assets under the old standards, which released the difference between fair value and book value into other comprehensive income, thus boosting the comprehensive investment yield. In the subsequent period, the comprehensive investment yield often declines rapidly. Thus, the rebound in government bond yields in 2025 meant falling bond prices, which dragged down the comprehensive investment yield. Combined with the 'normalization' following the technical factors, the substantial declines in comprehensive investment yield for companies like Tongfang Global and Sino-Dutch Life in 2025 become understandable. In fact, some companies provided explanations for this in their Q4 solvency report summaries. Deutsche BSH Life Insurance (-0.85%, -13.1 ppts) stated, "Comprehensive investment income in the third quarter was primarily affected by the short-term rise in interest rates. The company holds interest rate bonds with a relatively long average duration, resulting in high interest rate sensitivity." China Post Life Insurance (0.74%, -10.3 ppts) explained, "Based on the principle of asset-liability matching and guided by the long-term stability of the investment portfolio, the company has invested a certain proportion in long-term bonds as part of its strategic asset allocation. After excluding the fair value changes of such assets for the current year, the company's comprehensive investment yield for 2025 is 3.91%. This adjusted comprehensive yield better reflects the strategic intent of the company's asset-liability management and is more meaningful for reference."
4 -Insurance Today- The Most Frightening Issue 36 companies see net assets decline by over 65 billion yuan This is a fatal crisis that the beauty of liabilities, investments, and profits cannot conceal If, in a prolonged low-interest-rate environment, the correction in bond prices merely signals the end of the one-sided bond market rally, the market will likely enter a period of range-bound fluctuations in the near future. In fact, as explained by Deutsche BSH and China Post Life, when viewed from a strategic perspective, the volatility in comprehensive investment yield might be accepted without undue alarm. Based on indications from the investment side, liability side, and income statements, it seems the life insurance industry is on the verge of emerging from the adjustment period that began after 2020. However, feeling excessively warm during a cold spell should raise concerns about severe hypothermia, especially for small and medium-sized companies. Profits can be deceptive, but net assets are far less so. Data from the 56 companies shows that after a year of effort in 2025, their total net assets decreased by 2.1% to 432.703 billion yuan.
For comparison, consider a report: According to incomplete statistics, a total of 13 life insurers (including Ping An and Taikang Pension) increased their capital by 38.7 billion yuan in 2025. However, as this discussion concerns non-listed companies, even excluding Ping An's approximately 20 billion yuan, there was still an injection of about 18.7 billion yuan. If this 18.7 billion yuan is excluded, the net assets of these 56 companies would have experienced negative growth of 6.4%. Among these 56 companies, 36 saw their net assets decline, with a total of 65.362 billion yuan in net assets effectively evaporating. In fact, at the beginning of 2025, many companies, particularly bank-affiliated insurers, were already grappling with net asset challenges. Data from the end of 2024 showed that companies like China Post Life, ICBC-AXA Life, ABC Life, CCB Life, and Zhongyi Life were facing net asset shrinkage of 40% or even greater magnitudes. For example, ICBC-AXA Life's net assets fell from 20.195 billion yuan to 13.309 billion yuan; China Post Life and ABC Life dropped from 11.342 billion yuan and 11.372 billion yuan to 6.421 billion yuan and 5.590 billion yuan, respectively; CCB Life lost over 10 billion, falling from 14.803 billion yuan to 4.243 billion yuan. One year later, these companies have either received capital injections or seen their net assets improve through profit accumulation. Notably, ICBC-AXA Life's net assets recovered to 20.831 billion yuan, China Post Life's reached 26.480 billion yuan, and CCB Life saw a slight increase of about 1.8 billion yuan to approximately 6.046 billion yuan. ABC Life remained largely unchanged at 5.680 billion yuan. However, compared to BOC Samsung Life and Sino-Dutch Life, it is far more fortunate. BOC Samsung Life, with total assets of 140 billion yuan, reported a net profit of 708 million yuan for 2025, but its net assets stood at a mere 670 million yuan, having shrunk by over 5 billion yuan during the year. Sino-Dutch Life reported a net profit of 740 million yuan for 2025. Although, unlike BOC Samsung, its annual profit did not exceed its net asset value, its net assets plummeted by 77% in one year, from 7.082 billion yuan to 1.608 billion yuan, which is telling enough. Companies reporting encouraging performance figures while their corporate substance dwindles are likely not limited to these few examples. At a closed-door meeting late last year, a senior executive from one insurer remarked, "What's the point of bustling about with great fanfare, only to discover eventually that the company itself is disappearing?" In the past, such a scenario seemed utterly impossible. But now, it has become the primary challenge that some companies must confront in 2026. To sound an alarm, this could indeed be considered a fatal crisis.
