To The Moon

$UOB(U11.SI)$   UOB’s 1.25x P/B discount: Justified caution or an overextended bear case? Among Singapore’s Big Three banks, UOB currently trades at the lowest absolute price-to-book ratio at 1.25x. While a discount to peers like DBS is fundamentally justified by UOB's lower historical return on equity (ROE), working backward through a Reverse P/B model reveals a striking mathematical mismatch.At a current price of ~S$37.30, the market is implicitly pricing UOB as if its long-run sustainable ROE will settle at 7.63%. To put that into perspective, that is roughly 400 basis points below its five-year average of 11.5%, and well under the 10.6% normalised ROE it’s tracking even after factoring in heavy macro provisioning buffers. If you l

When we find a stock we like, our brains naturally look for data that confirms our thesis—rising revenues, expanding margins, or secular tailwinds. But the real risk in investing isn't failing to see the upside; it's failing to stress-test what happens when things go wrong. A proper bear case isn't just a list of generic risks copied from an annual report's "Risk Factors" section. It’s a structural exercise in finding the breaking point of a business model. It means asking specific, uncomfortable questions: What happens to cash flow if a major customer accounts for 40% of revenue and walks away? If inflation spikes input costs, can this company actually pass those costs on, or do margins collapse? By forcing yourself to build a rigorous counter-thesis and identifying the exact triggers tha

Most retail investors try to value manufacturing companies using standard P/E multiples or free cash flow yield, but treating a capital-intensive factory business like a software company is a quick way to misprice the stock. In manufacturing, the income statement can be incredibly deceptive. A company might look highly profitable on paper, but if they are entering a heavy capital expenditure (CapEx) cycle to upgrade machinery or expand cleanrooms, that accounting profit won't translate into actual cash for shareholders. To find the true intrinsic value, you have to look at the relationship between capacity utilization, inventory turnover, and maintenance vs. growth CapEx. If a plant is running at only 60% capacity, its fixed-cost drag will quietly eat away at margins long before it shows u

The debate over DBS, OCBC, and UOB usually dissolves into a race to see who has the highest NIM or the juiciest dividend yield this quarter, but looking at those ratios in isolation misses the structural trade-offs each management team is making. A high Net Interest Margin (NIM) isn't inherently a win if it's being driven by riskier regional credit exposure that spikes non-performing loans later. Similarly, a massive CET1 ratio looks great on a flyer for safety, but if that excess capital isn't being aggressively deployed or paid out, it acts as a structural drag on Return on Equity (ROE) and prevents the stock from rerating. Understanding how these three metrics actually push and pull against each other completely changes how you value the Big Three, especially as we transition into a shi

$Frencken(E28.SI)$   Is the market over-extending on the Frencken (E28) AI narrative? Just did a deep dive into Frencken’s FY2025 annual report and the numbers tell a different story than the stock price. While the AI semiconductor tailwind is real, the market seems to be pricing in an 8% EBIT margin—a level they haven’t hit in years. Plus, there’s a massive free cash flow nuance involving a "temporary" working capital inflow that most people are overlooking. I've mapped out a reverse DCF showing what needs to go right just to justify the current $3+ price. It’s a lot more than just "AI growth." Check out the full breakdown here: www.stockbutts.com/e28-frencken-may-2026/

$OCBC Bank(O39.SI)$   The "OCBC Capital Trapped" Hook OCBC (O39) at near record highs: Massive margin of safety, or structural drag on ROE? Body: Everyone loves OCBC for its bulletproof balance sheet and fortress-like CET1 ratio, but there's an uncomfortable valuation question brewing as the stock edges toward its 52-week highs. Having that much excess capital is great for safety, but it acts as a massive anchor on ROE if management can't find a way to deploy it aggressively via higher payouts or major M&A. I just did a reverse P/B and DCF analysis on OCBC's latest numbers to see exactly what the market is pricing in. If net interest margins (NIM) soften through the rest of 2026, the hurdle to justify this current valuation become

$DBS(D05.SI)$   DBS (D05) at ??: Safe haven or "priced for perfection"? Everyone is cheering DBS hitting new 52-week highs on the back of record wealth management fees and that 17% ROE. But if you look under the hood of the FY2025 results, there's a growing tension the market is ignoring. My reverse P/B analysis shows the market is now pricing in a sustained ROE that DBS has historically struggled to maintain when interest rates ease. While the dividend yield looks juicy, my DCF suggests the "fair value" might actually be closer to $??—implying we are trading at a premium with very little margin for error. Is the capital return plan enough to offset a potential NIM compression in 2026? Read the full "Reverse P/B" breakdown here: www.s