To The Moon

Wall Street increasingly has two versions of NextEra Energy. The bull sees an AI-power compounder: America needs enormous quantities of electricity, grid connections take years, and NextEra owns one of the deepest development pipelines in the industry. The bear sees something less glamorous: a heavily indebted utility spending almost $30 billion a year on capital projects while issuing debt and shares to keep the machine moving. I think both arguments deserve attention. The investment question is which version ultimately earns the higher valuation. At $76.83, $NextEra(NEE)$ is neither a nuclear momentum trade nor a sleepy income utility. It is increasingly a wager on whether the scarce asset in American power is not generation technology itself, bu

AI can move at software speed. Electricity cannot. Investors are paying handsomely for the difference. At $437.28, Eaton Corporation presents me with an unusual problem. I think the business is better than it has ever been. I am considerably less convinced the shares are. Eaton has transformed itself from a diversified industrial manufacturer into a critical infrastructure supplier behind AI data centres, electrification, utility investment and factory reshoring. Revenue has climbed from $19.6 billion in 2021 to $30.0 billion trailing twelve months, while free cash flow has risen from $1.59 billion to $3.93 billion. Wall Street has noticed. At roughly 29x forward earnings, investors are no longer valuing Eaton as an ordinary industrial company. They are paying what I call the gridlock prem

Axcelis Technologies is an awkward stock to analyse — which is precisely why I find it interesting. The easy story says Axcelis is a semiconductor-equipment company whose silicon-carbide boom collided with slowing electric-vehicle investment and Chinese overcapacity. Revenue peaked at $1.13 billion in 2023, slipped to $1.02 billion in 2024 and fell again to $839 million in 2025. Trailing twelve-month revenue has recovered slightly to $866 million, but earnings have continued south. That looks suspiciously like a cyclical peak. Yet underneath it, the business mix is changing. Memory is returning, AI infrastructure is creating demand for decidedly unglamorous power-management chips, aftermarket revenue is expanding, and $Axcelis(ACLS)$ is attempting

At roughly 74 times sales and 100 times forward earnings, Palantir has become less a conventional software valuation exercise than a referendum on how valuable the operating layer of enterprise AI could eventually become. Wall Street rarely agrees on anything, but Palantir Technologies has achieved something special: it has given analysts an unusually large number of ways to disagree. At $189.67, $Palantir Technologies Inc.(PLTR)$ carries a market capitalisation of approximately $456 billion. Analyst targets stretch from $80 to $255, while the average sits at $195.57. That is not ordinary forecasting noise. Investors are effectively valuing two different companies wearing the same ticker. One is an extraordinarily profitable AI platform entering a

The scary number isn't the important one Moderna is supposedly caught between collapsing COVID revenues and a $3 billion cash-burning machine. That makes a wonderfully dramatic investment thesis. It is also slightly misleading. At $198.88, $Moderna, Inc.(MRNA)$ carries a market capitalisation of roughly $79.4 billion despite generating just $2.23 billion of trailing revenue. Investors are therefore paying approximately 35.6 times trailing sales for a company currently producing negative gross profit. That is an extraordinary multiple. But Moderna is increasingly being valued neither as a vaccine manufacturer nor as a conventional loss-making biotech. The market is assigning substantial value to something harder to measure: whether its mRNA platfor

America’s favourite three-digit number became an extraordinary business. Then extraordinary pricing gave customers a reason to find another number. Fair Isaac Corporation has spent decades achieving something most companies can only dream about: becoming so deeply embedded in an industry that buying its product feels less like a commercial decision and more like paying a tax. The FICO score sits inside the plumbing of American credit. Banks understand it, regulators recognise it, investors model around it and mortgage infrastructure has been built around it. That institutional entrenchment created formidable pricing power. But I think FICO now presents investors with a fascinating paradox. Its greatest competitive advantage may also have created its greatest threat. By monetising its indis

GE’s $210 billion order book looks enormous. I think the more interesting number is the $179 billion hiding inside it. GE Aerospace has developed a curious habit: beat expectations, raise guidance — and watch the shares fall anyway. That is not necessarily irrational. It tells me the argument around GE has changed. Investors are no longer asking whether the business is improving. They are asking whether it can improve fast enough to justify a valuation already anticipating considerable success. That makes GE particularly interesting now. The company is also becoming something different from a conventional aerospace manufacturer. Engines provide the spectacle, but increasingly the installed fleet provides the economics. The central investment question is therefore less about how many engine

When a Utility Stops Behaving Like One Wall Street cannot seem to decide what Constellation Energy is. That may be precisely why the opportunity — and the danger — is so interesting. Is Constellation Energy a utility deserving a utility multiple? A merchant power generator riding an unusually favourable electricity cycle? Or has artificial intelligence transformed its nuclear fleet into scarce digital infrastructure with cooling towers? I think all three descriptions contain some truth. The mistake is assuming investors must choose only one. Wall Street cannot decide which game Constellation is playing At $262.11, $Constellation Energy Corp(CEG)$ has fallen dramatically from its 52-week high of $412.70 despite raising 2026 adjusted operating EPS gu

The Treasury Operation That Ate the Software Company At $153.92 on 18 September 2026, $Strategy(MSTR)$ carries a market capitalisation of $59.14 billion against trailing revenue of just $498.35 million. That gap is not necessarily a problem; it is the point. Investors are valuing Strategy less as a software company and more as a capital-markets vehicle built around Bitcoin, with digital assets carried at $49.67 billion at 30 June. I find it fascinating in the way a Rube Goldberg machine is fascinating: ingenious, elegant and slightly alarming once you count how many things need to go right. The question is whether it keeps creating value for common shareholders once the cost of maintaining it is properly counted. The software company became a mach

Target has staged the sort of share-price recovery that makes value investors sit up — and then check their wallets. At $154.68, the stock is up 71.9% from its fiscal 2026 year-end level. Yet the analyst consensus remains Hold, with an average price target of $162.76 — just 5.22% above the current price. That is a fascinating disconnect. The market has already rewarded $Target(TGT)$ handsomely for its recovery, but analysts are not exactly throwing confetti. The question is whether the next leg comes from a genuine improvement in the economics of the business, or whether investors have already captured much of the easy rebound. The valuation gap with Walmart makes the debate even more interesting. Target trades at roughly 16.7 times forward earning